Aldie v. Grossman

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Julie Aldie, Appellant,

v.

Gregory Hampton Grossman, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001505

Appeal From Greenville County
Michael S. Holt, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-080
Submitted November 1, 2018 – Filed February 13, 2019

AFFIRMED

Brian P. Johnson, of The Law Office of Brian P. Johnson,
LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Sidney Paul Mitchell, Jr., of Mitchell Ramseur, LLC, and
J. Falkner Wilkes, both of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Julie Aldie (Mother) appeals the family court's order finding there
was a substantial change in circumstances that necessitated a change in the custody
and placement of the parties' minor child (Child). Mother contends the family court
erred by (1) making findings of fact that are without evidentiary support, (2) finding
there was a substantial change in circumstances that necessitated a change in the
custody and placement of Child, and (3) finding it was in Child's best interest to
modify a previous order granting Mother expanded visitation with Child. We affirm.

I. Family Court Findings
Mother contends the family court's factual findings are not supported by the
record. We disagree.

DSS and SAFY Investigations

The family court found that Mother made five separate allegations ranging
from physical abuse to sexual abuse against Father, all of which were unfounded.
Mother contends this finding was based solely on Father's testimony because there
is "no other analysis on how the [family] court found Mother was responsible."
Mother maintains that there is no evidence regarding who made the reports. We
disagree.

A review of the record indicates that Mother made several allegations against
Father. First, Mother admitted that she made reports to both the Department of
Social Services (DSS) and Specialized Alternatives for Families and Youth (SAFY).
Mother stated that because she is a nurse she is a mandatory reporter for South
Carolina and if she suspects or sees an injury she is mandated to report it, but stated
that she was not the only one to report Father. Specifically, Mother admitted she
reported that Father sexually abused Child, again, indicating that she was a
"mandated reporter."1 Mother admitted to making a report that Father was
"harming" Child because Father placed Child in a shirt that was too small. When
Mother was questioned about whether she was the person to report the shirt incident
to DSS or SAFY, Mother responded, "That was just one complaint of many."
Second, Father testified that Mother made reports to SAFY alleging Father slapped
Child in the face. Additionally, Father testified that he was investigated by SAFY
concerning a report Mother made alleging that he hit Child in the face with a frisbee.2
Lastly, Father stated that there was a night when Child was "horse-playing" prior to

1
Mother alleged that Child made the allegations of sexual abuse. Mother reported
the alleged abuse to DSS. Child was eventually interviewed at the Julie Valentine
Center, where Child revealed that the alleged abuse could have been a dream. As a
result of this statement, the case was closed and the allegations were determined to
be unfounded.
2
Father explained that Child was inadvertently hit in the face with a frisbee while
they were playing with it; however, Child was not injured or harmed. The
investigation was closed, and the allegations were determined to be unfounded.
his bath time and received a carpet burn on his bottom. Due to Mother making two
prior allegations of abuse against him, Father stated he emailed Mother to inform
her of the incident so that she would not be alarmed. Subsequently, Father was again
investigated by DSS for a report of child abuse concerning the carpet burn Child
received while in his care. Thus, we find the record is replete with evidence
indicating that Mother made several unfounded allegations against Father. See
Ashburn v. Rogers, 420 S.C. 411, 416, 803 S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ct. App. 2017) ("[T]he
appellant retains the burden to show that the family court's findings are not supported
by the preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be affirmed.").

Child's Therapy

The family court found that Mother interfered with Child's ability to receive
therapy. Specifically, the family court found that Mother "frustrated" the therapy
that Father attempted to obtain for Child. Mother contends that the family court did
not give weight to the testimony of the Child's current therapist, who testified the
specific therapy that Father had obtained was not appropriate for Child's situation.
We disagree.

At the modification hearing, Irene Shockley, a case manager with the South
Carolina Autism Society, testified that she coordinated services for Child to receive
behavioral therapy also known as Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA). In an effort
to curtail the cost of the therapy, Child applied for a "waiver," which would enable
Child to receive funding for ABA therapy for three years. Shockley noted that
thousands of children were on the waiting list for a waiver. Shortly thereafter, Child
began receiving services from a provider named Hope Reach.

