Charles E. Houston, Jr. Dean B. Bell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Charles E. Houston, Jr., Appellant,

v.

Shirley J. Boone, as Administrator of the Estate of Dean
B. Bell, individually; Law Offices of Dean B. Bell, LLC;
and B. Hammel Properties, LLC, Defendants,

of which the Law Offices of Dean B. Bell, LLC and B.
Hammel Properties, LLC are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001676

Appeal From Beaufort County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-069
Submitted October 3, 2022 – Filed February 22, 2023

AFFIRMED

Charles E. Houston, Jr., of Charleston, pro se.

Thomas Calvin Taylor, of Law Offices of Thomas C.
Taylor, LLC, of Bluffton; and Kirby Darr Shealy, III, and
W. Cliff Moore, III, both of Adams and Reese LLP, of
Columbia, all for Respondent B. Hammell Properties,
LLC.
PER CURIAM: More than four years after this court remitted Charles E. Houston,
Jr.'s appeal from an order partitioning property he jointly owned with his sisters,
Houston sued Dean B. Bell, 1 his sisters' attorney in the partition case; Bell's law firm,
The Law Offices of Dean B. Bell, LLC (the Firm); and B. Hammel Properties, LLC
(Hammel), the company who bought the property, asserting the partition order was
void and based on extrinsic fraud. The circuit court granted summary judgment to
Bell, the Firm, and Hammel on Houston's causes of action. Houston now appeals.
We affirm.

I. Facts

In December 2011, Houston's sisters filed an action against him for the partition of
a property the siblings jointly owned in Hilton Head (the Property). The circuit court
referred the partition action to the Master in Equity for Beaufort County on
September 4, 2012. On July 19, 2013, the Master filed an order: (1) ordering the
partition of the Property by private sale; (2) giving one of Houston's sisters the right
to sign contracts, deeds, and other sale documents for all of the siblings; (3) ordering
Houston to pay his sisters for his portion of the insurance and property taxes on the
Property since January 2011, rent for his sole use of the Property to the exclusion of
his sisters, and his sister's attorney's fees; and (4) requiring Houston to vacate the
Property. On July 30, 2013, Houston filed a motion to reconsider the partition order,
asserting: (1) the Master lacked jurisdiction to rule on his sisters' claims for partition
by private sale, accounting, conversion, and contribution because the circuit court
had previously dismissed these causes of action and told Houston's sisters their only
cause of action would be partition by public sale; (2) the Master lacked jurisdiction
to order a partition by private sale under the petition statute; (3) the Master erred in
granting Houston's sister the power to sign documents for her siblings as to the sale
of the Property; (4) the sale of the Property without pre-approval from the court was
improper; and (5) extrinsic fraud had been committed in this case. The Master
denied this motion in a Form 4 order on September 11, 2013.
Houston then appealed the partition order and the order denying his motion for
reconsideration. However, Houston failed to provide a transcript for the appeal and
did not file an appellant's brief or designation of the matter with this court;

