S.C. Public Interest Foundation v. SCDOT

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Public Interest Foundation, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Transportation and Robert
J. St. Onge, Jr., Secretary of Transportation,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001006

Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge
William Jeffrey Young, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-406
Submitted September 1, 2022 – Filed November 16, 2022

AFFIRMED

James G. Carpenter, of Carpenter Law Firm, PC, of
Greenville, for Appellant.

Beacham O. Brooker, Jr., of Brooker Law Offices LLC,
of Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: The South Carolina Public Interest Foundation (PIF) appeals a
circuit court order denying a request for attorney's fees under the fee-shifting
provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). We affirm.
First, we respectfully disagree with PIF's argument that winning a motion to compel
discovery in a separate case makes it the prevailing party on the FOIA request at
issue in this case. It is true that PIF sought the same information in both cases, but
the fact remains PIF did not get the information it sought through its FOIA request.
PIF received the information through an order compelling discovery. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 30-4-100(B) (Supp. 2022) (stating FOIA's fee-shifting provision only applies
to parties who prevail in seeking relief "under this section").

Second, we disagree with PIF's argument that its claim is supported by the reasoning
in Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley, Inc., 393 S.C. 152, 711 S.E.2d 895 (2011). As
noted above, the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) produced
the withheld information after the circuit court ordered it to do so in the separate
case between these same parties. We understand Sloan as holding that a party cannot
avoid the consequences of FOIA's fee-shifting provision by complying with a FOIA
request only after its noncompliance forces the requesting party to file a suit to
enforce FOIA. Id. at 154-58, 711 S.E.2d at 896-98 (holding the appellant was liable
for the respondent's attorney's fees when it initially denied it was subject to FOIA
and refused to produce any documents but then produced the documents "in the spirit
of cooperation" after the requesting party filed a FOIA complaint). Here, SCDOT
promptly responded to the FOIA request and was litigating the remainder of the
request until the discovery order rendered the merits of the FOIA case moot.

Third, we question whether PIF would have secured the withheld information if the
FOIA case was litigated on the merits. Though the subject matter and basic facts of
the situation leading to the FOIA case are undoubtedly matters of public concern,
the circuit court was never put to the task of weighing whether privacy interests
outweighed the public's interest with respect to any parts of the information PIF
sought. See S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-40(a)(3)(C) (Supp. 2022) (setting out FOIA's
"privacy exemption," which exempts parties from having to disclose information
when it would be an unreasonable invasion of privacy). The public has a strong
interest in preventing public bodies from using funds for private purposes, but
disclosing personal information and investigatory and disciplinary reports of the
people involved may not have been necessary to advance that interest. See
Glassmeyer v. City of Columbia, 414 S.C. 213, 216, 223, 777 S.E.2d 835, 837, 841
(Ct. App. 2015) (finding there was no evidence that disclosure of addresses,
telephone numbers, and email addresses of individuals who applied for the position
of city manager "would further the FOIA's purpose of protecting the public from
secret government activity" and exempting that information from disclosure to avoid
unreasonably invading those individuals' privacy); City of Columbia v. Am. Civ.
Liberties Union of S.C., Inc., 323 S.C. 384, 387, 475 S.E.2d 747, 749 (1996)
(explaining the contents of an investigatory report of a public body may be wholly
or partially exempt from FOIA under FOIA's privacy exemption and courts decide
whether information qualifies for the exemption on a case-by-case basis); Stern v.
FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating a public body could redact the
names of certain employees from a response to a FOIA request seeking an
investigatory report that led to disciplinary action against them when revealing their
identities would not serve a public interest).

Finally, the circuit court did not make any mistake of law or fact in its order. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 30-4-100(B) ("If a person or entity seeking relief under this section
prevails, he may be awarded reasonable attorney's fees . . . ." (emphasis added));
Litchfield Plantation Co. v. Georgetown Cnty. Water & Sewer Dist., 314 S.C. 30,
33, 443 S.E.2d 574, 575-76 (1994) (emphasizing the discretionary language in
section 30-4-100(B) and reviewing an order denying attorney's fees for an abuse of
discretion); Wilson v. Dallas, 403 S.C. 411, 425, 743 S.E.2d 746, 754 (2013) ("An
abuse of discretion occurs when a court's order is controlled by an error of law or
there is no evidentiary support for the court's factual conclusions.").
In light of the reasons given above, we need not reach PIF's argument about the
reasonableness of its fees. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court does not need
to review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
Therefore, the circuit court's order is
AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.