Richardson v. Richardson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Robert M. Richardson, Sr., Appellant,

v.

Jeanne B. Richardson, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001231

Appeal From Georgetown County
Wayne M. Creech, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-277
Submitted May 1, 2018 – Filed June 27, 2018

AFFIRMED

Mary Amanda Harrelson Shuler, of Whetstone Perkins &
Fulda, LLC, of Kingstree, for Appellant.

Ernest Joseph Jarrett, of Jenkinson Jarrett & Kellahan,
PA, of Kingstree, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Robert M. Richardson (Husband) appeals the family court's final
divorce order and denial of Husband's motion to reconsider. On appeal, Husband
argues the family court erred by (1) finding a 127-acre tract of land (the property)
belonging to Jeanne B. Richardson (Wife) was not transmuted and Husband did
not have a special equity interest in the property, (2) awarding Wife fifty percent of
the marital assets, and (3) awarding attorney's fees to Wife. We affirm1 pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the property was transmuted or whether Husband obtained a
special equity interest in the property: Stoney v. Stoney, 421 S.C. 528, 531, 809
S.E.2d 59, 60 (2017) ("[T]he proper standard of review in family court matters is
de novo."); McMillan v. McMillan, 417 S.C. 583, 590, 790 S.E.2d 216, 220 (Ct.
App. 2016) ("[T]his [c]ourt has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own
view of the preponderance of the evidence; however, this broad scope of review
does not require the [c]ourt to disregard the findings of the family court, which is
in a superior position to make credibility determinations." (quoting Crossland v.
Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014))); Buist v. Buist, 410
S.C. 569, 574, 766 S.E.2d 381, 383 (2014) ("The appellant retains the burden to
demonstrate the error in the family court's findings of fact."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392
S.C. 381, 392, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011) ("[T]he family court's factual findings
will be affirmed unless 'appellant satisfies this court that the preponderance of the
evidence is against [such findings].'" (quoting Finley v. Cartwright, 55 S.C. 198,
202, 33 S.E. 359, 360-61 (1899))); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(1) (2014)
("[P]roperty acquired by either party by inheritance, devise, bequest, or gift from a
party other than the spouse" is "nonmarital property."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 20-3-630(A)(5) (2014) (providing that "any increase in value in nonmarital
property, except to the extent that the increase resulted directly or indirectly from
efforts of the other spouse during marriage," is also nonmarital property); Murray
v. Murray, 312 S.C. 154, 157, 439 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[Nonmarital
property] may be transmuted (1) if it becomes so commingled with marital
property as to be untraceable; (2) if it is titled jointly; or (3) if it is used by the
parties in support of the marriage or in some manner so as to evidence an intent by
the parties to make it marital property."); id. at 157, 439 S.E.2d at 315
("Transmutation is a matter of intent to be gleaned from the facts of each case. The
spouse claiming transmutation . . . must produce objective evidence showing that,
during the marriage, the parties themselves regarded the property as the common
property of the marriage."); Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 396 S.C. 361, 369, 721 S.E.2d
7, 11 (Ct. App. 2011) (affirming the family court's ruling that property was not
transmuted when "the evidence . . . reflect[ed] [that] only cosmetic improvements
were made during the marriage, [which] would not have increased the equity");
Murray, 312 S.C. at 159, 439 S.E.2d at 316 ("A spouse has an equitable interest in
appreciation of property to which [he] contributed during the marriage, even if the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
property is nonmarital."); McMillan, 417 S.C. at 591, 790 S.E.2d at 220 ("A party
claiming an equitable interest in property . . . bears the burden of proving the
property is marital." (quoting Wilburn v. Wilburn, 403 S.C. 372, 382, 743 S.E.2d
734, 740 (2013))); Arnal v. Arnal, 363 S.C. 268, 294, 609 S.E.2d 821, 835 (Ct.
App. 2005) (holding husband had no special equity in nonmarital property despite
his testimony regarding the "use of his landscaping designs and his physical labor"
when there was "no testimony concerning any actual appreciation in value" of the
land), aff'd as modified, 371 S.C. 10, 636 S.E.2d 864 (2006).

2. As to the family court's division of the martial estate: McMillan, 417 S.C. at 590,
790 S.E.2d at 220 ("In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual
and legal issues de novo." (quoting Crossland, 408 S.C. at 451, 759 S.E.2d at
423)); Sanders v. Sanders, 396 S.C. 410, 419, 722 S.E.2d 15, 19 (Ct. App. 2011)
("On review, this court looks to the fairness of the overall apportionment, and if the
end result is equitable, the fact that this court might have weighed specific factors
differently than the family court is irrelevant."); Avery v. Avery, 370 S.C. 304, 310,
634 S.E.2d 668, 671 (Ct. App. 2006) ("On appeal, even if this court might have
weighed specific factors differently, we will affirm the family court's
apportionment so long as it is fair overall."); Doe v. Doe, 370 S.C. 206, 214, 634
S.E.2d 51, 56 (Ct. App. 2006) (noting that although "there is . . . no recognized
presumption in favor of a fifty-fifty division, [this court] approve[s] equal division
as an appropriate starting point for a family court . . . attempting to divide an estate
of a long-term marriage."); Sanders, 396 S.C. at 419, 722 S.E.2d at 19 (holding
when the "[family] court considered all the statutory factors in equitably
apportioning the parties' assets" its division was equitable and "was supported by a
preponderance of the evidence").

3. As to the award of attorney's fees to Wife: McMillan, 417 S.C. at 590, 790
S.E.2d at 220 ("In appeals from the family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and
legal issues de novo." (quoting Crossland, 408 S.C. at 451, 759 S.E.2d at 423));
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(H) (2014) (providing that the family court "may order
one party to pay a reasonable amount to the other for attorney['s] fees . . . incurred
in maintaining an action for divorce"); E.D.M. v. T.A.M., 307 S.C. 471, 476-77,
415 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1992) (setting forth four factors the family court should
consider in determining whether to award attorney's fees: "(1) the party's ability to
pay his[ or ]her own attorney's fee[s]; (2) beneficial results obtained by the
attorney; (3) the parties' respective financial conditions; [and] (4) [the] effect of the
attorney's fee[s] on each party's standard of living"); Glasscock v. Glasscock, 304
S.C. 158, 161, 403 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1991) (providing that the family court should
consider six factors in determining the reasonableness of attorney's fees: "(1) the
nature, extent, and difficulty of the case; (2) the time necessarily devoted to the
case; (3) professional standing of counsel; (4) contingency of compensation; (5)
beneficial results obtained; [and] (6) customary legal fees for similar services");
Burgess v. Burgess, 407 S.C. 98, 109, 753 S.E.2d 566, 572 (Ct. App. 2014) ("The
decision to award attorney's fees is within the family court's sound discretion, and
although appellate review of such an award is de novo, the appellant still has the
burden of showing error in the family court's findings of fact." (quoting Lewis v.
Lewis, 400 S.C. 354, 372, 734 S.E.2d 322, 331 (Ct. App. 2012))).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and HILL, JJ., concur.