State v. Pingle

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Brian Everett Pringle, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-001571

Appeal From Richland County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-391
Submitted October 1, 2019 – Filed December 18, 2019

AFFIRMED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Brian Everett Pringle appeals his convictions of three counts of
strong arm robbery. On appeal, Pringle asserts the trial court abused its discretion
by allowing the jury to hear evidence of prior bad acts because the probative value
of his former probation officer's testimony and the testimony of a law enforcement
officer who found drug paraphernalia in Pringle's car was substantially outweighed
by the prejudicial effect of this testimony. The State argues the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting the probation officer's testimony and the law
enforcement officer's drug paraphernalia testimony because the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial in establishing Pringle's identity. The State asserts that
even if the trial court erred in admitting the probation officer's testimony and the
testimony regarding drug paraphernalia, any error committed was harmless
because the evidence presented against Pringle was overwhelming. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the probation
officer's identification testimony because it was offered as to a material fact,
Pringle's identity, and was not needlessly cumulative. See State v. Baccus, 367
S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits
to review errors of law only."); State v. Gaster, 349 S.C. 545, 557, 564 S.E.2d 87,
93 (2002) ("The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion."); Clark v. Cantrell, 339
S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when
the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual
conclusions, is without evidentiary support."); State v. Gilchrist, 329 S.C. 621,
630, 496 S.E.2d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 1998) ("All evidence is meant to be
prejudicial; it is only unfair prejudice which must be avoided." (quoting United
States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir. 1989)) (emphasis in
original)); id. ("Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a defendant's case
that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to
evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis." (quoting United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993))); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406,
436, 118 S.E. 803, 814 (1923) (holding "a trial court has no discretionary power to
exclude competent evidence that is not merely cumulative, offered as to a material
point of fact, the proof of which is essential to the establishment of a party's cause
of action"); id. at 439-40, 118 S.E. at 815 ("Every fact [. . .] which closes up an exit
of possible distrust of the testimony, i.e., which prevents or refutes a possible
discrediting hypothesis, is a corroborative fact." (quoting John Henry Wigmore,
Principles of Judicial Proof 732 (1913))).

2. To the extent the admission of the testimony of the law enforcement officer who
found the crack pipe was erroneous, we find any error was harmless because, when
considering this case as a whole, the evidence presented against Pringle at trial was
overwhelming. See State v. Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 562, 575 S.E.2d 77, 83 (Ct.
App. 2003) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the circumstances of the
particular case."); State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985)
("No definite rule of law governs this finding; rather, the materiality and
prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to the
entire case."); Thompson, 352 S.C. at 562, 575 S.E.2d at 83 ("Error is harmless
when it could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial."); id. ("Where a
review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, the conviction should not be reversed.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, WILLIAMS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.