State v. Durant

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Melvin Durant, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001390

Appeal From Florence County
D. Craig Brown, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-083
Submitted January 1, 2019 – Filed February 20, 2019

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Senior Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of
Florence, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Melvin Durant appeals his conviction for assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature (ABHAN). On appeal, Durant argues the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting two statements he made to law enforcement.
We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting Durant's statement to Corporal
Happ: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal
cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Moses, 390
S.C. 502, 510-11, 702 S.E.2d 395, 399 (Ct. App. 2010) ("[T]he trial [court's] ruling
as to the voluntariness of [a] confession will not be disturbed unless so erroneous
as to constitute an abuse of discretion." (quoting State v. Myers, 359 S.C. 40, 47,
596 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004))); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 378-79, 652 S.E.2d
444, 448 (Ct. App. 2007) ("When reviewing a trial [court's] ruling concerning
voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own
view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial
[court's] ruling is supported by any evidence."); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (holding that, before police questioning can take place, an accused must be
warned he has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney; he must be
afforded the "[o]pportunity to exercise these rights . . . throughout the
interrogation"; and after these warnings, he may "knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement"); State v.
Franklin, 390 S.C. 535, 540, 702 S.E.2d 568, 571 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A statement
obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect
was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda . . . ." (alteration
by court) (quoting State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 30, 538 S.E.2d 248, 253 (2000)));
Moses, 390 S.C. at 513, 702 S.E.2d at 401 (providing the State must show the
waiver (1) was "voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception"; and (2) was
"made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it" (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 382-83 (2010))); State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d
500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will
was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession.");
Moses, 375 S.C. at 513-14, 702 S.E.2d at 401 ("Courts have recognized
appropriate factors that may be considered in a totality of the circumstances
analysis: background; experience; conduct of the accused; age; maturity; physical
condition and mental health; length of custody or detention; police
misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; the lack of any
advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; threats of violence; direct or
indirect promises, however slight; lack of education or low intelligence; repeated

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR
and prolonged nature of the questioning; exertion of improper influence; and the
use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food or sleep."); id. at 514,
702 S.E.2d at 401 ("[N]o single factor is dispositive and each case requires careful
scrutiny of all surrounding circumstances."); State v. Saxon, 261 S.C. 523, 529,
201 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1973) ("The fact that one is intoxicated at the time a
confession is made does not necessarily render him incapable of comprehending
the meaning and effect of his words."); id. ("[P]roof that an accused was
intoxicated at the time he made a confession does not render the statement
inadmissible as a matter of law" but rather "goes to the confession's weight and
credibility.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting Durant's statement to Investigator
Wynn: Moses, 390 S.C. at 510-11, 702 S.E.2d at 399 ("[T]he trial [court's] ruling
as to the voluntariness of [a] confession will not be disturbed unless so erroneous
as to constitute an abuse of discretion." (quoting Myers, 359 S.C. at 47, 596 S.E.2d
at 492)); Miller, 375 S.C. at 378-79, 652 S.E.2d at 448 ("When reviewing a trial
[court's] ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate
the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply
determines whether the trial [court's] ruling is supported by any evidence.");
Franklin, 390 S.C. at 540, 702 S.E.2d at 571 ("A statement obtained as a result of
custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and
voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda . . . ." (alteration by court) (quoting
Aleksey, 343 S.C. at 30, 538 S.E.2d at 253)); Moses, 390 S.C. at 513, 702 S.E.2d at
401 (providing the State must show the waiver (1) was "voluntary in the sense that
it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion,
or deception"; and (2) was "made with a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it"
(quoting Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382-83)); Miller, 375 S.C. at 380, 652 S.E.2d at 449
("Volunteered statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation or spontaneously offered up, are not barred by the Fifth
Amendment.").2

2
This court finds Durant's contention that his statement was involuntary because
Investigator Wynn improperly promised to help him is unpreserved for appellate
review. See State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In
order for an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to
and ruled upon by the trial [court]."); id. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693-94 ("Issues not
raised and ruled upon in the trial court will not be considered on appeal."); id. at
142, 587 S.E.2d at 694 ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate
ground on appeal.").
AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.