Antonio Sadler v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Antonio Sadler, Petitioner,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-002173

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Appeal From Richland County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP_057
Heard June 9, 2022 – Filed February 15, 2023

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia,
for Petitioner.

Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Megan
Harrigan Jameson and Assistant Attorney General D.
Russell Barlow, II, both of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this appeal from the denial of an application for
post-conviction relief (PCR), Antonio Sadler argues the PCR court erred in finding
plea counsel was not ineffective for failing to ensure Sadler underwent a
court-ordered competency evaluation when plea counsel was aware that Sadler had
a history of mental health problems and was taking mental health medications at
the time of his Alford1 plea. We affirm as modified.

A Richland County grand jury indicted Sadler for six counts of armed robbery, one
count of attempted armed robbery, and three counts of possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime. Pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement, Sadler entered an Alford plea to three counts of armed robbery. The
plea court sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment suspended upon the service
of ten years' imprisonment, three years' probation, and two years' community
supervision pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement. Sadler did not file a direct
appeal. He subsequently filed an application for PCR, which the PCR court
dismissed. This court granted Sadler's request for a writ of certiorari to review the
PCR court's order.

At the November 12, 2015 plea hearing, the State informed the plea court Sadler
intended to enter an Alford plea to three counts of armed robbery in exchange for a
negotiated sentence and the dismissal of his remaining charges. Attorney Ernest
Dessausure informed the court he was "standing in" for plea counsel, who was
unable to attend the hearing. A plea colloquy followed, during which Dessausure
stated both he and plea counsel explained the indicted charges and sentencing
exposure to Sadler and informed him of his constitutional rights. Sadler indicated
he wished to enter an Alford plea to three counts of armed robbery and confirmed
he understood that each count carried a potential sentence of ten to thirty years'
imprisonment. Sadler asserted he had not taken any medication, drugs, or alcohol
in the twenty-four-hour period before the plea hearing. He stated he understood
the collateral consequences of pleading pursuant to Alford. Sadler indicated he did
not need additional time to discuss his case with Dessausure or plea counsel and
asserted he was "completely satisfied with their services." He confirmed he was
pleading freely and voluntarily and no one had coerced or forced him to enter an
Alford plea. He also confirmed no promises outside of the negotiated sentence had
been made to induce his plea. Sadler confirmed he understood all of the plea
court's questions and had answered them truthfully.

1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (allowing a defendant to enter a
guilty plea while simultaneously maintaining his innocence).
The State recited its account of the facts related to Sadler's charges and Sadler
agreed the State could produce sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial. The plea court found there was a substantial factual basis
for Sadler's plea and it was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
issue of Sadler's competency was not raised at the plea hearing.

Thereafter, Sadler filed an application for PCR, alleging plea counsel and
Dessausure were ineffective for failing to be "fully aware" of his mental illness and
failing to ensure he underwent a court-ordered competency evaluation.

At the PCR hearing, Dessausure testified he agreed to represent Sadler at the plea
hearing because plea counsel was unable to attend the hearing. Dessausure stated
plea counsel negotiated Sadler's Alford plea and sentence before the plea hearing.
He testified he did not know or have any indication that Sadler was under the
influence of medication during the plea hearing or that Sadler did not understand
the plea offer or proceedings.

Sadler testified that a doctor at the detention center diagnosed him with bipolar
disorder and acute psychosis after he was arrested. The PCR court admitted
without objection a document titled "Order Record History." Sadler alleged this
document showed that on the day of the plea hearing, his daily medications
included eight hundred milligrams of Tegretol; four hundred milligrams of
Depakote; one hundred milligrams of Zoloft; and, four milligrams of Risperdal,
which Sadler alleged was an "anti-psychotic" medication. The Order Record
History, which appeared to have been provided by the Alvin S. Glenn Detention
Center, was dated June 2015, and included notations indicating these medications
were "discontinued." The PCR court also admitted a medication distribution log
into evidence that Sadler claimed indicated he had taken three milligrams of
Risperdal at 9:00 p.m. the night before the plea hearing. However, the hearing
transcript is unclear as to which medication and in what amount Sadler took on the
morning of the plea hearing. Sadler testified he experienced adverse side effects
from his medication, including insomnia, blurred vision, and trembling. However,
Sadler did not testify as to whether he had experienced these side effects during the
plea hearing.

