Winfrey v. Archway Services, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Clarence Winfrey, Employee, Appellant,

v.

Archway Services, Inc., Employer, and American Fire &
Casualty Insurance Company, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001816

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-337
Heard December 6, 2016 – Filed August 2, 2017

DISMISSED

Preston F. McDaniel, of McDaniel Law Firm, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Brett Harris Bayne, of McAngus Goudelock & Courie,
LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Clarence Winfrey appeals from the order of the Appellate Panel
of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) affirming in part and
reversing in part the order of the Single Commissioner. Winfrey alleges the
Appellate Panel erred as a matter of law in (1) denying his right to seek workers'
compensation benefits for an alleged injury to his head, brain, or both, (2)
permanently denying his right to seek benefits for an alleged injury to his head,
brain, or both, (3) considering these issues because Winfrey removed them from
consideration prior to the hearing before the Single Commissioner, and (4)
adopting the proposed order of Archway Services and American Fire & Casualty
Insurance Company (collectively Archway).

During oral argument Archway abandoned its position with regard to Issues 1, 2,
and 3. Specifically, Archway stated that if Winfrey had sufficient medical
evidence demonstrating causality between the work place accident and a head or
brain injury Archway would not contest his ability to file a Form 50 and seek
compensation pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, we find a
justiciable controversy no longer exists regarding these issues, and they are now
moot. See Pee Dee Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 279 S.C. 64,
66, 301 S.E.2d 761, 762 (1983) ("A justiciable controversy is a real and substantial
controversy which is ripe and appropriate for judicial determination, as
distinguished from a contingent, hypothetical or abstract dispute."); Sloan v.
Greenville Cty., 356 S.C. 531, 552, 590 S.E.2d 338, 349 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Moot
appeals differ from unripe appeals in that moot appeals result when intervening
events render a case nonjusticiable."); Id. ("This [c]ourt will not pass on moot and
academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual
controversy.").

With our disposition as to Winfrey's Issues 1, 2, and 3, we recognize that Winfrey
is no longer aggrieved by the Appellate Panel's decision and order. The Appellate
Panel's decision and order found Winfrey's myocardial infarction and attendant
ventricular septal defect to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.
The only aspect of the order that aggrieved Winfrey was the denial of any claim,
present or future, as to a related injury to either or both his head or brain.
However, as noted above, Archway has abandoned its position regarding those
issues and agreed that Winfrey would be allowed to file a new Form 50 alleging
causality should sufficient evidence exist to demonstrate an injury to his head,
brain, or both. Therefore, we find Winfrey is no longer aggrieved in any way and
cannot appeal from the order. See Rule 201(b), SCACR ("Only a party aggrieved
by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may appeal.").

DISMISSED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.