Breakfield v. Wood

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Robert H. Breakfield, as attorney-in-fact for John D.
Hinson, John C. Hinson, Jerry Hinson, Kathy
Huffstickle, Robert H. Hinson, Darrell W. Hinson, Lois
Hinson, Tina Jones, George Stanford as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Linda Stanford, William
L. Hinson, Elaine H. Hensley, and William C. Hinson,
Jr., Respondents,

v.

Mell Woods, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002016

Appeal From Chester County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-159
Submitted April 1, 2020 – Filed May 27, 2020

AFFIRMED

Mell Woods, of Lancaster, pro se.

B. Michael Brackett, of Moses & Brackett, PC, of
Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Mell Woods appeals the circuit court's order affirming the
magistrate's order that ejected him as a trespasser from a piece of real property (the
Property) in Chester County. On appeal, Woods argues the circuit court erred by
not: (1) granting him a jury trial, (2) determining he adversely possessed the
Property, (3) properly applying section 22-3-1130 of the South Carolina Code
(2007), (4) determining the ejection was barred by section 15-67-20 of the South
Carolina Code (2005), and (5) finding Robert Breakfield and Michael Brackett
improperly listed Elaine H. Hensley (Elaine) as a party because she was "a
non-represented dead person." Additionally, Woods asserts the magistrate did not
have jurisdiction to hear the ejectment action. We affirm.1

1. The magistrate court had jurisdiction to hear the ejectment action because the
question of title to the Property was not in issue based on this court's prior decision
affirming the finding that Woods had not adversely possessed the Property. See
Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Kiwi Corp., 280 S.C. 232, 233, 312
S.E.2d 20, 21 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that after an ejectment from the magistrate's
court and appeal to the circuit court, "this court is without jurisdiction to reverse
the findings of fact of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt if there is any supporting evidence");
Bowers v. Thomas, 373 S.C. 240, 244, 644 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 2007)
("Unless we find an error of law, we will affirm the [circuit court's] holding if there
are any facts supporting [its] decision." (quoting Hadfield v. Gilchrist, 343 S.C.
88, 94, 538 S.E.2d 268, 271 (Ct. App. 2000))); id. at 245, 644 S.E.2d at 753 ("[The
appellate court] still retains de novo review of whether the facts show the circuit
court's affirmance was controlled or affected by errors of law."); Palmetto Co. v.
McMahon, 395 S.C. 1, 3, 716 S.E.2d 329, 330 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Determining the
proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and [the appellate court]
reviews questions of law de novo." (quoting Town of Summerville v. City of North
Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008))); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 22-3-20(2) (2007) ("No magistrate shall have cognizance of a civil action . . .
[w]hen the title to real property shall come in question, except as provided in
Article 11 of this chapter." (emphasis added)); Woods v. Hinson, Op. No.
2014-UP-010 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 8, 2014). Because the title to the Property
was not in question, we need not address whether Woods adversely possessed the
Property and if the magistrate should have discontinued the ejectment action
pursuant to section 22-3-1130. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address
remaining issues when disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
2. The circuit court did not err in determining Woods was not entitled to a jury
trial because section 15-67-620 required Woods to first satisfy the magistrate, not a
jury. See Vacation Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 280 S.C. at 233, 312 S.E.2d
at 21 (stating that after an ejectment from the magistrate's court and appeal to the
circuit court, "this court is without jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact of the
[c]ircuit [c]ourt if there is any supporting evidence"); Palmetto Co., 395 S.C. at 3,
716 S.E.2d at 330 ("Determining the proper interpretation of a statute is a question
of law, and [the appellate court] reviews questions of law de novo." (quoting Town
of Summerville, 378 S.C. at 110, 662 S.E.2d at 41)); § 15-67-620 ("If the person in
possession shall, before the expiration of the five days, appear before such
magistrate and satisfy him that he has a bona fide color of claim to the possession
of such premises and enter into bond to the person claiming the land, with good
and sufficient security, to be approved by the magistrate, conditioned for the
payment of all such costs and expenses as the person claiming to be the owner of
the land may incur in the successful establishment of his claim and also for any
damages which the owner of the land may sustain by reason of the possession
being withheld from him, by any of the modes of proceeding now provided by law,
the magistrate shall not issue his warrant . . . ." (emphasis added)).

3. Section 15-67-20 did not bar Respondents' ejectment action because none of the
prior actions they filed finally disposed of the matter. See Vacation Time of Hilton
Head Island, Inc., 280 S.C. at 233, 312 S.E.2d at 21 (stating that after an ejectment
from the magistrate's court and appeal to the circuit court, "this court is without
jurisdiction to reverse the findings of fact of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt if there is any
supporting evidence"); Bowers, 373 S.C. at 244, 644 S.E.2d at 753 ("Unless we
find an error of law, we will affirm the [circuit court's] holding if there are any
facts supporting [its] decision." (quoting Hadfield, 343 S.C. at 94, 538 S.E.2d at
271)); Palmetto Co., 395 S.C. at 3, 716 S.E.2d at 330 ("Determining the proper
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and [the appellate court] reviews
questions of law de novo." (quoting Town of Summerville, 378 S.C. at 110, 662
S.E.2d at 41)); § 15-67-20 ("The plaintiff in actions for recovery of real property or
the recovery of the possession of real property is limited to one action for
recovery.").

4. Even assuming the circuit court erred in including Elaine as a party in the
caption, we find Woods failed to demonstrate how this inclusion prejudiced him
because even if this court were to modify the caption, the other respondents were
still entitled to bring this action to eject him. See Visual Graphics Leasing Corp. v.
Lucia, 311 S.C. 484, 489, 429 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ct. App. 1993) ("An error is not
reversible unless it is material and prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
appellant.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.