Bethanie Welborn, an employee at Hope Reach, testified that during one of
Child's therapy sessions, Child attempted to hit one of the therapists. According to
the therapists, this was a new behavior that Child had exhibited. As a response to
Child's actions, the therapist "prompted" Child's hands down and told him "no
hitting." Mother was observing the therapy session and disagreed with the way the
therapist handled Child. Father was also present during the session and did not have
a problem with the therapist's actions. Subsequently, Mother accused the therapist
of abusing Child.

After this session, Welborn scheduled a meeting with both parents and the
therapists to discuss Child's actions and how to move forward with Child's treatment
plan. However, Mother sent an email stating that she did not want to attend the
meeting. Mother expressed that she was "uncomfortable being in the same room
with [Father] and that she was uncomfortable with [Child's] escalating problem
behavior." As a result, Welborn decided to place Child's treatment on hold until she
could alleviate Mother's concerns and get both parents on the same page. Welborn
called Mother and Father to set up separate meetings; however, Mother indicated
that she was uncomfortable meeting with her. Welborn successfully met with Father
to discuss Child's treatment plan. However, Welborn ultimately decided that Hope
Reach would no longer be able to offer services to Child because she believed the
relationship with Mother was irreparable. Welborn explained that in order for Child
to experience success in the program both parents needed to be on one accord.
Welborn informed Father that Hope Reach would continue therapy with Child for a
month on the days that Father had custody and requested that Father forward all
communications with Hope Reach to Mother per their custody order. Additionally,
Welborn testified that a majority of Child's sessions were spent addressing Mother's
concerns. For example, during one of the sessions, Mother requested to be in the
same room as Child. In an effort to accommodate Mother, Welborn tried to reserve
a separate room for Child's session although this particular segment of his therapy
would have occurred in a room with other children.

We find that Mother's uncooperative behavior interfered with Child receiving
therapy that could have been beneficial to him. We find Mother's argument that
Child's current therapist indicated ABA therapy was inappropriate is without merit.
The fact that Child's current therapist stated the therapy would not be appropriate for
Child's needs does not negate the fact that it was Mother's actions that caused the
termination of Child's therapy. Furthermore, Father testified that Child has been
terminated from four service providers and another provider threatened termination,
all due to Mother's actions. Thus, the family court's finding is supported by the
record. See Ashburn, 420 S.C. at 416, 803 S.E.2d at 471 ("[T]he appellant retains
the burden to show that the family court's findings are not supported by the
preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be affirmed.").

Difficulty Co-Parenting

The family court found Mother was the primary reason the parties had
difficulty co-parenting and that Mother was the least capable of making decisions
concerning Child. Mother contends that the family court did not give weight to her
examples demonstrating how Father made co-parenting difficult. We disagree.

The family court's order referenced several examples of how Mother's
behavior created problems between the parties. For instance, witnesses testified
during one of Child's therapy sessions, Mother caused a scene, crying and requesting
to be placed in a separate room away from Father. The family court noted this in its
order. Additionally, in the Arbitrated Order3, the parties were instructed to select a
form of electronic communication, such as Family Wizard, but ultimately indicated
the parties could mutually agree on what they used. Father testified that he covered
the cost for both parties to use Family Wizard; however, Mother refused to use the
program. Father attempted to use Google calendar on the parties' cellular phones;
however, Mother refused to use that form of communication as well. Mother
explained that she refused because she is not "tech savvy" and preferred email or
text messaging. Once again the family court noted this in its order.

