U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Meisner

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

U.S. Bank, National Association, as trustee for the
Holders of The Banc of America Funding Corporation,
2008-FT1 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates,
Series 2008-FT1, Respondent,

v.

Rhonda Lewis Meisner a/k/a Rhonda L. Meisner; Bank
of America, N.A.; and SCBT, Defendants,

Of whom Rhonda Lewis Meisner is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001019

Appeal From Richland County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-066
Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 13, 2019

APPEAL DISMISSED

Rhonda Lewis Meisner, of Blythewood, pro se.

Magalie Arcure Creech, of Finkel Law Firm LLC, and
Jacob Shuler Barker, of Graybill, Lansche & Vinzani,
LLC, both of Charleston; and Trent M. Grissom, of
McGuire Woods LLP, of Charlotte, North Carolina, all
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Dismissed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Hagood v. Sommerville, 362 S.C. 191, 194, 607 S.E.2d 707, 708
(2005) ("The right of appeal arises from and is controlled by statutory law."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 14-3-330(2) (2017) ("[Our s]upreme [c]ourt shall have appellate
jurisdiction for correction of errors of law in law cases, and shall review upon
appeal: . . . [a]n order affecting a substantial right made in an action when such
order (a) in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an
appeal might be taken or discontinues the action, (b) grants or refuses a new trial or
(c) strikes out an answer or any part thereof or any pleading in any action . . . .");
Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 72, 533 S.E.2d 331, 333
(2000) ("Pursuant to [section] 14-3-330(2), this [c]ourt has held on numerous
occasions that when a trial court's order deprives a party of a mode of trial to which
it is entitled as a matter of right, such order is immediately appealable."); Williford
v. Downs, 265 S.C. 319, 321, 218 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975) ("Ordinarily the granting
or refusal of an order of reference is not appealable unless the granting of the
reference deprives a party of a mode of trial to which he is entitled by law . . . .");
id. ("Hence, the issue before the [c]ourt is whether the appellant is entitled to a jury
trial [a]s a matter of right. If she is not, the appeal should be dismissed."); id.
("The only issue [that] must be decided is whether the case at bar is a legal or
equitable action. If it is equitable, the order of reference is not directly
appealable."); Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 248, 489 S.E.2d
472, 475 (1997) ("A mortgage foreclosure is an action in equity."); Wachovia
Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 328, 755 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2014) ("In
equity the parties are not entitled, as a matter of right, to a trial by jury." (quoting
Williford, 265 S.C. at 321, 218 S.E.2d at 243)); id. ("However, counterclaims—
including those raised in equitable actions—may, at times, be entitled to a jury
trial."); id. at 329, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If both the complaint and the counterclaim
are in equity, the entire matter is triable by the court."); id. ("If both are at law, the
issues are triable by a jury."); id. at 330, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If the complaint is
equitable and the counterclaim is legal and permissive, the defendant waives his
right to a jury trial."); id. at 330, 755 S.E.2d at 441-42 ("If the complaint is
equitable and the counterclaim is legal and compulsory, the plaintiff or the
defendant has a right to a jury trial on the counterclaim unless a valid jury trial
waiver exists that encompasses the counterclaim."); Blackburn, 407 S.C. at 330
n.7, 755 S.E.2d at 442 n.7 ("We have previously adopted the 'logical relationship'
test to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory . . . ."); id. ("Under this
test, 'the "logical relationship" determination is made by asking whether the
counterclaim would affect the lender's right to enforce the note and foreclose the
mortgage.'" (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Smith, 398 S.C. 487, 496,
730 S.E.2d 328, 333 (Ct. App. 2012))); id. ("If the defendant's prevailing on his
counterclaim would affect the bank's right to enforce the note and foreclose the
mortgage, there is a logical relationship between the counterclaim and the
underlying suit, and the counterclaim is therefore compulsory.").

APPEAL DISMISSED.1

LOCKEMY, C.J., and THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.