State v. Hughes

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Jane Katherine Hughes, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000659

Appeal From Greenville County
Perry H. Gravely, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-283
Heard December 7, 2020 – Filed July 21, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Assistant
Attorney General Caroline Scrantom, all of Columbia,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jane Katherine Hughes appeals her convictions for conspiracy to
commit murder and the murder of John Michael Ferrell (Victim), her husband.
Hughes asserts the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion for a directed verdict
on the conspiracy charge, (2) failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included
offense of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and (3)
denying her trial counsel's motion to be relieved. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At 11:54 P.M. on January 24, 2015, Hughes called 911 and asked the operator to
send officers to her home, where she lived with her two children, her boyfriend
Andrew Martin, her parents John Hughes (Father) and Margaret Hughes (Mother),
and sometimes her brother Jacob Hughes (Brother). When the first officer arrived,
Father was standing outside the front of the home holding a handgun and Victim
was lying unresponsive on the ground, bleeding from his head and multiple
gunshot wounds. Hughes, Martin, Mother, Brother, and the children were inside
the home. Victim was pronounced dead at 12:13 A.M.

On January 28, 2015, Hughes, Martin, Father, Mother, and Brother were arrested.
Hughes was indicted for conspiring with Father, Mother, and/or Brother to kill
Victim, the murder of Victim, and possession of a weapon during the commission
of a violent crime.

On January 5, 2018, Hughes and her appointed counsel (Counsel) appeared before
the trial court for a hearing on Counsel's motions for a continuance and to be
relieved. Counsel requested the continuance in order to obtain the trial transcript
of a previous trial—for which she also had applied for funds due to Hughes's
indigent status—and the trial court granted the motion. However, the trial court
denied the motion to be relieved as counsel. In April 2018, Hughes and Brother
were tried jointly for murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and the following
evidence was presented.1

In the months preceding Victim's murder, he and Hughes were involved in a
custody dispute over their children. Victim and Hughes previously lived in
California, and Victim sought enforcement of a California court order giving him
custody of the children. Hughes and her parents were extremely worried Victim
would receive custody or unsupervised visitation. One witness talked with
Hughes, Father, and Mother the night before Victim's murder, and the witness said
Hughes was angry and adamant that Victim not get custody of the children. The

1
The State did not go forward with the weapon possession charge.
witness testified Hughes said "I wish he was just gone. Things would be so much
easier if he was just gone," and everyone chuckled.

On the night of Victim's murder, Victim and Brother sat in a bar and talked from
8:07 P.M. to 10:35 P.M., and then they went to a restaurant approximately two miles
from Hughes's home and talked from 10:49 P.M. until 11:21 P.M. While Brother
was with Victim, there were multiple calls and text messages between Father and
Brother. At 10:03 P.M., Brother sent Father a text message reading "Call when
you're ready for pie."2 Father replied several times between 10:04 P.M. and 11:10
P.M., stating, "Will do," "Almost," "Just a few minutes," and "Call me." In each of
Father's text messages, he ended the message with "green dragons and elm trees"
in quotation marks. When Victim and Brother left the restaurant, they drove to
Hughes's home.

At Hughes's home, Father told Martin that Victim was coming to talk about the
custody dispute, and he asked Martin to wait outside. While he was outside,
Martin heard a large crash from inside. When he entered the house, he saw the
kitchen table had been overturned and Hughes was standing in the kitchen
entryway wielding and swinging a hammer. Father was crouching and pointing a
gun at Victim, who was kneeling on the floor and bleeding, and Brother was
standing behind Victim. Martin then pulled Hughes into the foyer so she could call
the police, and he heard Brother try to tase Victim. Victim tried to escape through
the kitchen window, but Brother and Mother grabbed at him to try to prevent his
escape while Father ran out the front door. Victim escaped through the window,
and Martin heard him begging for his life before Martin heard Father shoot Victim
several times. Mother began cleaning the kitchen, and Brother helped before he
went to the back of the house. Martin later heard Brother say he broke the taser
and flushed it down the toilet. When Martin asked Hughes why she hit Victim
with the hammer, she told him she did it to "protect her family" and "because
[Father] hesitated." Martin testified Father stated twice that nobody would be in
trouble if the police did not find out what happened inside the house, which Martin
interpreted as threats.