Additionally, we find that based upon our view of the evidence, Mother has
exhibited an inability to effectively communicate and cooperate with Father in the
co-parenting of Child. For example, when Father enrolled Child into extracurricular
activities, there were instances when Mother refused to bring Child to his games,
practices, or award ceremonies. When Father tried to obtain a passport for Child,
Mother was uncooperative in signing the passport. Lastly, when Father was
informed Child needed a computer, Father provided Child with an old work
computer. However, Mother subsequently called Father's employer inquiring if the
computer was stolen, which resulted in Father being interrogated by his supervisor.
Ultimately, the issue was resolved and it was determined that the computer legally
belonged to Father. Thus, we share the family court's sentiment that mother is "more
concerned with damaging Father at any cost so that she may obtain custody."
Therefore, we find the record supports the family court's finding. See Stoney v.
Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018) ("[T]he proper standard of
review in family court matters is de novo . . . ."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 390,
709 S.E.2d 650, 654–55 (2011) ("De novo review permits appellate court fact-
finding, notwithstanding the presence of evidence supporting the trial court's
finding."); see also Ashburn, 420 S.C. at 416, 803 S.E.2d at 471 ("[T]he appellant
retains the burden to show that the family court's findings are not supported by the
preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be affirmed.").

Relationship with Babysitter

Lastly, the family court found Mother was responsible for disrupting Child's
relationship with his babysitter. Specifically, Mother caused a scene in the presence
of Child at Child's school when Father's babysitter tried to pick up Child. Babysitter
testified that Mother would not let Child get into her car and that Mother was yelling

3
In May 2012, Mother and Father litigated the issue of custody through binding
arbitration, which was incorporated into a final order—herein referenced as the
Arbitrated Order.
in the presence of Child. This commotion caused Child to become upset, and he
began clinging to Mother, crying and stating that he did not want to leave with the
babysitter. This incident caused Father to leave work in order to resolve the issue
with the school principal, and ultimately, Child left with Father's babysitter. The
babysitter testified that Child's behavior that day was unusual because Child was
typically eager to leave with her after school and enjoyed discussing his day with
her. We find this testimony reflects the detrimental effect Mother had on Child's
relationship with his babysitter, and therefore, the family court's finding is supported
by the record. See Ashburn, 420 S.C. at 416, 803 S.E.2d at 471 ("[T]he appellant
retains the burden to show that the family court's findings are not supported by the
preponderance of the evidence; otherwise, the findings will be affirmed.").
Furthermore, as to Mother's arguments that the family court failed to weigh certain
evidence, we note "[t]he weight to be given evidence lies within the province of the
fact finder, here the family court." Bailey v. Bailey, 293 S.C. 451, 453, 361 S.E.2d
348, 350 (Ct. App. 1987). "Considering the fact that the [family court] was in a
better position to weigh the evidence, we defer to [its] judgment." Id.; see also
McComb v. Conard, 394 S.C. 416, 422, 715 S.E.2d 662, 664–65 (Ct. App. 2011)
("The appellate court generally defers to the factual findings of the family court
regarding credibility because the family court is in a better position to observe the
witness and his or her demeanor.").

II. Change in Circumstances
Mother argues the family court erred because the modification order contains
limited findings addressing how Child's welfare was negatively affected.
Additionally, Mother maintains that the Arbitrated Order indicated that if Mother
failed to continue therapy or was unable to control her anger in the presence of child,
this behavior would constitute a "material change." Mother contends that the family
court failed to reference this provision in the Arbitrated Order and that she has
maintained therapy. We disagree.

When a court has previously established a visitation schedule, "the moving
party must show a change of circumstances to warrant a change of visitation."
Ingold v. Ingold, 304 S.C. 316, 320, 404 S.E.2d 35, 37 (Ct. App. 1991); see also
King v. Gardner, 274 S.C. 493, 495, 265 S.E.2d 260, 262 (1980) ("[A] judicial award
of the custody of a child and the fixing of visitation rights is not final and changed
circumstances may authorize the change of custody or visitation rights in the future."
(quoting McGregor v. McGregor, 255 S.C. 179, 183, 177 S.E.2d 599, 600–01
(1970))). Similar to changes of custody, modification of visitation must be in the
best interests of the child. See Paparella v. Paparella, 340 S.C. 186, 191, 531 S.E.2d
297, 300 (Ct. App. 2000) ("As with child custody, the welfare and best interests of
the child are the primary considerations in determining visitation."). A change in
circumstances justifying a reduction in visitation must adversely affect the welfare
of the child. See Ingold, 304 S.C. at 320, 404 S.E.2d at 37 (finding an insufficient
change of circumstances to justify reducing father's visitation because the mother
had not shown how the visitation adversely affected their child's welfare); Duck v.
Jenkins, 297 S.C. 136, 139, 375 S.E.2d 178, 179 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating visitation
privileges can be denied when "their exercise would injure the child emotionally").
Lastly, it is not in a child's best interest to grant expanded visitation to a non-
custodial parent when the child's parents lack cooperation and communication. See
Lewis v. Lewis, 400 S.C. 354, 367, 734 S.E.2d 322, 329 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Our review
of the preponderance of the evidence convinces us that, given the lack of cooperation
and communication between the parties, allowing [the father] more extensive
visitation would not be in [the child's] best interest.").

