State v. Chesnee L. Mattress

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Chesnee Labri Mattress, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000183

Appeal From Lexington County
Walton J. McLeod, IV, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-050
Submitted January 1, 2023 – Filed February 8, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William Joseph Maye, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Chesnee Labri Mattress appeals her convictions for murder and
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime and concurrent
sentences of thirty-five years' imprisonment and five years' imprisonment,
respectively. On appeal, Mattress argues the trial court erred by (1) failing to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to an unconstitutional search warrant that relied
upon information obtained from an illegal search and (2) admitting evidence that
was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We affirm.
1. We hold Mattress has not preserved her argument regarding her cellphone
location data and her Fourth Amendment right to privacy. See State v. Dunbar,
356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be
preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the
trial [court]."); id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693-94 ("Issues not raised and ruled upon
in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."). We also hold the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to suppress because the search
warrant application and supplemental testimony were sufficient to establish
probable cause for the magistrate to issue the search warrant. See State v.
Williams, 386 S.C. 503, 509, 690 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2010) ("The admission or
exclusion of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial [court], whose
decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); State v.
Philpot, 317 S.C. 458, 461, 454 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that a
search warrant affidavit "must contain sufficient underlying facts and information
upon which the magistrate may make a determination of probable cause"); State v.
Weston, 329 S.C. 287, 290, 494 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1997) ("A search warrant that is
insufficient in itself to establish probable cause may be supplemented by sworn
oral testimony.").

2. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence seized
from Mattress's home pursuant to the search warrant because the probative value of
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
See Rule 401, SCRE (defining relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence");
Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, . . . misleading the jury, . . . or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."); State v. Gray, 408 S.C. 601, 616, 759 S.E.2d 160, 168 (Ct. App. 2014)
("All evidence is meant to be prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be
[scrutinized under Rule 403]." (quoting State v. Gilchrist, 329 S.C. 621, 630, 496
S.E.2d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 1998))); id. ("Prejudice that is 'unfair' is distinguished
from the legitimate impact all evidence has on the outcome of a case.").
AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.