State v. Land

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Geraldo Dametrius Land, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001367

Appeal From Chester County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-084
Submitted February 1, 2021 – Filed March 17, 2021

AFFIRMED

Appellant Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William Fredrick Schumacher, IV,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr.,
of Lancaster, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Geraldo Land appeals his convictions for first-degree burglary,
first-degree assault and battery, possession of a weapon during the commission of a
violent crime, and two counts of armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to
concurrent sentences of fifteen years' imprisonment for first-degree burglary, ten
years' imprisonment for first-degree assault and battery, five years' imprisonment
for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and ten
years' imprisonment for each count of armed robbery. On appeal, he argues the
trial court erred in allowing him to proceed pro se because it did not adequately
warn him of the dangers of self-representation; thus, he could not make a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary invocation.

Land moved to proceed pro se. The trial court questioned Land about his
background, informed him of his right to counsel, warned him there were potential
dangers of self-representation, and explained that the rules of evidence and the
rules of the court were complex. Land responded that he understood these dangers
and still wished to proceed pro se. We find the trial court conducted a specific
inquiry that warned Land of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
and Land knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
representation. Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities: State v. Samuel, 422 S.C. 596, 602, 813 S.E.2d 487, 491
(2018) ("In order to effectively invoke this right of self-representation, the
defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his desire to proceed pro se and
such request must be made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily."); State v.
Fuller, 337 S.C. 236, 241, 523 S.E.2d 168, 170 (1999) ("If the request to proceed
pro se is made after trial has begun, the grant or denial of the right to proceed pro
se rests within the sound discretion of the trial [court]."); Prince v. State, 301 S.C.
422, 424, 392 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1990) (stating that Faretta requires the trial court
to conduct a specific inquiry to warn the defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation); Wroten v. State, 301 S.C. 293, 294, 391
S.E.2d 575, 576 (1990) ("[T]he ultimate test is not the trial [court's] advice but
rather the defendant's understanding [of the dangers of self-representation]."); id.
("If the record demonstrates the defendant's decision to represent himself was
made with an understanding of the risks of self-representation, the requirements of
a voluntary waiver will be satisfied.").

AFFIRMED.1

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.