State v. Green

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Rodney R. Green, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-002443

Appeal From Sumter County
George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-187
Submitted April 1, 2018 – Filed May 9, 2018

AFFIRMED

Appellant Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Alphonso Simon, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of
Sumter, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Rodney Green appeals his convictions of murder, attempted
murder, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and
possession of a stolen handgun for which the trial court sentenced him to life
imprisonment without parole (LWOP), thirty years' imprisonment, five years'
imprisonment, and time served, respectively. On appeal, Green argues the trial
court erred by (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict on the charge of
attempted murder, (2) charging the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent, and
(3) denying his motion for a mistrial.1 We affirm2 pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issue one: State v. Kennerly, 331 S.C. 442, 455, 503 S.E.2d 214, 221 (Ct.
App. 1998), aff'd, 337 S.C. 617, 524 S.E.2d 837 (1999) ("In reviewing a denial of
directed verdict, issues not raised to the trial court in support of the directed verdict
motion are not preserved for appellate review."); id. ("A defendant cannot argue on
appeal an issue in support of his directed verdict motion when the issue was not
presented to the trial court below."); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587
S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an
alternate ground on appeal.").

2. As to issue two: State v. Holland, 385 S.C. 159, 166, 682 S.E.2d 898, 901 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("This [c]ourt will not reverse the trial court's ruling regarding jury
instructions unless the trial court abused its discretion."); State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C.
94, 106, 610 S.E.2d 859, 865 (Ct. App. 2005) ("A jury charge which is
substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal."); State v.
Williams, Op. No. 5540 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Feb. 28, 2018) (Shearouse Adv. Sh.
No. 9 at 112, 124-25) (providing that in attempted murder cases involving an
unintentional victim, "South Carolina's criminal laws require the imposition of the
doctrine of transferred intent"); id. at 125 ("Section 16-3-29 does not require a
specific victim; instead, it states a 'person who, with the intent to kill, attempts to
kill another person' is guilty of attempted murder." (emphasis added by court)
(quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-29 (2015)); id. ("[A]s long as the State has shown
the specific intent to kill or commit a murder, the identity of the victim is
irrelevant."); id. at 122 ("[C]harging the doctrine of transferred intent is proper to
convict a defendant of attempted murder regardless of whether a victim, intended
or unintended, suffers an injury."); see also State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 272,
531 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2000) ("Although the defendant did not act with malice

1
In his appellant's brief, Green frames the issue of whether the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial as a violation of his right to confront his accusers
under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; however, Green solely
addresses the issue under a chain of custody analysis and provides no argument on
the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, we only address the
merits within the context of Green's chain of custody issue.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
toward the unintended victim, the defendant's criminal intent to kill the intended
victim (i.e., his mental state of malice) is transferred to the unintended victim.").

3. As to issue three: State v. Chisholm, 395 S.C. 259, 265-66, 717 S.E.2d 614, 617
(Ct. App. 2011) ("[W]hether to grant or deny a mistrial is within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."
(quoting State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 216, 692 S.E.2d 490, 498 (2009))); id. at
266, 717 S.E.2d at 617 ("A mistrial should be granted only when absolutely
necessary, and a defendant must show both error and resulting prejudice to be
entitled to a mistrial."); State v. Hatcher, 392 S.C. 86, 95, 708 S.E.2d 750, 755
(2011) ("The ultimate goal of chain of custody requirements is simply to ensure
that the item is what it is purported to be."); id. ("[T]he chain of custody need be
established only as far as practicable, . . . every person handling the evidence need
not be identified in all cases." (emphasis added)); id. at 93, 708 S.E.2d 753-54
("[W]here all individuals in the chain are, in fact, identified and the manner of
handling is reasonably demonstrated, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial
[court] to admit the evidence in the absence of proof of tampering, bad faith, or
ill-motive."); id. at 91, 708 S.E.2d at 753 ("Testimony from each custodian of
fungible evidence, . . . is not a prerequisite to establishing a chain of custody
sufficient for admissibility." (quoting State v. Sweet, 374 S.C. 1, 7, 647 S.E.2d 202,
206 (2007))).

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.