Under the Arbitrated Order, Mother and Father operated on a 2-2-3 schedule,
meaning Child was with Mother on Mondays and Tuesdays, with Father on
Wednesdays and Thursdays, and with Mother on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays.
The schedule would then rotate accordingly. The family court reduced Mother's
expanded visitation to a standard visitation schedule resulting in Mother having
alternate weekends with Child. The family court found that Child's welfare was
negatively affected by Mother's conduct. Specifically, the family court found that
due to Mother's inability to cooperate with Child's therapists, Child was denied
therapy services that could have benefitted him. As discussed in section I, the record
support's this finding and the finding that Mother's conduct was detrimental to the
welfare of Child.

Second, the family court found that Child's welfare was adversely affected
because of Mother's inability to co-parent under the current visitation schedule. The
family court noted that Mother was difficult to communicate with. Several
witnesses, such as Child's therapists and counselors, members of SAFY, and Father,
testified that communication with Mother was exhausting, hostile, and to no avail.
Additionally, an employee at Hope Reach testified that Hope Reach had 192 emails
concerning Child's case alone, in comparison to only receiving a total of forty emails
from other parents during that same time period. In another instance, Mother was
uncooperative with a SAFY investigation. A case manager at SAFY, Brenda
Mansel, testified that she received a report that Child had a scratch on his face. She
attempted to investigate the matter. The meeting with Father was successful;
however, when Mansel arrived at Mother's home for their scheduled meeting, she
could not contact Mother. Mansel stated that when she returned to her office the
next day, she was informed that Mother filed a complaint against her, alleging that
she failed to appear for their scheduled meeting. Mansel called Mother to inform
her that she was in fact at Mother's home as scheduled. Mansell informed Mother
that she still wanted to arrange a meeting with her; however, Mother stated that she
did not have confidence in their program and did not want Mansel to come to her
home. Mansel explained to the court that Mother seemed very agitated on the phone,
was talking over Mansel while Mansel was trying to explain herself, and was not
cooperative in trying to communicate with Mansel. Lastly, Father testified that
communication with Mother was difficult. Father and Mother agreed to use email
as their preferred method of communication. Father stated that attempts to solve
simple issues turned into "exhausting email sessions," explaining that if he emailed
Mother trying to resolve simple issues, it would result in thirty-one emails being
conveyed just to discuss something, but without the issues being resolved. Thus, we
find that Mother's inability to effectively and cordially communicate with the
persons involved in Child's life adversely effected the welfare of Child. See Lewis,
400 S.C. at 367, 734 S.E.2d at 329 ("Our review of the preponderance of the
evidence convinces us that, given the lack of cooperation and communication
between the parties, allowing [the father] more extensive visitation would not be in
[the child's] best interest.").

