State v. Jason E. Stoots

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jason Edwin Stoots, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000430

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-051
Submitted January 1, 2023 – Filed February 8, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jason Edwin Stoots appeals his conviction of second-degree
domestic violence and sentence of three years' imprisonment, suspended to
eighteen months' probation. On appeal, Stoots argues the trial court erred in
refusing to charge the jury on (1) self-defense and (2) the defense of accident. We
affirm.

1. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to charge the jury
on self-defense. See State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584
(2010) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a
jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583 ("To
warrant reversal, a trial [court]'s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be
both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."). Stoots claimed the strike to the
victim's (Victim) mouth was an accident; therefore, Stoots did not intentionally
strike Victim in self-defense. See State v. Owens, 427 S.C. 325, 330, 831 S.E.2d
126, 128 (Ct. App. 2019) ("It is precisely [the] lack of intent that separates accident
from self-defense . . . .") (aff'd, 433 S.C. 482, 860 S.E.2d 357 (2021)).
Furthermore, Stoots did not satisfy all four elements of self-defense, and Stoots
used excessive force towards Victim. See State v. Dickey, 394 S.C. 491, 499, 716
S.E.2d 97, 101 (2011) (stating one of the elements of self-defense is "[t]he
defendant . . . actually believed he was in imminent danger of . . . sustaining
serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such imminent danger"); Golden v.
State, 1 S.C. 292, 296 (1870) (explaining that when resisting a non-lethal assault,
"the degree of resistance ought to be in proportion to the nature of the injury
offered").

2. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to charge the jury
on the defense of accident. See Mattison, 388 S.C. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 584 ("An
appellate court will not reverse the trial [court]'s decision regarding a jury charge
absent an abuse of discretion."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583 ("To warrant
reversal, a trial [court]'s refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."). The jury charge the trial court gave
sufficiently covered Stoots's requested jury charge. See State v. Austin, 299 S.C.
456, 458, 385 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1989) ("[I]f the trial [court] refuses to give a
specific charge, there is no error if the charge actually given sufficiently covers the
substance of the request."). Additionally, Stoots failed to act with due care toward
Victim when he used excessive force in defending himself. See Owens, 427 S.C.
at 330, 831 S.E.2d at 128 ("The defense of accident (sometimes called
misadventure) protects a defendant who, while acting lawfully and with due care,
unintentionally causes harm to another.").

AFFIRMED. 1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.