Aretha Elizabeth Bennett v. Theola Pitts

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Aretha Elizabeth Bennett, Appellant,

v.

Theola Pitts and Colleton County School District,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000827

Appeal From Colleton County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-104
Submitted February 1, 2023 – Filed March 15, 2023

AFFIRMED

William Levern Pyatt, of Pyatt Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Peden Brown McLeod, Jr., of McLeod Fraser & Cone
LLC, of Walterboro, for Respondent Colleton County
School District.

Margie Bright Matthews, of Bright Matthews Law Firm,
LLC, of Walterboro, for Respondent Theola Pitts.
PER CURIAM: Aretha Elizabeth Bennett appeals the circuit court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Colleton County School District and Theola Pitts,
who was an employee of Colleton County School District. On appeal, Bennett
argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) the statute
of limitations should have been equitably tolled due to her efforts to resolve the
matter outside of court and (2) the statute of limitations should have been extended
to three years under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the Act) because she filed
a verified claim for damages. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in declining to equitably toll the statute of
limitations because Bennett failed to establish sufficient facts to justify the use of
equitable tolling. See S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 399 S.C. 483, 490, 732
S.E.2d 205, 208-09 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When reviewing the grant of a summary
judgment motion, [an appellate] court applies the same standard that governs the
[circuit] court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP; summary judgment is proper when there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."); Weston v. Kim's Dollar Store, 399 S.C. 303, 308,
731 S.E.2d 864, 866 (2012) ("In determining whether summary judgment is
proper, the court must construe all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising
from the evidence against the moving party." (quoting Byers v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 310 S.C. 5, 7, 425 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1992))); Hooper v. Ebenezer Sr. Servs. &
Rehab. Ctr., 386 S.C. 108, 115, 687 S.E.2d 29, 32 (2009) ("'Tolling' refers to
suspending or stopping the running of a statute of limitations; it is analogous to a
clock stopping, then restarting." (quoting 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions
§ 169 (2000))); id. (holding equitable tolling may be applied "[i]n order to serve
the ends of justice where technical forfeitures would unjustifiably prevent a trial on
the merits" (quoting 54 C. J. S. Limitations of Actions § 115 (2005))); id. ("The
party claiming the statute of limitations should be tolled bears the burden of
establishing sufficient facts to justify its use."); id. at 116, 687 S.E.2d at 32 ("It has
been observed that '[e]quitable tolling typically applies in cases where a litigant
was prevented from filing suit because of an extraordinary event beyond his or her
control.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 91 P.3d 58,
66 (N.M. 2004))).

2. We hold the circuit court did not err in finding the Act's two-year statute of
limitations barred Bennett's claim because she failed to file a verified claim. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-8-10 (2005) ("[A]ny action brought pursuant to [the Act] is
forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the
loss was or should have been discovered; provided, that if the claimant first filed a
[verified] claim pursuant to this chapter then the action for damages based upon the
same occurrence is forever barred unless the action is commenced within three
years of the date the loss was or should have been discovered."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-78-30(b) (2005) (defining a claim as "any written demand against the State of
South Carolina or a political subdivision for money only, on account of loss,
caused by the tort of any employee of the State or a political subdivision while
acting within the scope of his official duty"); Searcy v. S.C. Dep't of Educ., Transp.
Div., 303 S.C. 544, 547, 402 S.E.2d 486, 488 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining the
"claim" mentioned throughout the Act can only refer to the "verified claim"
described in section 15-78-80 (2005 & Supp. 2022) of the South Carolina Code);
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-80(a) (stating a verified claim for damages should set
"forth the circumstances which brought about the loss, the extent of the loss, the
time and place the loss occurred, the names of all persons involved if known, and
the amount of the loss sustained"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-80(d) ("If filed, the
[verified] claim must be received within one year after the loss was or should have
been discovered."); Pollard v. Cnty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 400, 444 S.E.2d
534, 536 (Ct. App. 1994) ("To satisfy the verification requirement, the claim must
be under oath: 'Without an oath, [a] document [cannot] be considered as having
been verified.'" (first alteration in original) (quoting Searcy, 303 S.C. at 547, 402
S.E.2d at 488)).

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., GEATHERS, J., and HILL, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.