1
Bell passed away during the pendency of this appeal, and he and the administrator
of his estate were dismissed from the appeal pursuant to an order of discharge from
the bankruptcy court.
consequently, this court dismissed his appeal, and the case was remitted on March
10, 2014. Houston asserts he withdrew this appeal because it was premature as the
Property had not been sold. The Property was sold to Hammel on June 23, 2015, for
$385,000. Three years later, on May 22, 2018, Hammel sold the Property, together
with several other properties, for $1,242,000.
On July 31, 2018, Houston filed a lis pendens as to the Property and a complaint
against Bell, the Firm, and Hammel. In his complaint, Houston first asked for the
partition order to be voided because the Master (1) never acquired jurisdiction over
the partition case as there was never an order of reference; (2) failed to refer to the
order of reference in the partition order; (3) lacked personal and subject matter
jurisdiction over the partition case; and (4) lacked the jurisdiction to modify an order
of the circuit court, noting the circuit court who referred the case to the Master had
ruled the partition would be by public sale. Next, Houston alleged his due process
rights had been violated in several ways, including (1) he was prejudiced by the
Master's ruling on issues the circuit court had already ruled on, specifically partition
by private sale rather than public sale; (2) Bell's placement of his work notes into the
court file, which Houston asserted Bell did to influence the Master; (3) Bell
submitting a proposed order to the Master without the Master requesting such an
order; (4) Bell not including Houston on communications between Bell and the
Master; and (5) Bell not sending him a copy of the proposed order. Based on these
acts, Houston asserted Bell had engaged in extrinsic fraud to deny Houston his due
process rights. Houston then alleged the Master exceeded his jurisdiction and erred
in his "ultra vires ruling" to allow Houston's sister to sign documents related to the
sale of the Property for her siblings and to not require the sale of the Property to be
pre-approved by the court. Houston asked for the sale of the Property to be voided
and for quiet title as to the Property.
Both Bell and Hammel filed motions for summary judgment on Houston's claims,
asserting (1) the Master had jurisdiction to partition the Property by private sale
pursuant to the order of reference; (2) no prior order prevented the Master from
ordering the partition by private sale or Houston's sisters from asserting their claims
for rent, contribution, and conversion; (3) Houston waived any right to challenge the
jurisdiction of the Master by participating in the partition action; (4) the Master asked
Bell to draft the partition order; (5) Houston raised these issues in his motion for
reconsideration of the partition order, which the Master denied, and Houston failed
to pursue his appeal of the orders; (6) Houston's due process rights were not violated;
and (7) Houston's claims were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel, statute
of limitations, and laches. After a hearing, the circuit court granted both motions for
summary judgment, finding the Master had jurisdiction to order partition by private
sale; no genuine issue of fact existed as to Houston's claims; and Houston's claims
were barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel, statute of limitations, and laches.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Whether to grant or deny a motion under Rule 60(b) lies within the sound discretion
of the judge." BB&T v. Taylor, 369 S.C. 548, 551, 633 S.E.2d 501, 502 (2006). As
does the decision of "[w]hether or not [a party] made his Rule 60 motion within a
reasonable time[.]" McDaniel v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 324 S.C. 639, 644, 478
S.E.2d 868, 871 (Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, "the determination of
whether laches has been established is largely within the discretion of the trial
court." Emery v. Smith, 361 S.C. 207, 216, 603 S.E.2d 598, 602 (Ct. App. 2004).

III. TIME LIMITATIONS AND LACHES
Houston argues the partition order should be vacated as void because it "exceeds
beyond the subject matter jurisdiction granted by statute to the Master." Houston
asserts this issue can be raised for the first time on appeal, and although there is no
law on the issue in South Carolina, other jurisdictions have found the doctrines of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, laches, estoppel, and statute of limitations do not
apply to actions to set aside a judgment as void. Similarly, Houston argues the circuit
court abused its discretion in ruling his extrinsic fraud claims were barred by the
affirmative defenses of estoppel, laches, and reasonable time limitations. We
disagree.
Rule 60(b), SCRCP, states, in relevant part:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
. . . (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of
an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application.

The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after
the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.
"The definition of 'void' under [Rule 60(b)(4)] only encompasses judgments from
courts which failed to provide proper due process, or judgments from courts which
lacked subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction." McDaniel, 324 S.C. at
644, 478 S.E.2d at 871. The reasonable time requirement applies to Rule 60(b)(4).
Id. (finding special referee's ruling that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion was untimely when
filed nearly four years after final judgment was not an abuse of discretion).
Additionally, while "motions to reopen judgements based on fraud must be filed
within a year of the judgment or order, Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from
an order for 'fraud upon the court' after the expiration of one year." Perry v. Heirs
at Law of Gadsden, 357 S.C. 42, 47, 590 S.E.2d 502, 504 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Rule 60(b), SCRCP). However, "[w]hen the movant alleges the judgment is void or
that the nonmoving party engaged in fraud upon the court, the motion must 'be
made within a reasonable time . . . after the judgment, order or proceeding was
entered or taken.'" Sanders v. Smith, 431 S.C. 605, 612, 848 S.E.2d 604, 607 (Ct.
App. 2020) (quoting Rule 60(b), SCRCP).

