Harwell v. Harwell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Deborah B. Harwell, Respondent/Appellant,

v.

Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and as the Personal
Representative of the Estate of David W. Harwell; and
the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control, Division of Vital Records,
Defendants,

Of whom Robert Bryan Harwell, individually and as the
Personal Representative of the Estate of David W.
Harwell is the Respondent/Appellant,

v.

Law Office of Deidre W. Edmonds, P.A. and Deidre W.
Edmonds, Individually, Appellants/Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002290

Appeal From Florence County
Roger L. Couch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-103
Submitted December 2, 2019 – Filed April 8, 2021
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled October 7, 2020
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled November 18, 2020
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART

M. Dawes Cooke, Jr. and Barbara J. Wagner, both of
Barnwell Whaley Patterson & Helms, LLC, of
Charleston, for Deidre W. Edmonds, Individually, and
the Law Office of Deidre W. Edmonds, P.A.

Kevin Mitchell Barth, of Barth, Ballenger & Lewis, LLP,
and Gena Phillips Ervin, of Orr & Ervin LLC, both of
Florence, for Robert Bryan Harwell, Individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of David W.
Harwell.

Deborah B. Harwell, pro se, of Mooresville, North
Carolina.

John Harleston, of Columbia, for South Carolina
Department of Health and Environmental Control,
Division of Vital Records.

PER CURIAM: In this cross-appeal from the circuit court, the Law Office of
Deirdre Edmonds, P.A. and Deirdre Edmonds individually (collectively, Edmonds)
appeal the circuit court's orders issuing sanctions against her amounting to $5,000.
Robert B. Harwell (Harwell), individually and as the personal representative for
the estate of David W. Harwell (Decedent), also appeals the circuit court's orders,
seeking additional sanctions against Edmonds for her representation of Deborah B.
Harwell (Widow), the estranged wife of Decedent. Widow additionally appeals
the aforementioned circuit court orders.1 We affirm in part and reverse in part.

1
On November 1, 2017, Edmonds filed a notice of appeal with this court,
appealing the circuit court's order issuing sanctions against Edmonds and Widow
and the circuit court's order following the parties' Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motions.
On November 2, 2017, Harwell filed a notice of appeal with this court, appealing
the aforementioned circuit court orders, which was assigned a different appellate
case number from Edmonds's appeal. On November 8, 2017, Widow filed a notice
of appeal with this court, cross-appealing the aforementioned circuit court orders
appealed by Harwell. Desa Ballard filed Widow's notice of appeal but
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Decedent and Widow were married on November 21, 2001, having previously
entered into a prenuptial agreement on November 19, 2001. In March 2015,
Decedent filed a family court action seeking a decree of separate support and
maintenance that enforced the parties' prenuptial agreement. After successful
mediation efforts, the parties entered into a mediation agreement (the Mediation
Agreement), which the family court adopted and incorporated into its final order
(the Separation Decree) issued on July 21, 2015. Shortly thereafter, Decedent
passed away on September 30, 2015.

On January 14, 2016, Widow filed a pro se action in the probate court in which she
brought two creditor's claims against Decedent's estate, seeking (1) an elective
share in the amount of $3.1 million pursuant to the prenuptial agreement (the
Prenuptial Claim) and (2) reimbursement in the amount of $1,457.25 for obituary
publication costs (the Obituary Claim) associated with two obituaries she filed for
Decedent. Harwell, as personal representative of the estate, served a notice
disallowing Widow's claims against the estate and subsequently initiated contempt
proceedings in the family court, alleging Widow violated the Mediation
Agreement.2,3

On March 1, 2016, Edmonds assumed representation of Widow for the pending
matters in the probate court. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the
probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse
and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as
Decedent's surviving spouse.4 Edmonds additionally filed petitions for allowance

simultaneously filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, which this court granted
by order dated November 27, 2017. On February 7, 2018, this court granted a
motion to consolidate the three appeals.
2
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-806(a) (Supp. 2019) ("[W]ithin sixty days after the
presentment of the claim, or within fourteen months after the death of the decedent,
whichever is later, the personal representative must serve upon the claimant a
notice stating the claim has been allowed or disallowed in whole or in part.").
3
By order dated July 20, 2016, the family court found Widow in contempt and
sentenced her to forty-five days' imprisonment. The family court additionally
ordered Widow to pay $25,000 in attorney's fees. This contempt action is not the
subject of this appeal.
4
At that time, Decedent's death certificate indicated his marital status as "married
but separated" and stated "NA" in the surviving spouse designation, which
of Widow's previous creditor's claims against the estate. On April 1, 2016,
Harwell filed answers and counterclaims, seeking dismissal of Widow's petitions
and sanctions against Widow and Edmonds pursuant to Rule 11, SCRCP, and the
South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act (the Act).5 On May 26,
2016, Widow filed another pro se probate petition seeking to collect her elective
share from Decedent's estate.6

