State v. Sellers

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

William C. (Billy) Sellers, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001667

Appeal From Edgefield County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-254
Heard April 15, 2021 – Filed July 7, 2021

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and
Assistant Attorney General Caroline M. Scrantom, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: A jury convicted William C. Sellers of murder. He now appeals,
arguing the trial court erred in (1) instructing the jury that malice "is the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse" because it unconstitutionally
shifted the State's burden of proof to him to show his acts were justified or excusable;
(2) instructing the jury on accomplice liability because the evidence did not support
this instruction; and (3) admitting witness Phillip Griffin's sentencing sheets into
evidence because they were not probative of whether Griffin received consideration
from the State for his testimony. We affirm.

1. As to whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging the jury that malice
is "is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse," we are
constrained to hold this charge remains good law that circuit judges may include as
part of a malice instruction. See State v. Franks, 376 S.C. 621, 624, 658 S.E.2d 104,
106 (Ct. App. 2008) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision
regarding jury instructions unless the trial court abused its discretion." (quoting
Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000))); State v. Cottrell,
421 S.C. 622, 643, 809 S.E.2d 423, 435 (2017) ("A trial court is required to charge
the current and correct law in South Carolina."); State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 269, 276,
584 S.E.2d 138, 141–42 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Malice is the wrongful intent to injure
another and indicates a wicked or depraved spirit intent on doing wrong. It is the
doing of a wrongful act intentionally and without just cause or excuse." (citations
omitted)). Our supreme court has held this instruction is not an unconstitutional
burden shifting charge. State v. Bell, 305 S.C. 11, 19, 406 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1991)
("Appellant complains the trial judge improperly defined malice as 'the doing of a
wrongful act intentionally and without just cause or excuse.' He claims the
instruction created an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption. We disagree.
The trial judge's definition of malice is correct, State v. Judge, 208 S.C. 497, 38
S.E.2d 715 (1946), and the charge given is devoid of any presumption."). The trial
court's malice instruction stated in part:

In order to sustain a conviction for murder the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . the defendant
killed another person with malice aforethought. Now, I
tell you that malice is defined as hatred, ill will hostility
towards another person. It is the intentional doing of a
wrongful act without just cause or excuse or with an intent
to inflict danger or under the circumstances which the law
infers an evil intent or malice.

(Emphasis added). We understand Sellers' argument that a reasonable jury could
apply the phrase equating malice with "intentional doing of a wrongful act without
just cause or excuse" in problematic ways. We are not sure what the challenged
phrase adds to a malice charge and can see the wisdom in not charging it. We are
also not sure how a wrongful act can be said to be done with malice if all that is
proven is that the act was done with intent (all crimes require some level of intent
except strict liability ones, see, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 271–72, 395
S.E.2d 182, 183 (1990)). Nor are we sure how an intentional act that is justified or
excusable by law could be a crime. But even amidst the trend by our supreme court
(aptly noted by Sellers) to revisit dubious and outworn jury instructions, see
Pantovich v. State, 427 S.C. 555, 832 S.E.2d 596 (2019), we are quite sure we must
comply with the precedent of Bell.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on accomplice
liability. See Franks, 376 S.C. at 624, 658 S.E.2d at 106 ("An appellate court will
not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial court
abused its discretion." (quoting Clark, 339 S.C. at 389, 529 S.E.2d at 539)). There
was evidence Sellers worked with an unidentified coconspirator named Gee or
another unknown person to rob and murder the victim by beating him to death. This
evidence included testimony from three of Sellers' fellow inmates that Sellers said
(1) he and Gee went to rob the victim for pills and money, and they pistol-whipped
the victim until he told them where his pills were; (2) he and his friends tied the
victim up, beat him, and stole a slot machine, some pills, and some money; and (3)
"they" beat an old white man with a .38 and stole some pills. Thus, the evidence
was equivocal as to whether Sellers or one of his unknown coconspirators dealt the
fatal blow that resulted in the victim's death. See State v. Washington, 431 S.C. 394,
407, 848 S.E.2d 779, 786 (2020) ("For an accomplice liability instruction to be
warranted, the evidence must be 'equivocal on some integral fact and the jury [must
have] been presented with evidence upon which it could rely to find the existence or
nonexistence of that fact.'" (alterations in original) (quoting Barber v. State, 393 S.C.
232, 236, 712 S.E.2d 436, 439 (2011))). Accordingly, we find the trial court properly
instructed the jury on accomplice liability, and we affirm as to this issue.

3. The State called Griffin, one of Sellers' fellow inmates, to testify against him.
During cross-examination, Sellers questioned Griffin extensively about the potential
sentence he faced for the charges he had pending when he was in jail with Sellers,
his plea, and the sentence he ultimately received. Sellers' cross-examination raised
the issue of Griffin's motive to testify and whether he was testifying against Sellers
in exchange for leniency by the State. On redirect, the State introduced Griffin's
sentencing sheets, which indicated he pled straight up, without any sentencing
negotiations or recommendation from the State. The trial court admitted the sheets
over Sellers' relevance objection. Sellers claims this was error. We disagree. We
hold the State was entitled to introduce evidence of Griffin's plea negotiations. See
State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 629, 545 S.E.2d 805, 817 (2001) ("Most courts
generally recognize the prosecution can introduce evidence of a plea agreement
during direct examination of a State witness."). Griffin's sentencing sheets were
probative of Griffin's alleged motive in testifying for the State. State v. McEachern,
399 S.C. 125, 137, 731 S.E.2d 604, 610 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When a party introduces
evidence about a particular matter, the other party is entitled to introduce evidence
in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even if the latter evidence would have been
incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially."); Rule 608(c), SCRE
(providing evidence showing "Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness . . . ."). The trial court did not err in admitting the
sentencing sheets where the only objection was on relevance grounds.

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.