State v. Hankinson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Wayne Hankinson, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002603

Appeal From Aiken County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-317
Submitted September 1, 2020 – Filed November 25, 2020

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor James Strom
Thurmond, Jr., of Aiken, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Wayne Hankinson appeals his convictions and concurrent
twelve-year sentences for assault with intent to commit first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC) and kidnapping. Hankinson argues the circuit court erred by (1)
ruling he was not entitled to ten peremptory challenges and (2) ruling he was not
entitled to an instruction on self-defense. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit erred by ruling Hankinson was not entitled to ten
peremptory challenges: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220
(2006) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.");
State v. Jacobs, 393 S.C. 584, 587, 713 S.E.2d 621, 622 (2011) ("Where the
statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite
meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no
right to impose another meaning." (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533
S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000))); S.C. Code Ann. § 14-7-1110 (2017) ("Any person who
is arraigned for the crime of murder, manslaughter, burglary, arson, criminal sexual
conduct, armed robbery, grand larceny, or breach of trust when it is punishable as
for grand larceny, perjury, or forgery is entitled to peremptory challenges not
exceeding ten, and the State in these cases is entitled to peremptory challenges not
exceeding five. Any person who is indicted for any crime or offense other than
those enumerated above has the right to peremptory challenges not exceeding five,
and the State in these cases is entitled to peremptory challenges not exceeding
five."); State v. Bailey, 273 S.C. 467, 469, 257 S.E.2d 231, 232 (1979) ("There is
no constitutional right, state or federal, to any peremptory challenge; it rests
entirely within the province of the legislature.").1

2. As to whether the circuit court erred by ruling Hankinson was not entitled to an
instruction on self-defense: State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 159, 634 S.E.2d 23, 26
(Ct. App. 2006) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision
regarding jury charges absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Slater, 373 S.C. 66,
69, 644 S.E.2d 50, 52 (2007) ("A self-defense charge is not required unless it is
supported by the evidence."); id. at 69-70, 644 S.E.2d at 52 ("To establish
self-defense in South Carolina, four elements must be present: (1) the defendant
must be without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2) the defendant must have
been in actual imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily
injury, or he must have actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing his

1
This court need not address Hankinson's argument relating to whether State v.
Green should be overturned because Green is inapplicable to this case. Hankinson
does not raise any issues relating to the qualification of a juror. See State v. Green,
301 S.C. 347, 352, 392 S.E.2d 157, 159 (1990) (holding when an appellate court is
reviewing an error as to the qualification of a juror, "an appellant must show that
he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges").
life or sustaining serious bodily injury; (3) if his defense is based upon his belief of
imminent danger, defendant must show that a reasonably prudent person of
ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the belief that he was
actually in imminent danger and that the circumstances were such as would
warrant a person of ordinary prudence, firmness, and courage to strike the fatal
blow in order to save himself from serious bodily harm or the loss of his life; and
(4) the defendant had no other probable means of avoiding the danger.").

AFFIRMED.2

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.