By order dated June 10, 2016, the probate court removed the pending probate
petitions to the circuit court. On August 31, 2016, Widow filed a partial stipulation
of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing all of her petitions against the estate except for
her petition for adjudication as the surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's
death certificate. By order dated October 21, 2016, the circuit court adopted
Widow's stipulations and dismissed the aforementioned petitions. Additionally,
the court dismissed Widow's remaining petition against the estate as moot, stating
"DHEC has now already amended the death certificate to reflect [Widow] as the
surviving spouse for vital records purposes with Bryan Harwell's consent."

On February 2, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on Harwell's remaining action
for sanctions against Widow and Edmonds. On April 12, 2017, the circuit court
issued an order (the Final Order) imposing sanctions against Widow and Edmonds.
Specifically, the circuit court found the pro se creditor's claims filed by Widow
against the estate were frivolous and without merit and consequently imposed
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of $40,000. The circuit
court further provided Widow's sanctions would be reduced by "any sums which
she may have already paid pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of $25,000.00 in
attorney's fees as provided in the [c]ontempt [o]rder." As to Edmonds, the circuit
court imposed sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act in the amount of $5,000.
Specifically, the court found Edmonds's filing of the Obituary Claim was frivolous
and without merit. Regarding Widow's petition for declaration as the surviving

prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits from the General
Assembly as provided in the Mediation Agreement. When Widow attempted to
amend the death certificate with the Department of Health and Environmental
Control (DHEC), DHEC informed her that only Harwell could request a correction
to the certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a
court order would be required.
5
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-36-10 to -100 (Supp. 2019).
6
Widow additionally filed a pro se motion in the family court to set aside the
Separation Decree, which incorporated the Mediation Agreement, pursuant to Rule
60(b), SCRCP, on May 26, 2016.
spouse and amendment of the death certificate, the circuit court found the relief
sought was justified and the actions taken by Edmonds were necessary to obtain
such relief. The court further found Edmonds's filing of the Prenuptial Claim,
based upon the information provided to her by Widow, was reasonable and
therefore not frivolous.

All parties filed motions to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP, and the
circuit court held a hearing on the motions on July 19, 2017. By order dated
September 27, 2017, the circuit court denied the parties' motions to reconsider.
This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The determination of whether a court should impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11,
SCRCP, or the Act is a matter of equity. Se. Site Prep, LLC v. Atl. Coast Builders
& Contractors, LLC, 394 S.C. 97, 104, 713 S.E.2d 650, 653 (Ct. App. 2011). "In
an action in equity tried by the judge alone, the appellate court has jurisdiction to
find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence."
Id. However, when the appellate court agrees with the circuit court's findings of
fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id.; see also Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. 430, 437, 663 S.E.2d
46, 50 (2008). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions
will not be disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law
or is based on unsupported factual conclusions." Se. Site Prep, 394 S.C. at 104,
713 S.E.2d at 654.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Sanctions

Rule 11(a), SCRCP, provides:

The written or electronic signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

Pursuant to Rule 11, a court may impose sanctions on a party or a party's attorney
for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper. Id.; see also Ex parte
Gregory, 378 S.C. at 437, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "The party and/or attorney may also
be sanctioned for filing a pleading, motion, or other paper in bad faith whether or
not there is good ground to support it." Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. at 437, 663
S.E.2d at 50. "The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable costs and
attorney fees incurred by the party or parties defending against the frivolous action
or action brought in bad faith . . . ." Id. at 437–38, 663 S.E.2d at 50. "Further, if
appropriate under the facts of the case, the court may order a party and/or the
party's attorney to pay a reasonable monetary penalty to the party or parties
defending against the frivolous action or action brought in bad faith." Id. at 438,
663 S.E.2d at 50. "While Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard, the rule
still may be violated with a filing that is so patently without merit that no
reasonable attorney could have a good faith belief in its propriety." Ex parte Bon
Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc., 393 S.C. 590, 598, 713 S.E.2d 624, 628
(2011) (footnote omitted).

