State v. Grant

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Henry Kevin Grant, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002499

Appeal From Laurens County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-341
Submitted September 1, 2019 – Filed October 9, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In all
criminal cases, an appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v.
Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2003) ("In reviewing
jury charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light
of the evidence and issues presented at trial."); id. at 318, 557 S.E.2d at 464 ("A
jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct
definition and adequately covers the law."); State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 478,
697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010) ("A jury charge that is substantially correct and covers
the law does not require reversal."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583 ("The trial court
is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); id. ("To
warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to give a requested jury charge must be
both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant."); id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 584
("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's] decision regarding a jury
charge absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. McDonald, 343 S.C. 319, 325, 540
S.E.2d 464, 467 (2000) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's
ruling is based on an error or law."); State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 125, 232
S.E.2d 328, 330 (1977) ("[V]oluntary intoxication, where it has not produced
permanent insanity, is never an excuse for or a defense to crime, regardless of
whether the intent involved be general or specific.").1

AFFIRMED.2

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
This case is distinguishable from Elonis v. United States because Elonis is
narrowly focused on the specific intent requirement of section 875(c) of Title 18 of
the United States Code, not on any broader First Amendment implications. 135
S. Ct. 2001, 2012-13 (2015); see also United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 220
(4th Cir. 2016) ("But, importantly, the Court's holding in Elonis was purely
statutory; and, having resolved the question on statutory grounds, the Court
declined to address whether a similar subjective intent to threaten is a necessary
component of a 'true threat' for purposes of the First Amendment.").
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.