Sadler explained he had experienced mental health issues for most of his life, but
the issues worsened approximately five months before his arrest when he began
experiencing extreme paranoia, auditory and visual hallucinations, and a lack of
sleep. Sadler claimed that when he was arrested, his family informed plea counsel
that he was experiencing "severe mental illness." He stated he informed plea
counsel on multiple occasions that he was suffering from mental illness and was
taking medication. Sadler testified plea counsel informed him and his father that
he filed a motion for a competency evaluation. By order dated May 14, 2014, the
circuit court ordered Sadler to submit to a competency evaluation; however, Sadler
testified he never underwent a competency evaluation even though he and his
family raised the issue with plea counsel several times. Sadler suggested he did
not have a clear understanding of his case or the evidence against him during his
pretrial incarceration due to his "medication and mental illness."

Sadler acknowledged his plea agreement resulted from his willingness to act as a
jailhouse informant for the State. He testified that the idea to act as an informant
was "loosely at [plea counsel]'s advice" and he gave the State the information
"under duress." Sadler stated plea counsel did not thoroughly review the State's
plea offer with him prior to the plea hearing.

Sadler testified he informed Dessausure on the day of the plea hearing that he was
on medication and wanted to speak with plea counsel. Sadler claimed he was
anxious and confused on the day of the plea hearing on account of the Risperdal.
According to Sadler, the medicine caused him to "doze . . . off" and his "perception
of reality [to be] blunted." He stated he raised his concerns about the plea offer to
Dessausure but Dessausure advised him that it was a "really good deal" and he
risked getting a life sentence if he didn't plead guilty. Sadler maintained he did not
know what an Alford plea was until the day of the plea hearing and that it was
Dessausure's idea for him to enter an Alford plea. He explained he lied to the plea
court when he denied taking any medication in the twenty-four-hour period before
the plea hearing because Dessausure advised him that he "probably shouldn't say
that [he] was on medicine" if he wanted the court to accept his plea.

Sadler's father testified Sadler "wasn't himself" during their visits prior to the plea
hearing. He recalled Sadler seemed to be "a little out of it" and "kind of
zombie-like" during the plea hearing. Sadler's mother testified that on at least one
occasion before Sadler was arrested, he exhibited behavior suggesting he was
suffering from mental illness. She recalled Sadler voiced paranoid ideations after
his arrest—claiming that someone was trying to "get [him]"— and that he did not
seem like himself during his incarceration or at the plea hearing.

Plea counsel testified he met with Sadler at least thirty times over a three-year
period and spent at least half an hour with him at each meeting. Plea counsel
indicated that during his meetings with Sadler, they went over discovery and
discussed the charges against him. He maintained Sadler understood their
discussions. Plea counsel testified he explained to Sadler that if he went to trial
and was found guilty, he faced a possible life sentence. He stated he and Sadler
discussed two different strategies to help in mitigation or working out a plea deal
with the State: using the results of a competency evaluation to show he suffered
from a mental illness; or, assisting the solicitor's office by testifying as an
informant. Plea counsel testified that after discussing with Sadler the strength of
the evidence against him, Sadler decided he did not want to undergo a mental
competency evaluation. He stated Sadler agreed with his recommendation that he
not undergo a competency evaluation because doing so would undermine Sadler's
credibility as an informant. Plea counsel indicated that after discussing these
options with Sadler, they decided Sadler would act as an informant. Plea counsel
explained Sadler acted as an informant in at least three cases but he never actually
testified for the State. He stated that despite not testifying, Sadler was able to
secure a plea offer in exchange for his cooperation as an informant. Plea counsel
testified he reviewed the plea offer with Sadler prior to the plea hearing and
advised Sadler he would be unable to attend the hearing. Plea counsel explained
he wanted the plea offer to be negotiated so that in the event he was unable to
attend the plea hearing, Sadler would know the terms of the offer.

