Federal Logistics, Inc. v. DMP Construction, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Federal Logistics, Inc., Respondent,

v.

DMP Construction, LLC, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000692

Appeal From Anderson County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 2023-UP-015
Heard September 14, 2022 – Filed January 11, 2023

AFFIRMED

William Norman Epps, III, of Epps & Epps, LLC, of
Anderson, for Appellant.

Craig Horger Allen, of Craig H. Allen, P.A., of
Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this contract dispute, DMP Construction, LLC (DMP) appeals
the trial court's orders (1) granting a directed verdict to Federal Logistics and (2)
denying DMP's motion to vacate the judgment or grant a new trial. We affirm.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 16, 2015, DMP entered into a "Freight Broker Terms and
Conditions" agreement (the Agreement) with Federal Logistics and
GlobalTranzEnterprises to obtain discounted brokerage and transportation services.
The Agreement required DMP to make timely payments on issued discounted
invoices, and if payments were not made, Federal Logistics could reissue the
invoices at the non-discounted rate.1 Further, the Agreement specified that interest
on past-due balances would accrue at a rate of 1.5% per month and the customer is
liable for costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Any dispute with an invoice must
be made in writing within thirty days or the charges would be conclusively
presumed valid. It is uncontested that DMP utilized Federal Logistics for its
discounted freight services, that it filled out the credit application, that the credit
application was subject to the terms of the Agreement, that it received several
invoices for the services provided, that it never disputed the issued invoices, and
that it owed Federal Logistics for the services provided.
Federal Logistics argued the amount owed was the sum of the non-discounted
charges and accrued interest of 1.5% per month from May 15, 2016, to the date of
trial, totaling $54,377.24. DMP's central argument is that Federal Logistics's
"non-discounted rate" included accrued daily interest, rather than monthly, and the
amount due should be the original discounted rate total of $16,421.28 plus interest
of 1.5% per month.
At the conclusion of evidence, both parties moved for a directed verdict. The trial
court found there was no evidence DMP disputed the issued invoices and that
DMP failed to elicit testimony showing the balance of $54,377.24 included daily
interest. DMP admitted to signing the Agreement and that it was bound to its
terms and conditions. Thus, the trial court granted Federal Logistics's motion for a
directed verdict and awarded it the principal sum of $54,377.24 plus interest of
$24,469.50 and reasonable attorney's fees of $8,100.00, totaling $86,946.74.

Post-trial, DMP moved to vacate the judgment and/or grant a new trial, relying on
emails produced from Federal Logistics to DMP containing contradictory
statements regarding accruing daily interest on DMP's debt. Specifically, DMP

1
Federal Logistics testified it formulates its discounted rates as part of its
negotiation process with carriers due to predicted estimates for services and the
business relationship Federal Logistics develops with carriers. These rates are
predicated on timely payment to the carriers.
argued it was able to retrieve two emails from Federal Logistics with attachments
regarding the outstanding invoices in which it references the amounts due plus
interest of 1.5% per day, totaling $39,721.73 as of June 14, 2016, and $51,791.37
as of July 13, 2016. The trial court denied DMP's motion, finding there was still
no evidence of any complaints made to Federal Logistics regarding the past-due
amounts and that DMP failed to elicit testimony showing the balance of
$54,377.24 included daily interest or that any amounts billed to DMP included a
calculation of daily interest. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"When reviewing a motion for directed verdict . . . , the appellate court applies the
same standard as the circuit court." Hennes v. Shaw, 397 S.C. 391, 398, 725
S.E.2d 501, 505 (Ct. App. 2012).
The rule in South Carolina is that on motions
for . . . directed verdict, . . . the evidence and all
reasonable inferences which have to be drawn from it
must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and if there is any testimony tending to
prove allegations of the complaint, the motions must be
refused.

