Crabtree v. Crabtree

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Christine Crabtree, Respondent,

v.

Donald Clinton Crabtree, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000269

Appeal From Sumter County
George M. McFaddin, Jr., Family Court Judge
Monet S. Pincus, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-310
Submitted October 1, 2020 – Filed November 18, 2020

AFFIRMED

Donald Clinton Crabtree, of Lynden, Washington, pro se.

Marian Dawn Nettles, of Nettles Turbeville & Reddeck,
of Lake City, and Michael W. Self, of McDougall, Self,
Currence & McLeod, LLP, of Sumter, both for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donald Crabtree (Husband) appeals two orders from the family
court: (1) the order denying his motion to reconsider the original divorce decree and
granting Christine Crabtree's (Wife's) motion to reconsider the original divorce
decree, and (2) the amended divorce decree. On appeal, Husband argues the family
court erred by granting Wife temporary possession of the family home; acting in
"contempt of justice" by ignoring law and evidence and lacking integrity in applying
the law in this case; acting against the preservation of marriage; showing gender
prejudice; incorrectly imputing his income; failing to properly assess marital fault
and consider whether the award of alimony should be reversed based on fault
grounds; and "subvert[ing] freedom of religion." He further asserts the evidence in
this case showed desertion or constructive desertion by Wife; libel and slander by
Wife; cruelty by Wife; he is the "most well[-]adjusted mature" and "reasonable
parent" for custody purposes; and the guardian ad litem was prejudiced against him
and colluded with the family court. Husband further lists several religious questions
in his statement of the issues on appeal, including whether religious authority has a
place in family life and if extorting a person's religion is "inherently abusive";
whether it is better to claim a religion and not adhere to its teachings; and whether it
is better to be at fault or tell someone they are at fault. We affirm.

I. FACTS
The parties were married in 2000 in the state of Washington and have four minor
children. Due to Husband's schooling and position in the United States Air Force
(USAF), the parties moved several times until Husband was stationed in South
Carolina in 2012. According to the record, Husband left the USAF in 2014,
accepting an incentive package of over $100,000. Husband stated he wished to use
this money to start his own business, but Wife, who he claimed initially supported
him leaving the USAF and starting his own business, later asked Husband to "take
the safer route" and find a new job instead. This disagreement caused problems in
the marriage1; in particular, Husband asserted Wife no longer had sexual relations
with him, and he began sleeping in the guest room. Wife asserted Husband yelled
at her, cursed at her, called her names in front of the children, belittled her opinions,
told her to submit and obey him, and generally used their Christian religion as a
weapon against her.

Husband sent Wife several emails regarding her actions and the religious
consequences, telling Wife "because you are in rebellion you will not find comfort
in the [L]ord, for he is the one you are rejecting"; "You are not justified, you are
incapable of judging what is fair. . . . The spirit of cowardice has no place in my

1
Parties also had issues earlier in their marriage, including physical abuse, and at
one point, they separated for fifteen months.
household"; "You are afraid because you are in rebellion against the Lord, the only
lasting peace you will find is in obedience"; and "You are simply following in the
curse of the woman, trying to unbalance my leadership. Coveting my authority and
attacking me. There will be no peace for you in this." Additionally, Husband had
an altercation with Wife's father, sending Wife's father an email asking him to leave
the parties' marital home and calling the police to "evict" him from the marital home,
which the police refused to do as Wife's father was Wife's guest. Afterwards,
Husband sent Wife's parents and Wife another email regarding the incident, stating
he was "under [God's] authority" and wishing "dreadful anxiety" on those who
claimed to be Christian but "rejected [God's] direction in this situation."

