Brock v. Town of Mount Pleasant

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Stephen G. Brock, Appellant,

v.

Town of Mount Pleasant, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000332

Appeal From Charleston County
J.C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-051
Submitted February 1, 2021 – Filed February 24, 2021

AFFIRMED

Stephen G. Brock, of Mount Pleasant, pro se.

Julia Parker Copeland, of Hinchey Murray & Pagliarini,
LLC, and Timothy Alan Domin, of Clawson and Staubes,
both of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Stephen G. Brock appeals the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, to the Town of Mount Pleasant (Mount
Pleasant). On appeal, Brock argues Mount Pleasant failed to follow its own
ordinances and rules of order when enacting an amendment to its zoning code and
land development regulations, provided deficient public notice of a public hearing
for the amendments, and improperly discussed amendments during a special
meeting. We affirm because the pleadings in this case demonstrate Brock did not
have standing to challenge Mount Pleasant's zoning code and land development
regulation amendments.1 See Jowers v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 423
S.C. 343, 353, 815 S.E.2d 446, 451 (2018) ("Our courts will not address the merits
of any case unless it presents a justiciable controversy."); Youngblood v. S.C. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 402 S.C. 311, 317, 741 S.E.2d 515, 518 (2013) ("Standing, a
fundamental prerequisite to instituting an action, may exist by statute, through the
principles of constitutional standing, or through the public importance exception.").
First, Brock lacked statutory standing to challenge the amended zoning code. See
Youngblood, 402 S.C. at 317, 741 S.E.2d at 518 ("Statutory standing exists, as the
name implies, when a statute confers a right to sue on a party, and determining
whether a statute confers standing is an exercise in statutory interpretation.").
Here, Brock did not have statutory standing under the South Carolina Local
Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of 1994 because he did not
demonstrate he suffered an injury distinct from the public generally. See Carnival
Corp. v. Hist. Ansonborough Neighborhood Ass'n, 407 S.C. 67, 78-79, 753 S.E.2d
846, 852 (2014) (explaining section 6-29-950 of the South Carolina Code (2004)
creates a "legally protected interest and thereby standing for neighbors of
properties violating a local zoning ordinance" and one seeking to enjoin an alleged
zoning violation must demonstrate they suffered an "injury distinct from that
suffered by the public generally"). Second, Brock lacked constitutional standing to
challenge the amendments. See Youngblood, 402 S.C. at 317, 741 S.E.2d at 518
(explaining constitutional standing requires a concrete and particularized injury, a
causal connection between the conduct complained of and the injury, and the
possibility of redress if a favorable decision is issued). Brock's challenge focused
on the legislative process the Town Council and Planning Commission of Mount

1
Although the circuit court did not rule on standing grounds, we note justiciability
is a threshold question. See Peoples Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Res. Plan. Corp.,
358 S.C. 460, 477, 596 S.E.2d 51, 60 (2004) ("A threshold inquiry for any court is
a determination of justiciability, i.e., whether the litigation presents an active case
or controversy." (quoting Lennon v. S.C. Coastal Council, 330 S.C. 414, 415, 498
S.E.2d 906, 906 (Ct. App. 1998))); James v. Anne's Inc., 390 S.C. 188, 193, 701
S.E.2d 730, 732 (2010) (stating appellate courts have "the inherent authority to
consider justiciability); Carolina All. for Fair Emp. v. S.C. Dep't of Labor,
Licensing, & Reg., 337 S.C. 476, 486-87, 523 S.E.2d 795, 800-01 (Ct. App. 1999)
(raising the issue of standing sua sponte in a declaratory judgment action and
affirming the grant of summary judgment under Rule 56(c) because the appellant
lacked standing).
Pleasant used to enact amendments. Brock did not identify how the legislative
process and the resulting amendments particularly injured him or his legally
protected interests. See Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 530, 511 S.E.2d
69, 75 (1999) ("[A] private person may not invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of executive or legislative action unless he has sustained, or is in
immediate danger of sustaining, prejudice therefrom."); Carolina All. for Fair
Emp., 337 S.C. at 486, 523 S.E.2d at 800 ("Such imminent prejudice must be of a
personal nature to the party laying claim to standing and not merely of general
interest common to all members of the public."). Thus, Brock lacked standing to
challenge the amendments to Mount Pleasant's zoning code and land development
regulations. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.2

WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and HILL, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.