Contreras v. St. John's Fire District Commission

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Thomas Contreras, Claimant, Appellant,

v.

St. John's Fire District Commission, Employer, and State
Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001247

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2019-UP-040
Heard November 13, 2018 – Filed January 23, 2019

VACATED AND REMANDED

Gary Christmas, of Howell & Christmas, LLC, of Mt.
Pleasant; and Stephen B. Samuels, of Samuels Law Firm,
LLC, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Margaret M. Urbanic, of Clawson and Staubes, LLC, of
Charleston; and Page S. Hilton, of State Accident Fund,
of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation case, Thomas Contreras appeals
the order of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Commission (the Appellate Panel). Contreras argues the Appellate Panel erred in
(1) finding Contreras's injury was limited to his right shoulder, and the Single
Commissioner of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the
Single Commissioner) did not find the clavicle compensable; and (2) prohibiting
Contreras from raising the issue of temporary partial disability (TPD) on remand.
We vacate and remand to the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission
(the Commission).

1. We find the Appellate Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are not
sufficiently detailed to allow us to determine whether the decision was erroneous.
See Able Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 290 S.C. 409, 411, 351 S.E.2d
151, 152 (1986) ("The findings of fact of [the Appellate Panel] must be sufficiently
detailed to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the findings are
supported by the evidence and whether the law has been properly applied to those
findings."). Although the Appellate Panel's order stated there was "no separate
impairment rating to the upper extremity," its order failed to clearly set forth the
underlying facts upon which it relied to support its conclusion that Contreras's
injury was limited to the right shoulder. See id. ("Implicit findings of fact are not
sufficient. Whe[n] material facts are in dispute, the [Appellate Panel] must make
specific, express findings of fact."). "To obtain compensation in addition to that
scheduled for the injured member, claimant must show that some other part of his
body is affected." Singleton v. Young Lumber Co., 236 S.C. 454, 471, 114 S.E.2d
837, 845 (1960). Here, Contreras presented evidence that he injured his right arm
and right clavicle in addition to his right shoulder. This issue impacts the ultimate
liability in the case and determines whether compensation falls under section 42-9-
20 of the South Carolina Code (2015) or section 42-9-30 of the South Carolina
Code (2015). See Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 129, 127
S.E.2d 288, 295 (1962) (holding an issue that impacts the "ultimate liability in the
case" is "one upon which the Commission is required to make an express finding
of fact" and "failure to do so requires that the case be remanded to the Commission
for such finding"), superseded by statute.

Without specific and definite findings upon the evidence, we must remand because
we cannot determine whether the Appellate Panel's findings are unsupported by
substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-
40(A) (2015) ("The award, together with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings
of law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue, must be filed with the
record of the proceedings."); Turner v. Campbell Soup Co., 252 S.C. 446, 450, 166
S.E.2d 817, 818 (1969) (finding remand is appropriate when the Appellate Panel
fails to make an essential finding of fact or when its findings are so indefinite or
general as to afford no reasonable basis for the appellate court to determine
whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether the law has
been properly applied to the findings); id. at 450, 166 S.E.2d at 818–19 ("To hold
otherwise would in such cases make the determination of the rights of the parties
turn upon the neglect of the [Appellate Panel] to make essential findings of fact, or
require the appellate court to make the omitted findings of fact which our statute
forbids." (quoting Drake, 241 S.C. at 124, 127 S.E.2d at 292–93)). Thus, we
vacate the Appellate Panel's order and remand the case to the Commission to make
specific findings of fact regarding Contreras's right arm, right shoulder, and right
clavicle.1

2. We find the Appellate Panel erred in prohibiting Contreras from raising the
issue of TPD on remand to the Single Commissioner and to the Appellate Panel on
appeal from remand. Initially, we find Contreras did not have to raise this issue in
his interlocutory appeal to preserve this issue. See S.C. Baptist Hosp. v. S.C. Dep't
of Health & Envt'l Control, 291 S.C. 267, 270, 353 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1987) ("An
agency decision which does not decide the merits of a contested case, but merely
remands . . . for further action is not a final agency decision subject to judicial
review."); Bone v. U.S. Food Service, 399 S.C. 566, 576, 733 S.E.2d 200, 205
(2012) ("Whe[n] the party is not yet able to appeal due to the lack of a final
judgment, the issue is not precluded [as the law of the case] as there was no prior
opportunity for appeal.").

We find the Appellate Panel's findings of fact regarding Contreras's TPD award do
not afford this Court a reasonable basis to "determine whether the findings of fact
are supported by the evidence and whether the law has been properly applied to
those findings." Turner, 252 S.C. at 450, 166 S.E.2d at 818 (quoting Drake, 241
S.C. at 124, 127 S.E.2d at 292–93). Although the Appellate Panel found Contreras
was entitled to TPD, it failed to make specific findings regarding the amount of
compensation awarded for TPD. "It is the duty of the Commission to make
specific findings upon which a claimant's entitlement to compensation may rest
and upon which the amount of compensation due him may be calculated by one of
the statutory formulae." Shealy v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 250 S.C. 106, 109–10, 156
S.E.2d 646, 648 (1967). "[A]wards without such specific findings do not comply

1
Because the Appellate Panel's order was insufficient, we need not address
whether Contreras should have received an award under section 42-9-20 rather
than section 42-9-30. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not
review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the
appeal).
with the requirements of the [Workers' Compensation Act] and are illegal." Id. at
110, 156 S.E.2d at 648. We vacate and remand this issue to the Commission to
make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding awarding TPD
benefits to Contreras. See Etheredge v. Monsanto Co., 349 S.C. 451, 454, 562
S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating the Appellate Panel is the ultimate fact
finder in workers' compensation cases and is not bound by the Single
Commissioner's findings of facts and conclusions of law); Frady v. Pacific Mills,
231 S.C. 601, 606, 99 S.E.2d 398, 401 (1957) (stating it is for the Commission, and
not the court, to make specific findings regarding an award, and it is appropriate
for the court to remand the case to the Commission to make such findings).

VACATED AND REMANDED.

HUFF, SHORT, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.