In 2015, Husband began to ask Wife to move with him back to Washington, but
Wife refused. Wife left Husband on November 9, 2015. Wife filed an action for
separate support and maintenance on November 10, 2015, asking for the right to live
separate and apart from Husband. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim,
requesting separate support and maintenance and the right to live separate and apart
from Wife. After a hearing, the family court issued a temporary order that granted
Wife sole custody of Children and temporary possession of the marital home;
granted Husband restricted and supervised visitation with Children; and ordered
Husband to pay child support, the mortgage on the marital home, and Children's
private school tuition.2 Subsequently, Wife filed a rule to show cause against
Husband, and after a hearing, the family court issued an order finding Husband in
contempt for failing to comply with the temporary order by not paying child support,
Children's private school tuition, and other support to Wife. Husband appealed the
civil contempt order, and this court affirmed. Crabtree v. Crabtree, Op. No.
2017-UP-461 (S.C. Ct. App. filed December 13, 2017). Wife later filed a second
rule to show cause against Husband because he had failed to pay the mortgage on
the marital home, and after a hearing, the family court found Husband in contempt.

Thereafter, Wife filed an amended complaint asking for a divorce on the ground of
one year's continuous separation. Husband amended his answer to also request a
divorce but on the ground of abandonment or desertion. After a trial, the family
court issued a final divorce decree, granting Wife a divorce based on one year's
continuous separation, stating its belief that the leading cause of the divorce was
Husband's use of the Christian faith against Wife; finding no fault ground applied to
the divorce; imputing an annual income of $80,000 to Husband; granting Wife

2
Husband filed a motion to reconsider this temporary order, which the family court
denied. Husband then filed a motion for supersedeas, but this court denied the
motion and stayed the appeal of the temporary order pending a final order.
custody of Children and stating Wife may relocate to Washington with Children;
ordering the parties to each pay half of the guardian ad litem's fees and costs;
ordering Husband to pay all of Wife's attorney's fees and costs; ordering Husband to
pay Wife $1,470 in child support and $1,300 in alimony per month; and dividing the
parties' marital property 50/50. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration. The
family court denied Husband's motion for reconsideration but granted Wife's motion,
and it filed an amended final divorce decree increasing Wife's alimony to $1,600 per
month, which resulted in a decrease of Husband's monthly child support obligation
from $1,470 to $1,404 per month pursuant to the child support guidelines. Husband
appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing this case raised the novel
issue of "faith based abuse," and the supreme court transferred the case to this court.
Crabtree v. Crabtree, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated February 22, 2018.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, on appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues
de novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011);
Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). However, appellate
courts review the "family court's evidentiary or procedural rulings . . . using an abuse
of discretion standard." Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d 486,
486 n.2 (2018).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Issues Abandoned on Appeal
Husband raises twenty-three issues in his statement of the issues on appeal. For
seventeen of these issues, he either fails to argue the issue at all, to provide any
supporting legal authority for his conclusory arguments, or to be specific as to what
finding, ruling, conduct, or evidence the issue he raises actually pertains to.3 These

3
Husband does split the issues into appropriately headed sections and make
arguments, mostly conclusory, for each issue in his reply brief. See Rule
208(b)(1)(E), SCACR ("The brief shall be divided into as many parts as there are
issues to be argued. At the head of each part, the particular issue to be addressed
shall be set forth in distinctive type, followed by discussion and citations of
authority.") However, these arguments are for the most part still unsupported by
citation to any legal authority. Additionally, Husband cannot make vague,
conclusory arguments on an issue in his final brief and then reserve substantive
argument as to that issue until his reply brief. See Divine v. Robbins, 385 S.C. 23,
44 n.4, 683 S.E.2d 286, 297 n.4 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The reply brief is not the
issues are whether: (1) the family court demonstrated "contempt for justice" by
ignoring statute and manifest evidence; (2) the family court erred by showing gender
prejudice; (3) the family court abused its discretion against manifest evidence; (4)
the family court acted against the preservation of the marriage; (5) Wife committed
libel and slander against Husband; (6) the evidence showed cruelty by Wife4; (7)
there was evidence to support the income imputed to Husband by the family court5;
(8) Husband was the "more well[-]adjusted parent" for custody purposes; (9)
Husband was the more reasonable parent for custody purposes; (10) the evidence

