Williams v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Thomas A. Williams, Appellant,

v.

State of South Carolina, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-000424

Appeal From Greenwood County
Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-166
Submitted March 1, 2018 – Filed April 18, 2018

AFFIRMED

Robert Jamison Tinsley, Jr., and Clarence Rauch Wise,
both of Greenwood, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of
Greenwood, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(A) (2018) ("A person who drives a motor
vehicle in this [s]tate is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of the
person's breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of
alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, if arrested for an offense
arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
alcohol and drugs."); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 522,
613 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The implied consent laws are driven by
public policy considerations. The State has a strong interest in maintaining safe
highways and roads. One way to accomplish this goal is to enact laws directed at
minimizing drunk driving."); State v. Jansen, 305 S.C. 320, 322, 408 S.E.2d 235,
237 (1991) ("[I]t is well established in this [s]tate that one who is arrested for DUI
impliedly consents to a breathalyzer test, and that revocation of that consent is
constitutionally admissible as prosecutorial evidence at the trial pursuant to that
arrest."); State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 365, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2002)
("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislative intent whenever possible."); id. at 365-66, 574 S.E.2d at 206 ("All rules
of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must
prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language
must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute.").

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.