Weddle v. Charleston County Sheriff's Office

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Linda Beth Weddle, Respondent,

v.

Charleston County Sheriff's Office, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-002526

Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-288
Submitted May 8, 2019 – Filed August 7, 2019

AFFIRMED

Elloree A. Ganes, of Hood Law Firm, LLC, and
Benjamin Houston Joyce, of Burr & Forman, LLP, both
of Charleston; and Deborah Harrison Sheffield, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Daniel Carson Boles, of Boles Law Firm, LLC, of
Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: The Charleston County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff's Office) appeals
a jury verdict in favor of Linda Beth Weddle on her cause of action for gross
negligence. We affirm.
1. We disagree with the Sheriff's Office's argument the trial court erred in denying
its motions for a directed verdict as we find the evidence supports the jury's
determination of gross negligence. See Sabb v. S.C. State Univ., 350 S.C. 416,
427, 567 S.E.2d 231, 236 (2002) ("In ruling on directed verdict or [Judgement
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV)] motions, the trial court is required to view the
evidence and the inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motions." (citing Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of
Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 386, 520 S.E.2d 142, 148 (1999)));
id. ("The trial court must deny the motions when the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt."); RFT Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P.,
399 S.C. 322, 332, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171 (2012) ("In deciding such motions, neither
the trial court nor the appellate court has the authority to decide credibility issues
or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence." (citing Welch v. Epstein,
342 S.C. 279, 300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 419 (Ct. App. 2000))); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-
78-60(25) (2005) (limiting the governmental entity's liability arising from the
"responsibility or duty . . . [of] supervision, protection, control, confinement, or
custody of any . . . prisoner [or] inmate . . . [to instances] when the responsibility or
duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner"); Staubes v. City of Folly Beach,
339 S.C. 406, 416, 529 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2000) ("The burden of establishing a
limitation upon liability under the Tort Claims Act is upon the governmental entity
asserting it as an affirmative defense." (citing Strange v. S.C. Dep't of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 430, 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994))); Etheredge v.
Richland Sch. Dist. One, 341 S.C. 307, 310, 534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000) ("Gross
negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do something which it is
incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not
to do." (citing Clyburn v. Sumter Cty. Dist. Seventeen, 317 S.C. 50, 53, 451 S.E.2d
885, 887 (1994); Richardson v. Hambright, 296 S.C. 504, 506, 374 S.E.2d 296,
298 (1988))); id. ("It is the failure to exercise slight care." (citing Clyburn, 317
S.C. at 53, 451 S.E.2d at 887)); id. ("Gross negligence has also been defined as a
relative term, and means the absence of care that is necessary under the
circumstances." (citing Hollins v. Richland Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 310 S.C. 486, 490,
427 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1993))); Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 350 S.C. 315,
332, 566 S.E.2d 536, 545 (2002) ("In most cases, gross negligence is a factually
controlled concept whose determination best rests with the jury."); Black v. Hodge,
306 S.C. 196, 198, 410 S.E.2d 595, 596 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The fact that testimony
is not contradicted directly does not render it undisputed." (citing Terwilliger v.
Marion, 222 S.C. 185, 188, 72 S.E.2d 165, 166 (1952))); id. ("There remains the
question of the inherent probability of the testimony and the credibility of the
witness or the interests of the witness in the result of the litigation."); id. ("If there
is anything tending to create distrust in his [or her] truthfulness, the question must
be left to the jury." (alteration in original) (quoting Terwilliger, 222 S.C. at 188, 72
S.E.2d at 166)).

2. We disagree with the Sheriff's Office's arguments the trial court erred in
allowing evidence of $52,192.72 in medical expenses and in denying its motions
for directed verdict and JNOV. While the record does not contain medical expert
testimony, Weddle "otherwise" presented evidence linking her injury and damages
to the Sheriff's Office's actions. See Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 400, 477
S.E.2d 715, 721 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Negligence is not actionable unless it is a
proximate cause of the injury." (citing Hanselmann v. McCardle, 275 S.C. 46, 48-
49, 267 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1980))); id. at 401, 477 S.E.2d at 721 ("A negligent act or
omission is a proximate cause of injury if, in a natural and continuous sequence of
events, it produces the injury, and without it, the injury would not have occurred."
(citing Crolley v. Hutchins, 300 S.C. 355, 357, 387 S.E.2d 716, 717 (Ct. App.
1989))); Hurd v. Williamsburg Cty., 353 S.C. 596, 613, 579 S.E.2d 136, 145 (Ct.
App. 2003) ("Ordinarily, the question of proximate cause is one of fact for the jury
and the trial judge's sole function regarding the issue is to inquire whether
particular conclusions are the only reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
the evidence." (quoting McNair v. Rainsford, 330 S.C. 332, 349, 499 S.E.2d 488,
497 (Ct. App. 1998))); Pederson v. Gould, 288 S.C. 141, 142, 341 S.E.2d 633, 634
(1986) ("Expert testimony is not required . . . in situations where the common
knowledge or experience of laymen is extensive enough for them to be able . . . to
determine the presence of the required causal link between the [defendant's]
actions and the [plaintiff's] medical problems." (citing King v. Williams, 276 S.C.
478, 483, 279 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1981))); Carlyle v. Tuomey Hosp., 305 S.C. 187,
193, 407 S.E.2d 630, 633 (1991) ("Medical bills not clearly identified by medical
testimony, or otherwise, as being connected with the tortious act which resulted in
injuries under litigation are generally held inadmissible, especially where there is
evidence that plaintiff was treated for a condition unrelated to the injuries
sustained in the accident." (emphasis added) (quoting 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §
933 (1988))); id. (concluding lack of apportionment in medical bill between
treatment for injury caused by defendant and unrelated ailment "allowed the jury to
arrive at a verdict through surmise, conjecture, or speculation").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.