appropriate vehicle to raise new issues on appeal; thus, we decline to address this
argument."); Bochette v. Bochette, 300 S.C. 109, 112, 386 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App.
1989) ("An appellant may not use either oral argument or the reply brief as a vehicle
to argue issues not argued in the appellant's brief.").
4
Husband's final brief does contain some argument with supporting authority
regarding cruelty, but it all pertains to his argument Wife did not prove he committed
physical cruelty—rather than just emotional and religious cruelty. The only section
that potentially pertains to cruelty by Wife against Husband is when Husband alleges
Wife "projected her behavior onto" Husband and acted coercively to get her way.
Husband has no law to support this statement and at no time alleged physical cruelty
by Wife as a potential ground of divorce in either his final brief or his reply brief.
Accordingly, we find this issue abandoned on appeal.
5
Husband failed to argue this issue at all in his final brief, but he argued it
extensively in his reply brief and included citations to legal authority. We find this
issue was abandoned due to his failure to argue it in his final brief. Nonetheless, on
the merits, we find the family court properly imputed $80,000 in income to Husband
given (1) he has four minor children to support; (2) his education—he has a
bachelor's degree in mechanical engineering, a master's degree in engineering
management, and a master's degree in human relations—his skills in software
development, his prior employment history, and the fact that he had a job offer
paying $80,000; and (3) he chose to be self-employed and start his own business
selling software to USAF bases, which made no profit in 2016. See, e.g., Kelley v.
Kelley, 324 S.C. 481, 489, 477 S.E.2d 727, 731 (Ct. App. 1996) (providing in
imputed income cases, courts closely "examine the payor's good-faith and
reasonable explanation for the decreased income," and "[e]fforts to frustrate support
obligations are not tolerated, nor are prolonged periods of unemployment generally
countenanced" (emphasis added)); id. ("[C]ourts are reluctant to invade a party's
freedom to pursue the employment path of their own choosing or impose
unreasonable demands upon parties . . . Nonetheless, even otherwise unreviewable
career choices are at times outweighed by countervailing considerations,
particularly child support obligations." (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
showed the guardian ad litem was biased against him; (11) the evidence showed the
family court colluded with the guardian ad litem; (12) the family court acted with
integrity in applying the law to the case; (13) the family court acted to subvert
freedom of religion; (14) the record shows the family court acted with despotism6;
(15) religion has a place in family life and whether using religion against a person
of that religion is "inherently abusive"; (16) it is more favorable to claim a religion
and not adhere to its teachings; and (17) it is better to be at fault or to tell someone
they are at fault. Thus, we find Husband abandoned these issues on appeal. See
Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("The statement [of the issues on appeal] shall be
concise and direct as to each issue, and may be stated in question form. Broad
general statements may be disregarded by the appellate court."); Rule 208(b)(1)(E),
SCACR ("The brief shall be divided into as many parts as there are issues to be
argued. At the head of each part, the particular issue to be addressed shall be set
forth in distinctive type, followed by discussion and citations of authority."
(emphasis added)); First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513,
514 (1994) (considering an issue abandoned because the appellant failed to provide
pertinent argument or supporting authority). Accordingly, we affirm as to these
issues.

B. Husband's "Eviction" from the Marital Home
Husband argues the family court's temporary order should not have "evicted" him
from the parties' marital home by granting Wife temporary possession of the parties'
marital home based on Wife's allegations of psychological and emotional abuse
because the only type of abuse South Carolina recognizes as a ground for divorce is
physical abuse. We disagree.

Initially, we find this issue moot because Husband's eviction from the parties' marital
home was part of the temporary order and did not affect his rights at the divorce
hearing. See Terry v. Terry, 400 S.C. 453, 456–57, 734 S.E.2d 646, 648 (2012) ("A
temporary order of the family court is without prejudice to the rights of the parties.
Such orders are, by definition, temporary—they neither decide any issue with
finality nor affect a substantial right . . . . The family court at the final hearing has

6
Husband's issue on appeal questions whether the family court acted as a despot;
however, the argument section of his final brief alleges Wife acted as a despot.
Husband provides no legal authority regarding this particular argument; thus, we
find the issue is abandoned on appeal. See State v. Lindsey, 394 S.C. 354, 363, 714
S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2011) (stating an issue is abandoned if the appellant's brief
fails to provide legal authority).
the authority to redress any error from the temporary order."). Moreover, in the final
divorce decree, the family court granted Wife's request for a 50/50 division of the
parties' marital property, which Husband did not dispute. Thus, any ruling by this
court regarding Husband's eviction from the marital home pursuant to the temporary
ruling will have no practical legal effect in this case.

