State v. Joe L. Busby

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Joe Lewis Busby, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001796

Appeal From Richland County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-401
Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed November 9, 2022

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, and
Solicitor Byron E. Gipson, all of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Joe Lewis Busby appeals his reckless driving conviction and
sentence of eight years' imprisonment. On appeal, Busby argues the trial court
erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant that
lacked probable cause. Additionally, he argues the error of its admission was not
harmless. We affirm.

We hold the trial court did not err by denying Busby's motion to suppress the
Airbag Control Module (ACM) data that was seized via the search warrant for his
truck because Investigator Calvin Shumard informed the magistrate about the
crimes he believed had been committed and would be supported by the evidence
sought via the search warrant. See State v. Dupree, 354 S.C. 676, 683, 583 S.E.2d
437, 441 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The appellate court should give great deference to a
magistrate's determination of probable cause."); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238 (1983) (explaining a magistrate's task is to make a "practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place"). Although Busby argues the magistrate was unable
to determine the veracity of the source of Investigator Shumard's information, our
law does not require a magistrate to evaluate the veracity of statements made by
other investigating officers. See State v. Sullivan, 267 S.C. 610, 615, 230 S.E.2d
621, 623 (1976) ("The propriety of an affiant attesting to information supplied him
by a fellow officer has been judicially endorsed."). Moreover, we find section
17-13-140 of the South Carolina Code (2014) was complied with because
Investigator Shumard informed the magistrate that he believed the search warrant
would provide evidence tending to support the crimes of failure to yield, crossing
the center line, and reckless driving. See § 17-13-140 ("Any magistrate . . . of any
court of record of the State having jurisdiction over the area where the property
sought is located, may issue a search warrant to search for and seize . . . (4)
property constituting evidence of a crime or tending to show that a particular
person committed a criminal offense.").

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.