Third, as previously stated, the family court found that Mother caused a scene
in the presence of Child at Child's school when Father's babysitter tried to pick up
Child. This incident forced Father to leave work in order to resolve the issue with
the school principal. The babysitter testified that Child's behavior that day was
unusual because Child was typically eager to leave with her after school and enjoyed
discussing his day with her. Additionally, the babysitter testified that once Child has
stayed with Mother for a period of time, Child acts differently towards her. For
instance, Child seemed upset around the babysitter and started saying that he did not
feel safe at her house—something that Child had never said before. The family court
found that Mother's actions caused Child to withdraw from his babysitter. Thus, it
is evident that the family court's order contains sufficient findings addressing
Mother's conduct and the adverse effect that it has on the welfare of Child. Although
the family court did not reference the language in the Arbitrated Order—which
provided that Mother must maintain therapy and control her anger in front of child
and that failure to do so would constitute a "material" change from the circumstances
under which extended visitation was granted—the family court took into
consideration that Mother caused a scene at Child's school, which resulted in Child
becoming upset. This incident alone is enough to be deemed a "material" change as
provided by the Arbitrated Order.
Furthermore, based upon our view of the evidence, Mother's conduct
adversely affected the welfare of Child and, thus, constituted a change in
circumstances. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 596, 813 S.E.2d at 487 ("[T]he proper
standard of review in family court matters is de novo. . . ."). The record indicates
that the stressful relationship between Mother and Father placed emotional and
mental stress upon Child. For example, some of Child's anxiety was attributable to
the high tension between his parents. Additionally, Child's guardian ad litem
testified that she was concerned that Child's level of anxiety was related to his
Mother's level of anxiety. See Duck, 297 S.C. at 139, 375 S.E.2d at 179 (providing
visitation privileges can be denied when "their exercise would injure the child
emotionally"). Father also testified that there is conflict between the two parties,
much of which he believes is directed towards him. Father stated, "There's conflict
in every which way. [Child] is a part of that. I believe a lot of the conflict is directed
at me. [Child] is a victim of that. And my ability to parent [Child] is [a]ffected
negatively by a lot of that conflict." Father explained that if he refused to discuss
something with Mother that was not a "major parenting decision," Mother would
resort to contacting law enforcement to perform well-checks or make allegations to
child protective services. Father testified that Mother called the police to his home
thirteen times while Child was in his care. When Mother was questioned on the
number of times she called law enforcement, Mother stated that she called "[e]very
time [she] heard [her] Child scream on the phone." Thus, it is apparent that Mother
uses civil services to interfere with Father's ability to care for child. See Sheila R. v.
David R., 396 S.C. 41, 49–50, 719 S.E.2d 682, 686 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding the
family court's decision to change primary physical placement of a child from the
mother to the father where it was necessary to "provide an immediate remedy to the
child-related conflicts between Mother and Father," and to limit child's exposure to
mother due to "numerous disturbing incidents, including Mother's unnecessary calls
to law enforcement during Father's visits," and unsubstantiated accusations of
father's drug use as well as a "pattern of inflexibility and uncooperativeness" with
court-ordered provisions).

Additionally, Father testified that Child has been terminated from four service
providers and another provider threatened termination. Child's guardian ad litem
indicated in her report that Child had "access to valuable therapeutic services as a
result of" the waiver with Hope Reach and she believed that Child "should be
allowed to receive the benefit of those services[,] which could assist him with
functioning as he matures." Father stated that Child has not been able to attend the
therapy session for the past two years. Thus, the record reveals that Mother has
interfered with Child's ability to receive medical treatment, Mother's actions have
potentially damaged Child's relationship with his babysitter, and Mother uses every
tactic possible to make Father's life difficult. We believe that Mother has
demonstrated that she is unable to control her anger in front of Child and that she is
unable to cordially co-parent or communicate with Father or communicate with any
medical providers Father has chosen for Child. Therefore, we find that it is not in
Child's best interest to have expanded visitation with Mother. See Lewis, 400 S.C.
at 367, 734 S.E.2d at 329 ("Our review of the preponderance of the evidence
convinces us that, given the lack of cooperation and communication between the
parties, allowing [the father] more extensive visitation would not be in [the child's]
best interest."); see also Kisling v. Allison, 343 S.C. 674, 684–85, 541 S.E.2d 273,
278 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding substantial change in circumstances warranting a
change in custody where, among other things, the mother exhibited poor judgment
and instability, discouraged the child from visiting the father, and was the source of
difficulties between the parties).