Nonetheless, on the merits, we find the family court did not err in granting the parties'
mutual request to live separately from each other and granting Wife temporary
possession of the marital home because it granted her sole custody of Children. See
Jones v. Jones, 281 S.C. 96, 100, 314 S.E.2d 33, 36 (Ct. App. 1984) (providing a
family court does not necessarily have to award exclusive use of the marital home
to the custodial spouse in every case, and it must "weigh the cost, inconvenience and
other hardships that may be experienced by requiring the custodial spouse to move
out of the marital home to the burden imposed upon the non-custodial parent in being
unable to realize his equity from a sale or other disposition of the home"; however,
the award of custody to the custodial parent "may constitute sufficient reason for
granting the custodial spouse exclusive use of the marital home" in some cases).
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

C. Desertion, Constructive Desertion, Marital Fault, and Alimony

Husband argues the family court erred in finding no fault ground for the divorce—
while simultaneously noting Husband's use of his Christian faith against Wife caused
the demise of the marriage—and in granting Wife alimony when Wife deserted or
constructively deserted him.7 We disagree.

We find the family court did not err in finding no ground for marital fault applied in
this case, and thus, the family court was not obligated to consider marital fault when
it granted Wife alimony. First, we agree with Wife that the family court did address
marital fault in its order because it went through possible reasons for the demise of
the marriage—noting Husband's pornography addiction and use of religion against
Wife as well as Husband's belief that Wife should not receive alimony due to her
failure to live up to her biblical role—and found no ground for marital fault applied.
Accordingly, Husband's argument the court failed to address marital fault is
meritless.

Second, we find the family court did not err in failing to find Wife deserted Husband
because both parties asked for the right to live separate and apart in their respective

7
Husband also argues Wife committed cruelty and libel/slander against him, but as
noted above, he abandoned these issues on appeal.
pleadings and were granted that right by the family court in its temporary order. See
Machado v. Machado, 220 S.C. 90, 101–02, 66 S.E.2d 629, 634 (1951) ("There can
be no desertion where the separation of the spouses is upon mutual consent and under
a separation agreement, and hence the existence of such an agreement may be
advanced as a defense to a suit for divorce on the ground of desertion." (quoting
Morland, Keezer on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, § 528 (3d ed.))). Because
the parties mutually separated, desertion does not apply in this case.

Third, we find the family court did not err in finding Wife did not constructively
desert Husband because Wife left Husband. Constructive desertion would only
apply if Husband left Wife and argued Wife's conduct forced him to leave and also
constituted a fault ground for divorce. See Mincey v. Mincey, 224 S.C. 520, 531, 80
S.E.2d 123, 129 (1954) ("In order to constitute constructive desertion, the
abandoning party seeking to make a technical deserter out of the one abandoned,
must establish misconduct on the part of the other in itself, and independently,
amounting to one or more of the recognized permitted grounds for divorce. The
conduct complained of must in itself be a sufficient cause for divorce, one or more
of the four grounds permitted by the constitutional amendment."). Because Husband
did not leave Wife, Husband cannot claim constructive desertion.

Finally, because desertion and constructive desertion are not applicable in this case,
we find Husband's argument that Wife should not have been granted alimony due to
her alleged marital fault in deserting or constructively deserting him without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.

D. Reversal of the Family Court's Findings and Rulings
Husband argues the family court's findings and rulings should be reversed based on
all of the other arguments raised in his appeal. We disagree.

We agree with Wife that Husband did not properly format his brief or provide
argument with supporting authority for this particular issue. However, he did
provide arguments with supporting law for at least a few of his issues on appeal, and
given this issue's reliance on Husband's other issues, we cannot find this issue
abandoned. Nonetheless, because we affirm the family court on all of Husband's
other issues, we also affirm the family court on this issue.

AFFIRMED.8

8
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
THOMAS, HILL, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.