State v. Rogers

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Daniel Antwan Rogers, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000704

Appeal From Dillon County
Roger E. Henderson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-329
Submitted June 1, 2021 – Filed September 15, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Victor R. Seeger, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor William Benjamin Rogers, Jr.,
of Bennettsville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Daniel Antwan Rogers appeals the sentencing court's imposition
of his full suspended fifteen-year imprisonment sentence. Rogers argues the
sentencing court abused its discretion by refusing to exercise discretion over his
sentencing when deciding to allow Rogers to continue in the drug court program or
impose his full sentence. Because we find the sentencing court only commented
that it did not have discretion over the drug court's decision and Rogers violated a
condition of his suspended sentence by being terminated from the drug court, the
sentencing court acted within its discretion to impose Rogers's suspended
fifteen-year imprisonment sentence. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Perkins, 378 S.C. 57, 61,
661 S.E.2d 366, 368 (2008) ("The decision of whether a defendant has violated a
condition of his suspended sentence rests within the sound discretion of the
[sentencing] court."); id. ("An appellate court will not reverse the [sentencing]
court's decision unless that court abused its discretion."); id. ("[L]ike any other
defendant who is subject to the imposition of a suspended sentence, we conclude
that a Drug Court Program participant is entitled to notice and a hearing to
determine whether he has violated the conditions of his suspended sentence before
his sentence may be imposed."); id. ("Accordingly, while we hold that it is
inappropriate for the courts to review whether a participant was properly
terminated from a Drug Court Program, the participant is entitled to a hearing to
determine whether he was in fact terminated from a Drug Court Program . . .
before his sentence may be imposed."); id. at 62, 661 S.E.2d at 368-69 (holding the
"[sentencing] court correctly determined that [Perkins] violated a condition of his
suspended sentence, and therefore, properly imposed [Perkins's] original
sentence").

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.