Proctor v. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 368 S.C. 279, 293, 628 S.E.2d 496,
504 (Ct. App. 2006). "This rule is especially strong in South Carolina where the
'scintilla of evidence rule' is applied." Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Norman, 283 S.C.
443, 446, 322 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Ct. App. 1984)). "[H]owever, we cannot ignore
facts unfavorable to that party and we must determine whether a verdict for the
party opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts." Hopson
v. Clary, 321 S.C. 312, 314, 468 S.E.2d 305, 307 (Ct. App. 1996). "If more than
one inference can be drawn from the evidence, the case must be submitted to the
jury." Hennes, 397 S.C. at 398, 725 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting Minter v. GOCT, Inc.,
322 S.C. 525, 527, 473 S.E.2d 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1996)). "However, this rule does
not authorize submission of speculative, theoretical and hypothetical views to the
jury." Hanahan v. Simpson, 326 S.C. 140, 149, 485 S.E.2d 903, 908 (1997),
superseded on other grounds by statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 15‑36‑10(C)(1) (Supp.
2012), as recognized in Holmes v. E. Cooper Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 408 S.C. 138, 758
S.E.2d 483 (2014). "When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial
court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve
conflicts in the testimony or evidence." Holmes v. Haynsworth, Sinkler & Boyd,
P.A., 408 S.C. 620, 634–35, 760 S.E.2d 399, 406 (2014), abrogated on other
grounds by Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson, 416 S.C. 517, 787 S.E.2d
485 (2016) (quoting Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 308, 566 S.E.2d 529, 532
(2002)). "Moreover, in reviewing a circuit court's grant or denial of a motion for
directed verdict . . . , this court reverses only when there is no evidence to support
the ruling or when the ruling is governed by an error of law." Hennes, 397 S.C. at
398, 725 S.E.2d at 505.

LAW/ANALYSIS
DMP relies entirely on Federal Logistics's emails and worksheets to support its
argument that Federal Logistics was billing a late interest fee of 1.5% per day.
However, these emails and worksheets total $51,791.37 rather than Federal
Logistics's requested amount of $54,377.24. Consequently, DMP's argument
necessitates a sizeable inference that because the two sums, $54,377.24 and
$51,791.37, are relatively close, they were calculated in the same or similar
manner (by including impermissible daily interest rather than monthly interest).
However, this conclusion lacks the necessary evidentiary support to create a
reasonable inference that impermissible daily interest was, in fact, included in
calculating DMP's debt. See Proctor, 368 S.C. at 293, 628 S.E.2d at 504. DMP
failed to demonstrate (through simple arithmetic) or submit any evidence, other
than its arguments and speculation, that Federal Logistics's requested amount of
$54,377.24 was calculated by using impermissible daily interest. See Hanahan,
326 S.C. at 149, 485 S.E.2d at 908 ("In reviewing a directed verdict, this Court
must determine whether a verdict for the party opposing the motion would have
been reasonably possible under the facts. . . . However, this rule does not authorize
submission of speculative, theoretical and hypothetical views to the jury." (citation
omitted) (emphasis added)).
Conversely, Federal Logistics provided evidence of invoices and a statement of
account disclosing the original discounted amount, the reinvoiced non-discounted
amount, and the total remaining balance amounting exactly to $54,377.24. Thus,
nothing in the record indicates that more than one reasonable inference can be
drawn from the evidence presented. See Hennes, 397 S.C. at 398, 725 S.E.2d at
505 ("If more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence, the case must be
submitted to the jury . . . this court reverses [a grant of a motion for a directed
verdict] only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or when the ruling is
governed by an error of law."). DMP admitted to signing the Agreement and was,
therefore, bound to its terms requiring it to make timely payments, and if payments
were not made, Federal Logistics could reissue the invoices at the non-discounted
rate with accruing interest of 1.5%. DMP failed to demonstrate that the balance of
$54,377.24 included daily interest or that any amounts billed to DMP included a
calculation of daily interest. Thus, we affirm the trial court's grant of a directed
verdict to Federal Logistics.
DMP's motion to vacate the judgment and/or grant a new trial relied solely on the
emails produced from Federal Logistics to DMP. Because we affirm the trial
court's grant of a directed verdict based upon the lack of any evidence indicating
daily interest was included in Federal Logistics's calculation of the amount owed,
we find the trial court's decision to deny DMP's motion was not based upon an
error of law and its conclusions did not lack evidentiary support. See BB&T v.
Taylor, 369 S.C. 548, 551, 633 S.E.2d 501, 502–03 (2006) ("Whether to grant or
deny a motion under Rule 60(b) lies within the sound discretion of the judge. [The
appellate] standard of review, therefore, is limited to determining whether there
was an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion arises whe[n] the judge issuing
the order was controlled by an error of law or whe[n] the order is based on factual
conclusions that are without evidentiary support.").
Based on the foregoing analysis, the trial court is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., THOMAS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.