Stevenson v. Laney

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James M. Stevenson, Claimant, Appellant,

v.

Arnold Laney D/B/A Metal & Roofing Shingle Pros,
Employer, and South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Uninsured Employers' Fund, Defendants, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000613

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-010
Submitted November 1, 2021 – Filed January 12, 2022

AFFIRMED

James David George, Jr. and C. Daniel Vega, of Chappell
Smith & Arden, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Timothy Blair Killen, of Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn &
Prickett, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: James M. Stevenson appeals the order of the Workers'
Compensation Commission denying his claim for workers' compensation benefits.
On appeal, Stevenson argues the Commission erred by finding (1) Stevenson was
not an "employee" of Arnold Laney d/b/a Metal & Roofing Shingle Pros (Laney),
(2) Laney was not subject to the Workers' Compensation Act, (3) Stevenson failed
to establish his claim was within the Commission's jurisdiction, (4) Stevenson's
testimony was not credible, and (5) Stevenson failed to provide corroborating
testimony. We affirm.

1. We hold the Commission did not err in finding that Laney was not subject to the
Workers' Compensation Act because he did not regularly employ four or more
employees. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-360(2) (2015) (stating an employer who
does not regularly employ four or more employees in the same business is not
subject to the Workers' Compensation Act); Lee v. Bondex, Inc., 406 S.C. 97, 101,
749 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Ct. App. 2013) ("[C]redibility determination[s] by the
appellate panel, if supported by substantial evidence, [are] binding on the
[appellate] court[s]."); Johnson v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 398 S.C. 595, 600, 730 S.E.2d
857, 860 (2012) ("Substantial evidence . . . is evidence which, considering the
record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the [same]
conclusion . . . ."); Fishburne v. ATI Sys. Int'l, 384 S.C. 76, 85, 681 S.E.2d 595,
600 (Ct. App. 2009) ("[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent [the Commission's] finding from being
supported by substantial evidence." (quoting Palmetto Alliance, Inc. v. S.C. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 282 S.C. 430, 432, 319 S.E.2d 695, 696 (1984))); Crane v. Raber's
Discount Tire Rack, 429 S.C. 636, 645, 842 S.E.2d 349, 353 (2020) ("In cases in
which we affirmed factual findings of the [C]ommission based on its credibility
determination, we did so because it made sense for the [C]ommission to use
credibility as the dispositive factor in deciding the particular issue."); Langdale v.
Carpets, 395 S.C. 194, 203, 717 S.E.2d 80, 84-85 (Ct. App. 2011) (affirming the
Commission's reliance on its credibility determination to decide a factual issue
because the evidence presented was conflicting). Thus, the Commission correctly
found it did not have jurisdiction over Stevenson's claim. See Hernandez-Zuniga
v. Tickle, 374 S.C. 235, 244, 647 S.E.2d 691, 695 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The issue of
whether an employer regularly employs the requisite number of employees . . . is
jurisdictional." (quoting Harding v. Plumley, 329 S.C. 580, 584, 496 S.E.2d 29, 31
(Ct. App. 1998))).

2. Because our holding that Laney is not subject to the Act is dispositive, we
decline to address Stevenson's remaining issues. See Earthscapes Unlimited, Inc.
v. Ulbrich, 390 S.C. 609, 617, 703 S.E.2d 221, 225 (2010) ("Because an appellate
court need not address remaining issues when disposition of a prior issue is
dispositive, an analysis of the remaining issues in unnecessary."); Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (holding appellate courts need not address remaining issues when
determination of a prior issue is dispositive).

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, A.C.J., MCDONALD, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.