State v. Walter Murrey

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Walter Murrey, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001795

Appeal From Sumter County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-029
Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed February 1, 2023

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek and
Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, both of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Julianna E. Battenfield, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of
Sumter, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Walter Murrey appeals his conviction and thirty-year sentence
for murder. On appeal, Murrey argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial
motion for immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act (the Act). 1

The trial court correctly found Murrey did not prove by a preponderance of
evidence the necessary elements of self-defense and was thus not eligible for
immunity under the Act. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Curry, 406 S.C. 364, 370, 752
S.E.2d 263, 266 (2013) ("A claim of immunity under the Act requires a pretrial
determination using a preponderance of the evidence standard, which [an
appellate] court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard of review."); State v.
Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016) ("An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded
in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support."); State v. Douglas, 411 S.C.
307, 316, 768 S.E.2d 232, 238 (Ct. App. 2014) ("[T]he abuse of discretion standard
of review does not allow [an appellate] court to reweigh the evidence or
second-guess the trial court's assessment of witness credibility."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-11-440(C) (2015) ("A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and
who is attacked in another place where he has a right to be . . . has no duty to
retreat and has the right to stand his ground and meet force with force . . . if he
reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to
himself . . ."); Curry, 406 S.C. at 371, 752 S.E.2d at 266 ("[T]he trial court must
necessarily consider the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant's
entitlement to the Act's immunity [under subsection C]. This includes all elements
of self-defense, save the duty to retreat."); id. at 371 n.4, 752 S.E.2d at 266 n.4
(delineating the remaining elements of self-defense, including that the defendant
must believe "he was in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious
bodily injury" and the belief must be one "a reasonably prudent man of ordinary
firmness and courage would have entertained," or the defendant "actually was in
such imminent danger"); State v. Andrews, 427 S.C. 178, 182, 830 S.E.2d 12, 14
(2010) (finding "while the circuit court may not have set forth every detail of its
analysis in the record, the record is nevertheless adequate for a reviewing court to
determine that the circuit court applied the correct burden of proof and made
findings that supported its denial of immunity"); State v. McCarty, 437 S.C. 355,
373-74, 878 S.E.2d 902, 912 (2022) ("[T]he relevant inquiry [in determining
whether an accused person is entitled to immunity] is not merely whether there is a
conflict in the evidence but, rather, whether the accused has proved an entitlement

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-410 to -450 (2015).
to immunity under the Act by a preponderance of the evidence." (quoting Andrews,
427 S.C. at 181, 830 S.E.2d at 13.)).

AFFIRMED. 2

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.