Skip Hoagland v. John Tecklenburg

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Skip Hoagland, Appellant,

v.

John Tecklenburg, in his official capacity, the City of
Charleston, and the City of Charleston Police
Department, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000936

Appeal From Charleston County
Bentley Price, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-117
Submitted November 1, 2022 – Filed March 22, 2023

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED

Taylor Meriwether Smith, IV, of Harrison, Radeker &
Smith, P.A., of Columbia, for Appellant.

Christopher Thomas Dorsel, of Bringardner Injury Law
Firm, LLC, of Charleston, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Skip Hoagland appeals the dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
SCRCP, of his complaint against the City of Charleston, the City of Charleston
Police Department, and John Tecklenburg, in his official capacity as Mayor of the
City of Charleston (the Mayor) (collectively, Respondents). On appeal, Hoagland
argues the circuit court erred by (1) dismissing his causes of action for a violation
of the South Carolina Constitution and civil conspiracy; (2) dismissing his
complaint with prejudice; and (3) failing to address his fourth cause of action,
which sought a declaratory judgment on whether a Charleston City Ordinance,
section 2-28 of the Charleston, South Carolina Code (2007), was unconstitutionally
vague. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 1

Initially, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Hoagland, we hold
the circuit court did not err by finding Hoagland failed to state a claim for civil
conspiracy. The Mayor and the City of Charleston Police Department are agents
of the same government entity as the remaining Respondent—the City of
Charleston—thus, Respondents cannot be legally found to have conspired together
unless they were acting outside the scope of their duties, which Hoagland has not
alleged. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Hoagland's cause
of action for civil conspiracy. 2 See Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d
431, 433 (2009) ("On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), [SCRCP,] an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the
trial court."); Doe v. Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007)
(stating that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper "[i]f the facts alleged and
inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, [when] viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, would [not] entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory");
Pye v. Est. of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 566-67, 633 S.E.2d 505, 511 (2006) ("The
elements of a civil conspiracy in South Carolina are (1) the combination of two or
more people, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes special
damages."), overruled by Paradis v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., 433 S.C. 562,
577, 861 S.E.2d 774, 781 (2021) (providing that any cases on appeal that have
already been tried under the framework that required a plaintiff to plead special
damages shall be decided using that analysis); McMillan v. Oconee Mem'l Hosp.,
Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886-87 (2006) ("[A] civil conspiracy
cannot exist when the alleged acts arise in the context of a principal-agent

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
2
Further, we note Hoagland did not appeal the circuit court's finding his cause of
action pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, sections 30-4-10 to -165 of the
South Carolina Code (2007 & Supp. 2022), was without merit; thus, we affirm the
circuit court's ruling on that issue. See Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v.
Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012) ("[A]n unappealed ruling,
right or wrong, is the law of the case.").
relationship because by virtue of the relationship such acts do not involve separate
entities."), overruled on other grounds by Paradis, 433 S.C. at 574, 861 S.E.2d at
780; id. at 564, 626 S.E.2d at 887 ("[A]gents for a corporation acting in the scope
of their duties cannot conspire with the corporation absent the guilty knowledge of
a third party."); Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC v. Gilland, 390 S.C. 312, 325, 701
S.E.2d 39, 46 (Ct. App. 2010) (referring to the principle set forth in McMillan as
the "intracorporate conspiracy" doctrine). Moreover, we find any amendment to
Hoagland's civil conspiracy claim would be futile because, although he sought to
amend his civil conspiracy claim to better plead special damages and clarify the
distinct acts of each Respondent, he never argued to the circuit court that
Respondents acted outside the scope of their official duties or that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did not apply. See Alterna Tax Asset Grp., LLC
v. York County, 434 S.C. 328, 334, 863 S.E.2d 465, 468 (Ct. App. 2021) ("[W]e
are mindful that [circuit] courts should not dismiss pleadings with prejudice at the
12(b)[, SCRCP,] stage without allowing the pleader to amend its complaint (unless
amendment would be futile)."); cf. Cricket Cove Ventures, LLC, 390 S.C. at 326,
701 S.E.2d at 46-47 (holding the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was limited to
persons acting within the scope of their employment and did not apply to the
appellant's conspiracy claim against the respondents in their individual capacities).

However, because the circuit court did not determine whether Hoagland stated
facts sufficient to support a claim for a violation of Article 1, Section 2 of the
South Carolina Constitution and instead ruled on an issue not yet before it, we hold
the circuit court erred and reverse and remand all remaining causes of action. See
Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 527, 511 S.E.2d 69, 73 (1999)
("Generally, in considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the trial court must base its ruling
solely upon allegations set forth on the face of the complaint."); id. ("The 12(b)(6)
motion may not be sustained if the facts alleged and inferences therefrom would
entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory."); S.C. Const. art. I, § 2 ("The
General Assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government or any department thereof for a redress of grievances."); Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E. 2d 591, 598
(1999) ("[An] appellate court need not address [the] remaining issues when [the]
disposition of [a] prior issue is dispositive.").

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.