State v. Jenkins

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tyquin Terrell Jenkins, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000284

Appeal From Orangeburg County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-263
Submitted May 1, 2021 – Filed July 14, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew
Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Tyquin Terrell Jenkins appeals his convictions for first-degree
criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping, for which he was sentenced to concurrent
sentences of thirty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Jenkins argues the trial court
erred in finding he opened the door to the elicitation of portions of his statement to
law enforcement during opening remarks and in failing to give a curative
instruction to the jury. Because Jenkins asserted in his opening statement that he
told law enforcement he would never hurt anyone, we find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by allowing the limited testimony from one of the
investigators, which demonstrated Jenkins's statement to law enforcement was not
truthful. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 5, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001)
("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); id. at 6,
545 S.E.2d at 829 ("[The appellate court is] bound by the trial court's factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous."); State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208,
631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v.
Page, 378 S.C. 476, 482, 663 S.E.2d 357, 360 (Ct. App. 2008) ("It is firmly
established that otherwise inadmissible evidence may be properly admitted when
opposing counsel opens the door to that evidence."); id. at 483, 663 S.E.2d at 360
("Whether a person opens the door to the admission of otherwise inadmissible
evidence during the course of a trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
[court]."); Ellenburg v. State, 367 S.C. 66, 69, 625 S.E.2d 224, 226 (2006) ("Once
the defendant opens the door, the [State's] invited response is appropriate so long
as it is does not unfairly prejudice the defendant."); State v. Dunlap, 353 S.C. 539,
541, 579 S.E.2d 318, 319 (2003) (holding a criminal defendant's opening
statement, which created the impression he had no prior connection to the sale of
narcotics, opened the door to the introduction of evidence rebutting the contention
that the defendant was merely an addict).1

AFFIRMED.2

KONDUROS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
Additionally, because there was no error there was no need for the trial court to
issue a curative instruction. See State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d
578, 583 (2010) ("To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested
jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); id. at 479,
697 S.E.2d at 584 ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision
regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Walker, 366 S.C.
643, 658, 623 S.E.2d 122, 129 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Generally, a curative instruction
is deemed to have cured any alleged error").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.