Mark Mitchell v. Donnita Harmon

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Mark B. Mitchell and Celine C. Mitchell, Plaintiffs,

v.

Ronald Joseph Albertelli and Mary Frances Snelling,
Trustees of the Mary Frances Snelling Living Trust;
Donnita C. Harmon and Jimmie Phillip Harmon,
Defendants,

Of Whom Mark B. Mitchell, Celine C. Mitchell, Ronald
Joseph Albertelli, and Mary Frances Snelling are the
Respondents,

And

Donnita Harmon and Jimmie Harmon are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000236

Appeal From Aiken County
M. Anderson Griffith, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-113
Submitted March 1, 2023 – Filed March 22, 2023

AFFIRMED
John W Harte, of John W Harte Attorney At Law, LLC,
of Aiken, for Appellants.

Bradley A. Brodie, of Smith, Massey, Brodie, Guynn &
Mayes, LLC, of Aiken, for Respondents Ronald Joseph
Albertelli and Mary Frances Snelling.

Woodrow Grady Jordan, of Smith Jordan, P.A, of Easley,
for Respondents Mark B. Mitchell and Celine C.
Mitchell.

PER CURIAM: In this dispute involving competing claims for the right to
purchase a parcel of real estate in Aiken County, Donnita and Jimmie Harmon
(collectively, the Harmons) appeal an order of the Aiken County Master-in-Equity
granting a request by Mark and Celine Mitchell (collectively, the Mitchells) for
specific performance of their contract to purchase the subject property from Ronald
Joseph Albertelli and Mary Frances Snelling, Trustees of the Mary Frances
Snelling Living Trust (collectively, the Trust). On appeal, the Harmons argue the
master erred in ruling their right of first refusal to purchase the subject property
was unenforceable. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

The master correctly found the Harmons' right of first refusal to purchase the
subject property was unenforceable because the contractual language purportedly
granting them this right did not specify any time limit within which the Harmons
were to exercise this right once they had been informed of the Trust's intention to
sell the property to the Mitchells. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of specific
performance to the Mitchells. See Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc., ___ S.C. ___, ___,
882 S.E.2d 763, 769 (2023) (noting "courts often examine the time period within
which [a right of first refusal] can be exercised after the owner decides to sell"
because "[a]lienation can be substantially restrained when the holder of the right
has an extended time to decide whether he will purchase the property"); id. at
____, 882 S.E.2d at 769 (indicating the complete absence of provisions delineating
the procedural requirements the appellant was to follow to exercise a right of first
refusal—including a limitation on the time within which he could exercise this
right—supported the conclusion that the right was an unreasonable restraint on
alienation).
AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J, and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.