Moreover, "the doctrine of laches [is] applicable in determining whether an action
is time-barred even if extrinsic fraud is established." Robinson v. Est. of Harris, 389
S.C. 360, 371, 698 S.E.2d 801, 807 (2010). "The equitable doctrine of laches is
defined as 'neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under
circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what in law should have
been done.'" Id. at 371–72, 698 S.E.2d at 807 (quoting Hallums v. Hallums, 296
S.C. 195, 198, 371 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1988)). "The party seeking to establish laches
must show: (1) a delay, (2) that was unreasonable under the circumstances, and (3)
prejudice." Id. at 372, 698 S.E.2d at 807.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding Houston's causes of action to
void the partition order based on lack of jurisdiction and fraud on the court were
barred by the time limitations of Rule 60(b), SCRCP, and the doctrine of laches. See
McDaniel, 324 S.C. at 644, 478 S.E.2d at 871 ("Whether or not [a party] made his
Rule 60 motion within a reasonable time is a matter addressed to the trial judge's
sound discretion, and an appellate court will not disturb that determination absent
abuse of discretion."); Emery, 361 S.C. at 216, 603 S.E.2d at 602 ("[T]he
determination of whether laches has been established is largely within the discretion
of the trial court.").
Initially, it is not clear that Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP, applies to Houston's claims to
void the partition order based on lack of jurisdiction or fraud on the court, and
Houston fails to explain how this section is applicable or to provide any law
concerning this section in his appellant's brief. Thus, we find any arguments as to
Rule 60(b)(5), SCRCP, abandoned on appeal. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[S]hort,
conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned on
appeal and therefore not presented for review.").
As to Houston's remaining claims, we first find Houston's claims are barred by the
time limitation in Rule 60(b), which requires motions to void a judgment for lack of
jurisdiction and for fraud on the court to be filed "within a reasonable time." See
Rule 60(b), SCRCP; McDaniel, 324 S.C. at 644, 478 S.E.2d at 871; Sanders, 431
S.C. at 612, 848 S.E.2d at 607. Here, the partition case was filed in December 2011;
the partition order was filed on July 19, 2013; and this court remitted Houston's
appeal from the partition case on March 10, 2014. Hammel then purchased the
Property on June 23, 2015, and sold the Property on May 22, 2018. Houston finally
brought this action to void the partition order on July 21, 2018. We find the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Houston did not file this case in a
reasonable time because (1) Houston's appeal from the partition order was remitted
four years and four months prior to Houston's filing of this case; (2) the claims
Houston raised in this case are the same or extremely similar to those he previously
raised in his motion for reconsideration of the partition order and that could have
been raised in his appeal of the partition order had he pursued his appeal; and (3) the
Property was sold to Hammel, and Houston admitted he learned of this sale
approximately three years prior to his filing of this action. Contrast McDaniel, 324
S.C. at 644, 478 S.E.2d at 871 (finding special referee did not abuse its discretion in
finding plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was not filed in a reasonable time when it
was filed "nearly four years" after the final order and plaintiff participated in the
settlement of the case) with Sanders, 431 S.C. at 607–08, 848 S.E.2d at 612–13
(finding wife filed her Rule 60(b) motion for fraud against the court in a reasonable
time because while husband received a divorce order in 2010, wife did not learn of
the order until 2014 and did not learn the divorce order contained findings as to the
parties' property until 2016 after wife hired an attorney).

Second, we find Houston's fraud on the court claims are also barred by the doctrine
of laches. See Robinson, 389 S.C. at 371, 698 S.E.2d at 807 ("[T]he doctrine of
laches [is] applicable in determining whether an action is time-barred even if
extrinsic fraud is established."); id. at 372, 698 S.E.2d at 807 ("The party seeking to
establish laches must show: (1) a delay, (2) that was unreasonable under the
circumstances, and (3) prejudice."). Houston delayed bringing this case for four
years and four months after his appeal from the partition order was remitted and
three years after he learned of the sale of the Property. Houston offered no
explanation for his delay in bringing this case, and his claims in this case echo his
arguments from his motion to reconsider the partition order, reflecting no new
reasons for his claims in this action. Moreover, Hammel, who bought the Property
for $385,000 and held the Property for almost three years, would be prejudiced if
Houston's claims were not barred. Thus, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in finding the doctrine of laches barred Houston's fraud on the court
claims.
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's ruling that Houston's claims are barred by
the time limitations of Rule 60(b), SCRCP, and the doctrine of laches. Because this
disposition is dispositive of the appeal, we need not address Houston's remaining
arguments on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (appellate court need not address remaining
issues when the disposition of another issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED. 2

GEATHERS, McDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.