State v. Barr

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Calvin Solomon Barr, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001367

Appeal From Horry County
Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-196
Submitted May 1, 2019 – Filed June 5, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of
Conway, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Calvin Solomon Barr appeals his convictions of possession of
cocaine, second offense; possession with intent to distribute marijuana, first
offense; and possession with intent to distribute heroin. He argues the trial court
erred by (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to
present any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence he was knowingly in
constructive possession of the drugs, and (2) instructing the jury on the definitions
of "dominion" and "control" because the instruction lowered the burden of proof to
satisfy the element of constructive possession. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred by denying Barr's motion for a directed
verdict: State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with the
existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); State v. Odems, 395 S.C.
582, 586, 720 S.E.2d 48, 50 (2011) ("On appeal from the denial of a directed
verdict, [the appellate court] must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State."); id. ("[I]f there is any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence
reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate court must find
the case was properly submitted to the jury."); State v. Muhammed, 338 S.C. 22,
28, 524 S.E.2d 637, 640 (Ct. App. 1999) (finding the trial court properly denied a
motion for a directed verdict because the State produced sufficient evidence of the
defendant's constructive possession of drugs when the defendant was a temporary
visitor in the house with access while the owner was gone and possessed a key to
the room where the drugs were found).

2. As to whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the definitions of
"dominion" and "control": State v. Commander, 396 S.C. 254, 270, 721 S.E.2d
413, 421-22 (2011) ("An appellate court will not reverse the trial [court's] decision
regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v. Mattison,
388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010))); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312,
317, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Generally, the trial [court] is required
to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina."); id. at 318, 577
S.E.2d at 463 ("In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the [trial]
court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at
trial."); id. at 318, 577 S.E.2d at 464 ("A jury charge is correct if, when the charge
is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the
law."); State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 31, 667 S.E.2d 728, 732 (2008) ("To warrant
reversal, a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both
erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant.").

AFFIRMED.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and HILL, JJ., concur.