Peay v. Alexander

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lenora Peay, Appellant,

v.

Gerald Alexander, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001738

Appeal From Fairfield County
W. Thomas Sprott, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-316
Heard March 14, 2019 – Filed September 11, 2019

AFFIRMED

April Dawn Porter, of Law Office of April D. Porter,
P.C., of Chester, for Appellant.

George W. Speedy, of Speedy, Tanner, Atkinson &
Cook, LLC, of Camden; and Katherine Carruth Goode,
of Winnsboro, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lenora Peay appeals the family court's order arguing the family
court erred by (1) failing to find she was entitled to a rebuttable presumption a
common-law marriage existed between her and Gerald Alexander, (2) finding
Alexander presented evidence to rebut such presumption, and (3) concluding no
common-law marriage existed between them. We affirm.

1. As to whether the family court erred in failing to find Peay was entitled to a
rebuttal presumption of common-law marriage, we conclude Peay did not allege
facts sufficient that, even if unrebutted, would establish a common-law marriage.
See Barker v. Baker, 330 S.C. 361, 368-69, 499 S.E.2d 503, 507 (Ct. App. 1998)
("[I]f a party claiming a common-law marriage presents proof of apparently
matrimonial cohabitation and long-term social acceptance of the couple as married,
a presumption arises that the couple entered into a common-law marriage,
notwithstanding the absence of any proof of an express agreement to enter into a
common-law marriage."), abrogated by Stone v. Thompson, Op. No. 27908 (S.C.
Sup. Ct. filed July 24, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 30 at 94)1; id. at 369, 499
S.E.2d at 507 ("The presumption, however, in no way lessens the claimant's burden
of proving a common-law marriage by the preponderance of the evidence."); id.
("[T]he presumption simply designates the facts that, if proven to the satisfaction
of the fact-finder, will be sufficient to establish a common-law marriage unless
properly rebutted." (emphases added)).2

2. As to whether the family court erred in finding no common-law marriage
existed between Peay and Alexander, we conclude the family court did not err in
finding Peay did not establish the requisite intent by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S.C. 542, 550, 112 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1960)
("It is essential to a common-law marriage that there shall be a mutual agreement
between the parties to assume toward each other the relation of husband and wife.
Cohabitation without such an agreement does not constitute marriage."); Stone
(Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 30 at 100) ("The key element in discerning whether
parties are common-law married is mutual assent: each party must intend to be

1
Stone prospectively abolishes the doctrine of common-law marriage and, in cases
commenced after the filing of the opinion, eliminates the rebuttable presumption of
common-law marriage and heightens the required standard of proof from a
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing. Stone v. Thompson, Op.
No. 27908 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 24, 2019) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 30 at 95).
2
Because we conclude Peay did not set forth facts sufficient to entitle her to the
rebuttal presumption of common-law marriage, we need not analyze whether
Alexander successfully rebutted those facts. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an
"appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue
is dispositive").
married to the other and understand the other's intent."); id. ("Some factors to
which courts have looked to discern the parties' intent include tax returns,
documents filed under penalty of perjury, introductions in public, contracts, and
checking accounts."); id. at 106 (disapproving of "false statements [made] in
pursuit of a financial benefit" but concluding mortgage documents showing parties
as married in order to bolster application did not evidence the necessary intent to
prove common-law marriage); id. at 104 ("Even under de novo review, the
longstanding principles that trial judges are in superior positions to assess witness
credibility and that appellants must show the trial judge erred by ruling against the
preponderance of the evidence remain applicable.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.