Paul v. SCDOT

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Ronald I. Paul, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Transportation; Paul D. de
Holczer, individually and as a partner of the law firm of
Moses, Koon & Brackett, PC; Michael H. Quinn,
individually and as senior lawyer of Quinn Law Firm,
LLC; J. Charles Ormond, Jr., individually and as a
partner of the Law Firm of Holler, Dennis, Corbett,
Ormond, Plante & Garner; Oscar K. Rucker, in his
individual capacity as Director, Rights of Way South
Carolina Department of Transportation; Macie M.
Gresham, in her individual capacity as Eastern Region
Right of Way Program Manager South Carolina
Department of Transportation; Natalie J. Moore, in her
individual capacity as Assistant Chief Counsel, South
Carolina Department of Transportation, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-002076

Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-051
Submitted January 1, 2022 – Filed February 9, 2022

AFFIRMED
Ronald I. Paul, of Columbia, pro se.

Michael H. Quinn, of Quinn Law Firm, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent Michael H. Quinn.

Andrew F. Lindemann, of Lindemann & Davis, P.A., of
Columbia, for Respondents South Carolina Department
of Transportation, Macie M. Gresham, Oscar K. Rucker,
and Natalie J. Moore.

B. Michael Brackett, of Moses & Brackett, and Andrew
F. Lindemann, of Lindemann & Davis, P.A., both of
Columbia, for Respondent Paul D. de Holczer.

J. Charles Ormond, Jr., of Ormond/Dunn, of Columbia,
for Respondent J. Charles Ormond, Jr.

PER CURIAM: Ronald I. Paul appeals the circuit court's grant of the motions to
dismiss by the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT), Paul D. de
Holczer, Natalie J. Moore, Michael H. Quinn, and J. Charles Ormond, Jr.
(collectively, Respondents) under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. On appeal, Paul argues
the circuit court erred by (1) dismissing SCDOT as an improper party when his
complaint contained a state law claim, (2) determining the statute of limitations
governing his claim was three years, (3) not finding the statute of limitations began
to run on the date of the last overt act of conspiracy, (4) dismissing Respondents on
the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel, (5) finding that Quinn and Ormond
were not state actors, and (6) dismissing his complaint with prejudice without an
opportunity to replead or amend. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

As to issues two and three, we hold the circuit court properly granted Respondents'
motions to dismiss because Paul's complaint reflects he pursued causes of action
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for alleged conduct that occurred outside the
applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Grimsley v. S.C. Law Enforcement
Div., 396 S.C. 276, 281, 721 S.E.2d 423, 426 (2012) ("On appeal from the
dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), an appellate court applies the same
standard of review as the [circuit] court." (quoting Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643,
646, 675 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2009))); id. ("That standard requires the [c]ourt to
construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if
the 'facts alleged and the inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would
entitle the plaintiff to relief on any theory of the case.'" (quoting Rydde, 381 S.C. at
646, 675 S.E.2d at 433)); Spence v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 116, 628 S.E.2d 869,
874 (2006) ("In considering such a motion, the [circuit] court must base its ruling
solely on allegations set forth in the complaint."); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
249-50 (1989) ("[W]here state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for
personal injury actions, courts considering [section] 1983 claims should borrow the
general or residual statute for personal injury actions."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-3-530(5) (2005) (providing a three-year limitations period for personal injury
actions); Est. of Mims v. S.C. Dep't of Disabilities & Special Needs, 422 S.C. 388,
399, 811 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Ct. App. 2018) ("In South Carolina, [section] 1983
claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations."); Blanck v. McKeen, 707
F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[T]he time when a [federal] cause of action accrues
is governed by federal, not state, law."); id. ("[T]he statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of due diligence should
have discovered, the facts forming the basis of his cause of action."); id. at 820
("[A claimant's] action is time-barred as long as they were 'on notice' of the
conduct about which they complain.").

As to issue six, we hold the circuit court properly dismissed Paul's claims with
prejudice because Respondents' dismissal was not due to any correctable pleading
deficiency. See Spence, 368 S.C. at 129, 628 S.E.2d at 881 ("When a complaint is
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action, the dismissal generally is without prejudice. The plaintiff in most
cases should be given an opportunity to file and serve an amended complaint.");
Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry Cnty., 426 S.C. 175, 189, 826 S.E.2d 585, 592
(2019) ("A circuit court does not have 'discretion' to dismiss a complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) without at least
considering whether to allow leave to amend under Rule 15(a)[, SCRCP].");
Alterna Tax Asset Grp., LLC v. York Cnty., 434 S.C. 328, 334, 863 S.E.2d 465, 468
(Ct. App. 2021) ("[W]e are mindful that [circuit] courts should not dismiss
pleadings with prejudice at the 12(b) stage without allowing the pleader to amend
its complaint (unless amendment would be futile)." (emphasis added)).

Because the resolution of issues two, three, and six are dispositive, we need not
address the remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.1

THOMAS, GEATHERS, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.