Additionally, "[t]he South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanction[s] Act
provides for liability for attorney fees and costs of frivolous suits." Ex parte
Gregory, 378 S.C. at 438, 663 S.E.2d at 50. Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(a) of the
South Carolina Code provides:

An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or
administrative action or defense may be sanctioned
for: . . . filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document
if: . . . a reasonable attorney in the same circumstances
would believe that under the facts, his claim or defense
was clearly not warranted under existing law . . . a
reasonable attorney presented with the same
circumstances would believe that the procurement,
initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause was
intended merely to harass or injure the other party;
or . . . a reasonable attorney presented with the same
circumstances would believe the pleading, motion, or
document is frivolous, interposed for merely delay, or
merely brought for any purpose other than securing
proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of
the claim or defense upon which the proceedings are
based . . . .

Subsection 15-36-10(A)(4)(b) further provides an attorney or pro se litigant may be
sanctioned for "making frivolous arguments a reasonable attorney would believe
were not reasonably supported by the facts." Pursuant to subsection
15-36-10(B)(2), if "an attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the
court, upon its own motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in
violation any sanction which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under
the circumstances."

Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the circuit court's findings of
fact. Thus, we review the court's imposition of sanctions for an abuse of discretion
and address the parties' various contentions in turn. See Se. Site Prep, 394 S.C. at
104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 (providing that when the appellate court agrees with the
circuit court's findings of fact, it reviews the circuit court's imposition of sanctions
under an abuse of discretion standard).

A. Harwell's Appeal

Harwell argues the circuit court erred in failing to sanction Edmonds for (1)
asserting he committed a felony in her filing of the claim seeking a declaration of
Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse and amendment of Decedent's death
certificate and (2) filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, which
the Mediation Agreement barred. Harwell additionally contends the circuit court
erred in offsetting the sanctions issued against Widow with prior contempt
sanctions issued against her by the family court. We disagree.

Prior to Widow's claim seeking adjudication as Decedent's surviving spouse and
amendment of Decedent's death certificate, Decedent's death certificate indicated
his marital status as "married but separated" and stated "NA" in the surviving
spouse designation, which prevented Widow from receiving his retirement benefits
from the General Assembly, as provided in the Mediation Agreement, as well as
death benefits. When Widow attempted to amend the death certificate with
DHEC, it informed her that only Harwell could request a correction to the
certificate as he was the prior informant and if he was unwilling to do so, a court
order would be required. On March 9, 2016, Edmonds filed a petition in the
probate court seeking an adjudication of Widow as Decedent's surviving spouse
and an amendment to Decedent's death certificate, which would list Widow as
Decedent's surviving spouse. In her filing, Edmonds asserted Harwell willfully
and knowingly supplied false information to DHEC in violation of section
44-63-161(A)(2), which was a felony under section 44-63-161(B).7

7
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(A)(2) (2018) ("It is unlawful for a person: . . . to
wilfully make a false statement in a certificate, record, or report required to be filed
In its Final Order, the circuit court found sanctions were not warranted regarding
Widow's claim, stating:

I find that the relief sought in that action was justified
and that the action was necessary. While it is clear that
some of the allegations contained in that petition
concerning the alleged actions of the personal
representati[ve] were false and ultimately found to be
without justification, it is my finding that these
allegations were the result of what appears to be an
almost paranoid belief on the part of the parties to these
actions concerning the evaluation of the motives of the
other side. . . . This is an equitable matter and I must
consider th[e] possibility that [] Harwell could have taken
steps to resolve the problem early in the life of this
[d]eath [c]ertificate issue to resolve the matter, . . . but
instead used this issue as a bargaining chip to seek
withdrawal of the other unrelated claims. At any rate, the
claim was necessary since the [d]eath [c]ertificate was
incorrect in the manner in which it did not reflect the
existence of a surviving spouse. It is my finding that Ms.
Edm[o]nds['s] preparation of this pleading was based on
information provided to her by DHEC and [Widow].
While some of her allegation[s] were not later proven to
be true and perhaps overzealous when made, it did result
in obtaining the relief her client needed in that situation.

We agree with the circuit court's assessment of the situation at hand. Although we
acknowledge Edmonds made assertions in the filing that were unnecessary to
obtain the relief sought, we find the circuit court properly found the overall
purpose of the claim was not frivolous, and therefore, sanctions were not

by this chapter or a regulation, or in an application for an amendment to or for a
certified copy of the certificate, record, or report, or to wilfully supply false
information intending that the information be used in the preparation or
amendment of the certificate, record, or report."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-63-161(B)
(2018) ("A person who violates a provision of item (1), (2), (3), or (4) of
subsection (A) is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more
than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.").
warranted pursuant to Rule 11 and the Act for "continuing" the claim. See
§ 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a
frivolous pleading, motion, or document if "a reasonable attorney presented with
the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation,
continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the
other party" (emphasis added)); Se. Site Prep, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654
("Under the abuse of discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be
disturbed on appeal unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based
on unsupported factual conclusions.").

