Todd v. Roberts

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kevin M. Todd, Appellant,

v.

Michael Roberts d/b/a Michael Roberts Home Repair,
Employer, and S.C. Uninsured Employers' Fund,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000181

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-215
Submitted April 3, 2018 – Filed May 23, 2018

VACATED AND REMANDED

Gene McCain Connell, Jr., of Kelaher Connell &
Connor, PC, of Surfside Beach, for Appellant.

Lisa C. Glover, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation case, Kevin Todd appeals the
order of the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Commission (the Appellate Panel) denying his claim for benefits under the South
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (the Act).1 Todd argues the Appellate Panel
erred in (1) not finding Todd's injury to be compensable although he was directed
by his employer, Michael Roberts, to conduct a personal errand; (2) not ruling that
Roberts directed Todd to conduct a personal errand; and (3) finding Todd to be
engaged in a personal venture. Todd also asserts (4) the Appellate Panel's findings
are irrelevant and erroneous to the issue in this case. We vacate and remand to the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Commission).

1. We find the Appellate Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are not
sufficiently detailed to allow us to determine whether the decision was erroneous.
See Able Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 290 S.C. 409, 411, 351 S.E.2d
151, 152 (1986) ("The findings of fact of [the Appellate Panel] must be sufficiently
detailed to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the findings are
supported by the evidence and whether the law has been properly applied to those
findings."); id. ("Implicit findings of fact are not sufficient. Whe[n] material facts
are in dispute, the [Appellate Panel] must make specific, express findings of
fact."). Although the Appellate Panel's order stated Todd was not injured in the
"course and scope of his employment," its order made no explicit mention of
whether the accident arose out of his employment and did not contain an express
finding of fact addressing Todd's argument that he was performing a private errand
at the behest, and for the benefit, of his employer. See S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-
160(A) (2015) (stating that, to be compensable under the Act, an injury by accident
must be one "arising out of and in the course of employment" (emphasis added));
see also West v. All. Capital, 368 S.C. 246, 254, 628 S.E.2d 279, 283 (Ct. App.
2006) ("A key factor in determining entitlement to compensation under [the course
of employment] prong is whether an employee's activity benefited the employer.").

Without these key factual determinations, we must remand because we cannot
determine whether the Appellate Panel's findings are unsupported by substantial
evidence or controlled by an error of law. See Hicks v. Piedmont Cold Storage,
Inc., 335 S.C. 46, 48, 515 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1999) ("A court shall not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of
fact."); Turner v. Campbell Soup Co., 252 S.C. 446, 450, 166 S.E.2d 817, 818

1
As an initial matter, we note that Respondents—the South Carolina Uninsured
Employers' Fund and Michael Roberts—failed to file a final Respondents' Brief
with this court. Rule 208(a)(4), SCACR, provides in part: "Upon the failure of
respondent to timely file a brief, the appellate court may take such action as it
deems proper."
(1969) (finding remand is appropriate when the Appellate Panel fails to make an
essential finding of fact or when its findings are so indefinite or general as to afford
no reasonable basis for the appellate court to determine whether the findings of fact
are supported by the evidence and whether the law has been properly applied to the
findings); id. at 450, 166 S.E.2d at 818–19 ("To hold otherwise would in such
cases make the determination of the rights of the parties turn upon the neglect of
the [Appellate Panel] to make essential findings of fact, or require the appellate
court to make the omitted findings of fact which our statute forbids." (quoting
Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 124, 127 S.E.2d 288, 292–93
(1962))). Thus, we vacate the Appellate Panel's order and remand the case to the
Commission for it to determine whether the incident arose out of Todd's
employment with Michael Roberts Home Repair and whether Todd's work on the
salvaged boat provided any benefit to Roberts or to Todd's employment with
Michael Roberts Home Repair.

2. Because our resolution of the prior issue is dispositive, we decline to address
the remaining issues on appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need
not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

VACATED AND REMANDED.2

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.