Delinzy Grant v. Steel Technologies

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Delinzy Grant, Claimant, Respondent,

v.

Steel Technologies, Employer, and Zurich American
Insurance Co., Carrier, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2019-001017

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-221
Submitted April 1, 2022 – Filed May 18, 2022

AFFIRMED

Matthew Clark LaFave, of Crowe LaFave, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellants.

Ryan Thomas LeBlanc, of Joye Law Firm, LLP, of North
Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Steel Technologies and Zurich American Insurance Company
(collectively, Appellants) appeal an order from the Appellate Panel of the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel). On appeal,
Appellants argue the Appellate Panel erred in finding Steel Technologies' former
employee, Delinzy Grant, gave timely notice of her repetitive trauma injury in
accordance with section 42-15-20(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015).

We hold Grant provided adequate notice to Appellants. Accordingly, we affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hargrove v. Titan
Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 288, 599 S.E.2d 604, 610 (Ct. App. 2004) ("The South
Carolina Administrative Procedures Act . . . establishes the standard for judicial
review of decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission."); id at 289, 599
S.E.2d at 610-11 ("[An appellate c]ourt's review is limited to deciding whether the
[Appellate Panel's] decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or is controlled
by some error of law."); Shealy v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438,
442 (2000) ("In workers' compensation cases, the [Appellate Panel] is the ultimate
fact finder."); Hargrove, 360 S.C. at 290, 599 S.E.2d at 611 ("Where there are
conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings of the Appellate Panel
are conclusive."); § 42-15-20(C) ("In the case of repetitive trauma, notice must be
given by the employee within ninety days of the date the employee discovered, or
could have discovered by exercising reasonable diligence, that h[er] condition is
compensable, unless reasonable excuse is made to the satisfaction of the
commission for not giving timely notice, and the commission is satisfied that the
employer has not been unduly prejudiced thereby."); King v. Int'l Knife &
Saw-Florence, 395 S.C. 437, 444, 718 S.E.2d 227, 231 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[A]
work-related repetitive trauma injury does not become compensable, and the
ninety-day reporting clock does not start, until the injured employee discovers or
should discover [s]he qualifies to receive benefits for medical care, treatment, or
disability due to h[er] condition.").

AFFIRMED.1

GEATHERS and HILL, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.