Plea counsel testified he never had any difficulty discussing the case or otherwise
communicating with Sadler and Sadler was "always . . . very coherent" and even
came up with some of their strategy. He testified he never had any reason to
believe Sadler had any "mental problem[s]" or was unable to assist in his defense.
However, plea counsel stated he was aware Sadler had a history of mental health
issues and was taking medication. He explained his motion for a competency
evaluation was purely part of a strategy to negotiate a lesser sentence as part of a
plea offer or to mitigate Sadler's sentence if they went to trial. Plea counsel
testified the factual basis for the motion was Sadler's mental health history and the
medications he was prescribed during his pretrial incarceration. He acknowledged
he did not seek any additional medical information pertaining to Sadler's mental
health history or the medications he was prescribed. Plea counsel asserted he had
"no doubt whatsoever" that Sadler was competent.

The PCR court held Sadler's claim that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
ensure he underwent a competency evaluation was without merit. The court
determined Sadler presented no credible evidence he did not fully understand his
plea or the circumstances surrounding his case. It found plea counsel credibly
testified that Sadler was well-able to assist in his defense and Sadler decided not to
proceed with the competency evaluation so he could serve as an informant for the
State in exchange for a favorable plea offer. The court concluded plea counsel
moved for a competency evaluation as part of a defense strategy rather than due to
a legitimate concern about Sadler's competency. It found plea counsel credibly
testified a competency hearing was not held because it would have been potentially
harmful to Sadler's role as an informant. Finally, the court found Sadler was not
prejudiced because he was able to reach a favorable plea deal by way of becoming
an informant.

On appeal, Sadler argues the PCR court erred in finding plea counsel was not
ineffective for failing to ensure Sadler underwent the court-ordered competency
evaluation when plea counsel was aware Sadler had a history of mental health
problems and was taking mental health medications at the time he entered his
Alford plea. We disagree.

"We defer to a PCR court's findings of fact and will uphold them if there is any
evidence in the record to support them." Mangal v. State, 421 S.C. 85, 91, 805
S.E.2d 568, 571 (2017). However, "[w]e do not defer to a PCR court's rulings on
questions of law." Id. "Questions of law are reviewed de novo, and we will
reverse the PCR court's decision when it is controlled by an error of law." Id.
(quoting Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016)). "If
matters of credibility are involved, then this court gives deference to the PCR
court's findings because this court lacks the opportunity to directly observe the
witnesses." Lee v. State, 396 S.C. 314, 319, 721 S.E.2d 442, 445 (Ct. App. 2011).

Initially, we hold the PCR court applied the incorrect standard in determining plea
counsel's alleged deficiency did not prejudice Sadler because plea counsel was able
to obtain a favorable plea deal on Sadler's behalf. The PCR court's prejudice
analysis should have focused on whether Sadler showed there was a reasonable
probability he was incompetent at the time of his plea. See Speaks v. State, 377
S.C. 396, 399, 660 S.E.2d 512, 514 (2008) ("In order to establish a claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant must show that: (1) counsel failed to
render reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms, and (2)
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the applicant's case."); Ramirez v. State,
419 S.C. 14, 21, 795 S.E.2d 841, 845 (2017) ("[W]hen establishing . . . prejudice in
the context of plea counsel's failure to request a mental competency evaluation, 'the
[applicant] need only show a "reasonable probability" that he was . . . incompetent
at the time of the plea.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Jeter v.
State, 308 S.C. 230, 233, 417 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992))). Nevertheless, we find
Sadler failed to show there was a reasonable probability he was incompetent at the
time of his plea. See Jeter, 308 S.C. at 232, 417 S.E.2d at 596 (holding that in
determining whether an accused is competent to enter a plea, a court must
determine whether he "ha[s] sufficient capability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and ha[s] a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him"). At the PCR hearing, Sadler made
several claims concerning his mental capacity both at the time of the robberies and
the plea hearing, including that he experienced a mental breakdown and suffered
from paranoia, hallucinations, and severe mental illness. Sadler also testified he
was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and acute psychosis after his arrest. To
support these claims, Sadler presented the following evidence: testimony from his
mother and father, who testified generally about their concerns regarding Sadler's
demeanor during his incarceration and at the plea hearing; the Order Record
History; and, a medication distribution log. Although Sadler's medication records
could have helped support his mental incompetency claims, we find his failure to
provide any information at the PCR hearing about the medications listed and what
medical conditions they were used to treat diminished the probative value of such
records. Moreover, Sadler failed to present any medical records verifying his
diagnoses or history of mental illness, testimony from the doctor who diagnosed
him with bipolar disorder and acute psychosis, or testimony from doctors who had
treated him for mental illness in the past. Without medical evidence or testimony
to support the veracity of Sadler's claims, we find the evidence Sadler presented at
the PCR hearing was merely speculative as to whether he was incompetent at the
time he entered his Alford plea. See Speaks, 377 S.C. at 399, 660 S.E.2d at 514
("In post-conviction proceedings, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove
the allegations in his application.").