As to Harwell's contention that the circuit court erred in failing to sanction
Edmonds for filing the petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim, we agree
with the court's assessment that sanctions were not warranted.

The Mediation Agreement entered into between the parties and incorporated into
the Separation Decree contained the following provision: "Both parties waive any
and all rights they may have in the estate of the other or to make any claim upon or
against the estate of the other. Each party shall be bound by the terms of this
agreement." (emphases added).

Prior to assuming representation of Widow, Edmonds met with Widow to discuss
the notice of disallowance she received from the estate and other potential claims
she might have. During this meeting, Widow informed Edmonds that she believed
Decedent withheld information regarding the extent of his assets when they entered
the Mediation Agreement and she intended to challenge the Separation Decree.
Edmonds advised Widow she would need to file a motion to set aside the order in
family court; Edmonds further advised Widow to obtain other counsel for that
action because she was not a family court practitioner and would only represent her
regarding her probate claims. Based upon her experience and knowledge as a long
term probate practitioner and former probate judge, Edmonds determined Widow
would need to file a petition for allowance of the Prenuptial Claim so that if
Widow succeeded in the family court, she would not be foreclosed from making
resulting claims against the estate in probate court. See § 62-3-806(a) ("Every
claim which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative is
barred so far as not allowed unless the claimant commences a proceeding for
allowance of the claim in accordance with Section 62-3-804(2) not later than thirty
days after the mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial
disallowance by the personal representative." (emphases added)). Having
determined the petition for allowance could be filed no later than March 12, 2016,
Edmonds filed a petition on March 9, 2016. In support of her motions in
opposition of sanctions, Edmonds submitted expert affidavits from Burnele Powell
and Mitchell Payne, who both opined Edmonds's filing of the petition for
allowance of the Prenuptial Claim was reasonable and not a violation of the
provisions of Rule 11 or the Act.

Based on the foregoing, we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to impose sanctions against Edmonds for filing the Prenuptial Claim.
See § 15-36-10(B)(2) (providing a court may upon its own motion or motion of a
party impose sanctions against an attorney for violations of subsection (A)(4));
§ 15-36-10(A)(4)(a)(iii) (providing that an attorney may be sanctioned for filing a
frivolous pleading, motion, or document if "a reasonable attorney presented with
the same circumstances would believe that the procurement, initiation,
continuation, or defense of a civil cause was intended merely to harass or injure the
other party"); Rule 11(a), SCRCP (providing that a court may impose sanctions on
a party or a party's attorney for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or other paper).
We agree with the circuit court and the expert affidavits that based upon the
information provided to her by Widow and the timeframe at hand, Edmonds's
actions were reasonable and in the best interest of her client. Although Harwell
contends Edmonds was required to investigate the merits of the claim prior to
filing the petition for allowance, we find Edmonds was entitled to rely on the
information provided to her by Widow. See Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. at 439 n.3,
663 S.E.2d at 51 n.3 ("Our conclusion that an attorney must conduct a reasonable
investigation beyond what is related to the attorney by his client is limited to the
situation whe[n] a client is alleging conversion against his or her former attorney
for misappropriation of client funds or legal malpractice." (emphases added)).
Furthermore, we note the merit of the Prenuptial Claim was contingent upon the
success of Widow's motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP,8 in the family court,
which Edmonds could not have known during the timeframe she had for filing a
petition for allowance. Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly found
Edmonds's filing of the petition for allowance was not frivolous.

Finally, Harwell contends the circuit court erred in offsetting the sanctions issued
against Widow with prior sanctions issued against her by the family court for
contemptuous conduct. In the Final Order, the circuit court imposed sanctions
against Widow in the amount of $40,000, but the court specified Widow's

8
Rule 60(b)(3), SCRCP ("On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party . . . .").
sanctions would be reduced by "any sums which she may have already paid
pursuant to the [f]amily [c]ourt award of $25,000.00 in attorney's fees as provided
in the [c]ontempt [o]rder." In its order denying the parties' motions for
reconsideration, the court explained it ordered this particular remedy as an
equitable protection for Widow in an effort to prevent punishing her twice for her
actions surrounding the pro se creditor's claims against the estate, since these
claims had previously been the subject of Harwell's contempt action against her.
Although a unique stipulation, we find the sanction fashioned by the circuit court
was within the scope of its authority. See § 15-36-10(B)(2) (providing that if "an
attorney or pro se litigant has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own
motion or motion of a party, may impose upon the person in violation any sanction
which the court considers just, equitable, and proper under the circumstances"
(emphasis added)); Rule 11(a), SCRCP ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction . . . ." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we hold the circuit
court did not err in offsetting Widow's sanctions issued pursuant to Rule 11 and the
Act with the prior sanctions imposed by the family court.