III. Child's Best Interest
Mother contends the family court failed to consider and weigh the factors set
forth in section 63-15-240(B), which provides, "In issuing or modifying a custody
order, the court must consider the best interest of the child, which may include, but
is not limited to" the several factors listed therein. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-240(B)
(Supp. 2018). Additionally, Mother maintains that the family court's order is
"ambiguous as to why" the change in visitation is in the child's best interest. We
disagree.

First, we note that Mother failed to file a motion for reconsideration to request
that the family court address the factors in section 63-15-240(B). "Therefore, when
an appellant neither raises an issue at trial nor [files] a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion,
the issue is not preserved for appellate review." Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C.
481, 487, 769 S.E.2d 442, 446 (Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206,
212, 634 S.E.2d 51, 54–55 (Ct. App. 2006)); id. ("To preserve an issue for appellate
review, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been
raised to and ruled upon by the [family] court." (quoting Doe, 370 S.C. at 212, 634
S.E.2d at 54)). Additionally, we note that section 63-15-240(B) indicates the family
court may consider those factors but it is not limited to those factors. Therefore, the
family court was only required to consider the best interests of the child, and the
factors were listed to help guide the court in its analysis. See Kennedy v. S.C. Ret.
Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 352–53, 549 S.E.2d 243, 250 (2001) ("The use of the word 'may'
[in a statute] signifies permission and generally means that the action spoken of is
optional or discretionary unless it appears to require that it be given any other
meaning in the present statute."). Even if the issue was preserved, a review of the
record indicates the family court considered several of the factors referenced in
section 63-15-240(B), although the court did not list the factors out verbatim.

Furthermore, upon our view of the evidence, Child's best interest would be
served by reducing Mother's visitation from expanded to standard because Child
needs greater stability and consistency in his treatment. See Stoney, 422 S.C. at 596,
813 S.E.2d at 487 ("[T]he proper standard of review in family court matters is de
novo. . . ."); see also Paparella, 340 S.C. at 191, 531 S.E.2d at 297 ("As with child
custody, the welfare and best interests of the child are the primary considerations in
determining visitation."). One of the biggest concerns that Child's therapists,
counselors, guardian ad litem, and Father expressed to the family court was the fact
that Child needed consistency and greater stability. Shockley testified that she
believed Child needed a visitation schedule that would allow him to receive the
therapy that he needed. As previously mentioned, the parties were operating on a 2-
2-3 rotating schedule. After Hope Reach informed Father that they would only
conduct therapy sessions at his home, the sessions were scheduled to occur on
Wednesdays. However, due to the constantly rotating schedule, Child's therapists
were meeting with Child every other Wednesday. Shockley stated that "things
changed so frequently and it's irregular," and that Child "couldn't have a regular
schedule." Welborn testified that one of the reasons Hope Reach terminated Child's
therapy was the fact that both parents needed to reinforce certain behaviors in the
same manner to help Child progress. Welborn explained that "things were [going
to] be [reinforced] in different places, in different ways. And I felt like [child's
behavioral problems] [were] [going to] be counterproductive for [Child]."

Lastly, Father testified that Child needed

a more regular schedule. The 2-2-3 is not working for his
age. He needs consistency. He's getting very different
feedback from his two parents and it's hard for him to
progress as he needs. My proposal is for [Child] to be with
one parent primarily through the school week and
alternating weekends.

Father also testified that when Child returns from Mother's house, Father feels
that he has to "re-install" the rules, explaining, "Not just the rules at my house but
the rules at the majority of the other environments." Therefore, we find it is in
Child's best interest to reduce Mother's expanded visitation. See Sheila R., 396 S.C.
at 48, 719 S.E.2d at 685 ("In determining custody, the family court 'must consider
the character, fitness, attitude, and inclinations on the part of each parent as they
impact the child." (quoting Woodall v. Woodall, 322 S.C. 7, 11, 471 S.E.2d 154, 157
(1996))); id. ("[T]he totality of the circumstances peculiar to each case constitutes
the only scale upon which the ultimate decision can be weighed." (quoting Parris v.
Parris, 319 S.C. 308, 310, 460 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1995))).

AFFIRMED.4

LOCKEMY, C.J., and THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.