Furthermore, plea counsel's and Dessausure's testimonies at the PCR hearing
contradict Sadler's claim that he was incompetent at the time of his plea.
Specifically, plea counsel testified he met with Sadler at least thirty times over a
three-year period and Sadler understood their conversations about the discovery in
his case and the charges against him. Plea counsel further testified he never had
any difficulty discussing the case or otherwise communicating with Sadler and
Sadler was "always . . . very coherent" and even constructed some of the case
strategy. Plea counsel maintained he never had any reason to believe Sadler had
any "mental problem[s]" or was unable to assist in his defense. Dessausure
testified Sadler appeared to understand the plea offer and proceedings. The PCR
court found plea counsel's and Dessausure's testimonies credible, and we defer to
that finding. See Lee, 396 S.C. at 319, 721 S.E.2d at 445 ("If matters of credibility
are involved, then this court gives deference to the PCR court's findings because
this court lacks the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses."). Based on the
foregoing, we hold Sadler failed to show his plea was rendered involuntary due to
incompetence.
As to Sadler's claim his guilty plea was rendered involuntary due to the medication
he was prescribed, we find he failed to show "that his mental faculties were so
impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was incapable of full understanding and
appreciation of the charges against him, of comprehending his constitutional rights,
and of realizing the consequences of his plea." Garren v. State, 423 S.C. 1, 15,
813 S.E.2d 704, 712 (2018) (quoting United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574, 578
(4th Cir. 1974)). At the PCR hearing, Sadler testified he experienced adverse side
effects from his medication, including insomnia, blurred vision, and trembling;
however, he did not state whether he was experiencing these side effects at the
time of the plea hearing. As we stated, Sadler failed to provide any supporting
medical evidence or testimony at the PCR hearing about the medications listed in
the Order Record History and medication distribution log regarding any potential
adverse side effects or how such medication impacted his cognitive abilities.
Furthermore, the medication history was dated June 2015, five months before the
plea hearing. With the exception of Sadler's prescription of Risperdal, which he
stated was given to him the night before the plea hearing, the record is unclear if
Sadler was taking any other mental health medications at the time of the plea as he
alleged. Sadler suggested at the PCR hearing that he might have taken medication
the morning of the plea hearing; however, Sadler told the plea court he had not
taken any medication in the twenty-four-hour period before the hearing. See Suber
v. State, 371 S.C. 554, 558, 640 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2007) ("In determining guilty
plea issues, it is proper to consider the guilty plea transcript as well as evidence at
the PCR hearing."). Accordingly, we find Sadler failed to show his mental
faculties were so impaired by medication at the time of the plea hearing that it
rendered him incompetent. See Garren, 423 S.C. at 15, 813 S.E.2d at 712 ("A
PCR court must consider 'objective data' about the nature and effect of the
medication the defendant had taken and evaluate whether such medication 'had the
capability to produce a sufficient effect on his mental faculties to render him
incompetent to enter a guilty plea.'" (quoting United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d
561, 565 (4th Cir. 1999))).

Based on the foregoing, we hold Sadler failed to show plea counsel's failure to
ensure he underwent the court-ordered competency evaluation prejudiced him. We
decline to reach the issue of deficiency. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 697 (1984) ("[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the [applicant] as a result
of the alleged deficiencies."); id. ("If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be
followed.").

Accordingly, the PCR court's denial of Sadler's PCR application is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.