B. Edmonds's Appeal

Edmonds argues the circuit court erred in sanctioning her under Rule 11 and the
Act for filing the petition for allowance of Widow's Obituary Claim against the
estate. Specifically, Edmonds contends the court improvidently issued the
sanctions because (1) a determination on the merits of the Obituary Claim was
never made as required under the Act and (2) Harwell failed to present evidence
establishing the Obituary Claim was frivolously asserted. We agree in part.

Following Decedent's death, the estate published an obituary. Displeased with this
obituary because it failed to name her as Decedent's surviving spouse, Widow,
without authorization from the estate, published two more obituaries, which named
her as Decedent's widow.9 Widow thereafter filed a pro se creditor's claim against
the estate seeking reimbursement in the amount of $1,457.25 for the publication
costs of the obituaries. After Widow received Harwell's notice of disallowance on
behalf of the estate, Edmonds filed a petition for allowance of the claim on
Widow's behalf.

9
Widow published obituaries in The Sun News and The State newspapers.
We find unpersuasive Edmonds's initial contention that the circuit court erred in
imposing sanctions against her because a merits determination was never made on
the Obituary Claim. Although subsection 15-36-10(C)(1) delineates at what
procedural stage a court will determine if a claim or defense is considered frivolous
upon a motion of the prevailing party, we find this subsection does not prescribe a
court's sole method for imposing sanctions for filing or advancing frivolous claims.
Subsection (B)(2) provides a court may "upon its own motion or motion of a party"
impose sanctions upon an attorney or pro se litigant for violations of subsection
(A)(4). Furthermore, the circuit court additionally found sanctions were warranted
pursuant to Rule 11, which contains no such procedural prerequisite. See Rule
11(a), SCRCP ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this
Rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction . . . .").

However, we agree the circuit court abused its discretion in sanctioning Edmonds
for filing the petition for allowance of the Obituary Claim as the record is devoid
of evidence showing Edmonds filed the petition for any other reason than to
preserve Widow's claim for judicial review. See § 62-3-806(a) ("Every claim
which is disallowed in whole or in part by the personal representative is barred so
far as not allowed unless the claimant commences a proceeding for allowance of
the claim in accordance with Section 62-3-804(2) not later than thirty days after the
mailing or other service of the notice of disallowance or partial disallowance by the
personal representative." (emphases added)). Accordingly, we find Edmonds's
intent in filing the petition was not malicious or for any improper purpose. See Ex
parte Bon Secours-St. Francis Xavier Hosp., Inc., 393 S.C. at 598, 713 S.E.2d at
628 (providing that Rule 11 is evaluated by a subjective standard). Thus, we
reverse the circuit court's sanction of Edmonds regarding the Obituary Claim.10
See Se. Site Prep, 394 S.C. at 104, 713 S.E.2d at 654 ("Under the abuse of
discretion standard, the imposition of sanctions will not be disturbed on appeal
unless the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported
factual conclusions.").

10
Edmonds additionally argues the sanction imposed by the circuit court was
excessive. Because we reverse the circuit court's imposition of the sanction, we
need not address this issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need
not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of
the appeal).
II. Expert Testimony

Widow asserts the circuit court erred in failing to admit the expert testimony of
Burnele Powell.11 We find this issue is without merit as Edmonds submitted
Powell's affidavit as an exhibit to her motion opposing sanctions, and the circuit
court indicated on the record that it received and reviewed the affidavit. Further,
the court referenced its consideration of the submitted affidavits in its order
denying the parties' motions to reconsider.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's orders are

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.12

WILLIAMS, KONDUROS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

11
In her appellant's brief, Widow raised five issues on appeal; however, the first
four issues solely pertain to criminal contempt sanctions Widow received
following a contempt proceeding in the family court. Widow did not appeal the
family court contempt order in this appeal. Accordingly, this court is confined to
considering only the fifth issue.
12
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.