When officers found Victim, they observed that the bottom of his shirt was ripped
and his pants and underwear were around his ankles. Officers found a trail of
blood running from Victim's body to the kitchen window, and they found Victim's
blood on the kitchen blinds, a hammer and blanket in the kitchen, and Hughes's

2
On the day before Victim's murder, Father sent Brother a text message saying,
"Stop on [the] way home, need[] to discuss dessert. 'Revolution is the solution.'"
shirt and pants. Officers discovered nonvisible blood stains on the kitchen floor
and table, the foyer wall, the hallway bathroom, and a damp rag found in the
kitchen trash can.

At trial, the State played Hughes's 911 call for the jury, in which Hughes tells the
911 operator that Victim broke into the house and was trying to kill her and her
children. However, before the 911 operator answered and before Father shot
Victim, the call recorded Hughes asking where Victim was and repeatedly saying
"you gotta get to him" and "you gotta get him."

The doctor performing Victim's autopsy found at least five gunshot wounds and
determined those wounds were the cause of Victim's death. The doctor also noted
blunt force trauma on Victim's head and found two different wound patterns, one
of which was consistent with the claw side of a carpentry hammer. The doctor
testified Victim had been hit with the claw side of the hammer at least four to six
times.

The jury found Hughes guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and the
trial court sentenced her to concurrent sentences of thirty years and five years,
respectively, with credit for time served. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only, and are
therefore bound by the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous." State
v. Robinson, 410 S.C. 519, 526, 765 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2014). An appellate court's
review "is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion."
State v. Edwards, 384 S.C. 504, 508, 682 S.E.2d 820, 822 (2009). "An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when
grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary support." State v. Pittman,
373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166–67 (2007).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Directed Verdict

Hughes argues the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the
conspiracy charge. We disagree.
"In reviewing a motion for directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the
existence of evidence, not with its weight." State v. Phillips, 416 S.C. 184, 192,
785 S.E.2d 448, 452 (2016). The trial court must deny a motion for directed
verdict when "there is 'any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove
the guilt of the accused, or from which his guilt may be fairly and logically
deduced.'" Id. at 192–93, 785 S.E.2d at 452 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C.
406, 409, 535 S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000)). "On appeal from the denial of a directed
verdict, [appellate courts] view[] the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to the State." State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d
457, 460 (2014).

Conspiracy is defined as "a combination between two or more persons for the
purpose of accomplishing an unlawful object or lawful object by unlawful means."
S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-410 (2015). "The essence of a conspiracy is the
agreement. It may be proven by the specific overt acts done in furtherance of the
conspiracy but the crime is the agreement." State v. Buckmon, 347 S.C. 316, 323,
555 S.E.2d 402, 405 (2001) (citation omitted). "[P]roof of an express agreement is
not necessary, and direct evidence is not essential, but the conspiracy may be
sufficiently shown by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the parties." Id.

We find the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict on
the conspiracy charge. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
text messages between Father and Brother and Father's threatening statements
regarding the need to conceal the events occurring inside Hughes's home from the
police could lead the jury to "fairly and logically deduce[]" there was a conspiracy
to murder Victim. See Butler, 407 S.C. at 381, 755 S.E.2d at 460 (stating all
evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State on appeal from the
denial of a directed verdict); see Phillips, 416 S.C. at 192–93, 785 S.E.2d at 452
("[T]he trial court must submit the case to the jury if there is 'any substantial
evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused, or from which
his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.'" (quoting Mitchell, 341 S.C. at 409,
535 S.E.2d at 127)). The State also presented evidence indicating Hughes was a
part of the conspiracy. Before Father shot Victim outside the house, Hughes's 911
call recorded Hughes telling others "you gotta get to him" and "you gotta get him."
The State also showed that Hughes was worried about losing custody of her
children to Victim, that she struck Victim multiple times in the head with a
carpentry hammer, and that she did so "to protect her family" and "because
[Father] hesitated." A jury could find this evidence shows Hughes acted to further
the conspiracy by attacking Victim and then directing others to prevent Victim
from escaping and to complete the murder. See Buckmon, 347 S.C. at 323, 555
S.E.2d at 405 (stating a conspiracy can be proven by acts done in furtherance of the
conspiracy).

Because the State presented competent evidence of a conspiracy between Hughes
and her family, the trial court did not err in denying her motion for a directed
verdict. See State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139, 708 S.E.2d 774, 776–77 (2011)
("Unless there is a total failure of competent evidence as to the charges alleged,
refusal by the trial [court] to direct a verdict of acquittal is not error." (quoting
State v. Irvin, 270 S.C. 539, 543, 243 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1978))). Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court on this issue.

