State v. Dunham

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Levance Dunham, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001438

Appeal From Sumter County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-291
Submitted April 1, 2021 – Filed August 4, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of
Sumter, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Levance Dunham appeals his conviction of possession of
cocaine base and sentence of five years' imprisonment. Dunham argues the trial
court erred by admitting his wanted poster with his mugshot on it because the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the poster's probative value.
We affirm.

We find the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the wanted poster, which
included Dunham's mugshot. See State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E.2d
324, 326 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial
court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v.
Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557, 564 S.E.2d 87, 93 (2002))); id. ("An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded
in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." (quoting Clark v.
Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000))); State v. Traylor, 360
S.C. 74, 84, 600 S.E.2d 523, 528 (2004) ("The introduction of a 'mug-shot' of a
defendant is reversible error unless: (1) the state has a demonstrable need to
introduce the photograph, (2) the photograph shown to the jury does not suggest
the defendant has a criminal record, and (3) the photograph is not introduced in
such a way as to draw attention to its origin or implication.").

First, we find the State's asserted need for admitting the wanted poster—to
corroborate Officer Micah Young's testimony—was insufficient because the body
camera footage and Officer Verna Robertson's testimony already fully
corroborated Officer Young's testimony. Second, the wanted poster suggested that
Dunham had a criminal record because it stated he was wanted for the commission
of a crime other than possession of cocaine base. Moreover, a jury could infer that
Dunham was arrested on charges for a third crime because the mugshot on the
wanted poster would have been taken during an arrest for charges other than the
one for which he was wanted. Third, the State introduced the wanted poster in a
manner that drew attention to the mugshot's origin because the wanted poster
stated that the photograph was taken at the Sumter-Lee Regional Detention Center.
Thus, the State failed to show a demonstrable need to admit the wanted poster, the
wanted poster suggested Dunham had a criminal record, and the wanted poster
drew attention to its origin as a mugshot.

However, we affirm Dunham's conviction because he was not prejudiced by the
admission of the wanted poster beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Huggins,
336 S.C. 200, 204, 519 S.E.2d 574, 576 (1999) ("Error without prejudice does not
warrant reversal."); State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 389, 728 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2012)
("The key factor for determining whether a trial error constitutes reversible error is
'whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained."'" (quoting State v. Charping, 313 S.C. 147, 157,
437 S.E.2d 88, 94 (1993) (Goolsby A.J., concurring))); State v. King, 424 S.C. 188,
201, 818 S.E.2d 204, 211 (2018) ("[A]n insubstantial error not affecting a trial's
result is harmless where 'guilt has been conclusively proven by competent evidence
such that no other rational conclusion can be reached.'" (quoting State v. Bailey,
298 S.C. 1, 5, 377 S.E.2d 581, 584 (1989))); Traylor, 360 S.C. at 84, 600 S.E.2d at
528 (holding the admission of appellant's mugshot was error, but affirming
Traylor's conviction because the mugshot did not prejudice him). The evidence
presented at trial was overwhelming; thus, the error did not contribute to the guilty
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Chavis, 412 S.C. 101, 109, 771
S.E.2d 336, 340 (2015) (holding error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt "in
light of the substantial evidence of guilt"). Officer Young and Officer Robertson
testified they found cocaine base in Dunham's pocket and a pipe on the floorboard
where Dunham was seated. An expert in drug analysis testified the substance was
cocaine base. Critically, the video footage taken from Officer Young's body
camera showed Officer Young find a pipe and remove a rock-like substance from
Dunham's pocket. All of this evidence, especially the video evidence showing
Officer Young remove the rock-like substance, rendered the admission of the
wanted poster harmless because its admission could not reasonably have affected
the result of Dunham's trial.

AFFIRMED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.