II. ABHAN as a Lesser-Included Offense

Hughes argues the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on ABHAN as a
lesser-included offense to murder. We disagree.

"'Murder' is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or
implied." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (2015). A person commits ABHAN "if the
person unlawfully injures another person, and: (a) great bodily injury to another
person results; or (b) the act is accomplished by means likely to produce death or
great bodily injury." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(B)(1) (2015). When "there is no
dispute the victim died as a result of the battery alleged in the indictment, . . .
ABHAN [is] not [a] lesser included offense[] of murder." State v. Fields, 314 S.C.
144, 145, 442 S.E.2d 181, 182 (1994).

In the indictment, Hughes was charged with murdering Victim by "shooting him
multiple times with a handgun and assaulting him with a hammer." There is no
dispute that Victim died of gunshot wounds and that Father fired the shots. The
State argued at trial that Hughes was guilty of murder under the doctrine of
accomplice liability. See State v. Harry, 413 S.C. 534, 540, 776 S.E.2d 387, 390
(Ct. App. 2015) ("The doctrine of accomplice liability arises from the theory that
the hand of one is the hand of all." (quoting State v. Reid, 408 S.C. 461, 472, 758
S.E.2d 904, 910 (2014))); id. at 540, 776 S.E.2d at 391 ("Under this theory, one
who joins with another to accomplish an illegal purpose is liable criminally for
everything done by his confederate incidental to the execution of the common
design and purpose." (quoting Reid, 408 S.C. at 472, 758 S.E.2d at 910)); see also
Reid, 408 S.C. at 472–73, 758 S.E.2d at 910 ("A person must personally commit
the crime or be present at the scene of the crime and intentionally, or through a
common design, aid, abet, or assist in the commission of that crime through some
overt act to be guilty under a theory of accomplice liability.").
As discussed above, there was evidence that Hughes joined with her family to
murder Victim and that she participated in Victim's murder. Because it is not
disputed that Victim died as a result of one of the batteries alleged in the
indictment—i.e., the gunshots—ABHAN is not a lesser-included offense under the
facts of this case. See Fields, 314 S.C. at 145, 442 S.E.2d at 182 ("[When] there is
no dispute the victim died as a result of the battery alleged in the indictment, . . .
ABHAN [is] not [a] lesser included offense[] of murder."). Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in declining to charge the jury with ABHAN, and we affirm the
trial court on this issue.

III. Motion to be Relieved

Hughes argues the trial court erred in denying Counsel's motion to be relieved. We
disagree.

Whether to grant or deny a motion to relieve counsel rests within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150, 152, 612 S.E.2d 449, 450 (2005). "The movant
bears the burden to show satisfactory cause for removal." State v. Childers, 373
S.C. 367, 372, 645 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2007). "The mere possibility defense counsel
may have a conflict of interest is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction."
Gregory, 364 S.C. at 152–53, 612 S.E.2d at 450.

The alleged conflict of interest was Counsel's belief that Hughes or her family
pressured several of Counsel's other clients to file grievances against Counsel.3
Our supreme court has held "the filing of a disciplinary complaint should not result
in automatic removal of appointed counsel." Richardson v. State, 377 S.C. 103,
107, 659 S.E.2d 493, 495 (2008) (per curiam). The trial court asked Hughes if she
coerced Counsel's other clients to file the grievances, and she denied doing so. The
trial court noted Counsel's reputation as an excellent criminal attorney and
considered Counsel's representation following the grievances. Specifically, the
court commended Counsel for requesting both the transcript from a previous trial
and the funds for the transcript, stating that many attorneys would not have done
the same. The trial court, noting Counsel was in a difficult position if her assertion
was true, expressed concern that relieving Counsel "midstream" would be

3
Counsel informed the court that four grievances had been filed, but all were
determined to be without merit before the hearing on the motion to be relieved.
detrimental to Hughes. We find the trial court properly exercised its discretion in
denying Counsel's motion.

Furthermore, Hughes has failed to show the trial court's denial prejudiced her as
the record shows Counsel's representation was not affected by the grievances. See
id. ("[T]he filing of a disciplinary complaint should not result in automatic removal
of appointed counsel"). Counsel successfully objected to evidence that would have
strengthened the State's case on the conspiracy charge and effectively cross-
examined the State's witnesses. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's
denial of Counsel's motion to be relieved.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Hughes's convictions are

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.