Shiver v. Palmetto Health Richland

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Gertrude Shiver, Appellant,

v.

Palmetto Health Richland, Employer, Key Risk
Management Services, Inc., TPA, Palmetto Hospital
Trust Services, Carrier, Trident Regional Medical Center,
Employer, and Zurich American Insurance Company,
Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000887

Appeal From Richland County
Alison Renee Lee, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-066
Submitted December 1, 2016 – Filed February 1, 2017

AFFIRMED

Gertrude Shiver, of Gadsden, pro se.

Allison Molony Carter, of Willson Jones Carter &
Baxley, P.A., of Mount Pleasant, for Respondents
Trident Regional Medical Center and Zurich American
Insurance Company.
Michael E. Chase and Carmelo Barone Sammataro, both
of Turner Padget Graham & Laney, PA, of Columbia, for
Respondents Palmetto Health Richland and Key Risk
Management Services, Inc.

Lana H. Sims, Jr., of Adams and Reese LLP, of
Columbia, for Respondents Palmetto Health Richland
and Palmetto Hospital Trust Services.

PER CURIAM: Gertrude Shiver, pro se, appeals the circuit court's order, which
affirmed the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Commission (the Appellate Panel). On appeal, Shiver argues the circuit court
erred in affirming the Appellate Panel's (1) denial of leave to submit additional
evidence, (2) decision to rule on the merits of her claims without a hearing and oral
argument, (3) conclusion that she was bound by a consent order, and (4)
determination that the denial of benefits in each of her seven individual workers'
compensation claims1 was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm2 pursuant
to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. The circuit court did not err in affirming the Appellate Panel's denial of leave to
submit additional evidence. See 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-707(A) (2012)
("When additional evidence is necessary for the completion of the record in a case
on review[,] the Commission may, in its discretion, order such evidence taken
before a Commissioner."); 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-707(C) (2012) ("The
moving party must establish the new evidence is of the same nature and character
required for granting a new trial and show: (1) The evidence sought to be
introduced is not evidence of a cumulative or impeaching character but would
likely have produced a different result had the evidence been procurable at the first
hearing; and (2) The evidence was not known to the moving party at the time of
the first hearing, by reasonable diligence the new evidence could not have been
secured, and the discovery of the new evidence is being brought to the attention of
the Commission immediately upon its discovery.").

1
The following Workers' Compensation Commission Claim Numbers were
considered: 9503744, 0126962, 0217755, 0227098, 0322274, 0321756, and
0616756.
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
2. The circuit court did not err in affirming the Appellate Panel's decision to rule
on the merits of Shiver's claims without a hearing and oral argument. See 8 S.C.
Code Ann. Regs. 67-701(A) (2012) ("Either party or both may request [Appellate
Panel] review of the Hearing Commissioner's decision by filing the original and
three copies of a Form 30, Request for Commission Review, with the
Commission's Judicial Department within fourteen days of the day the
Commissioner's order is received."); § 67-701(A)(4)(a) ("If the space provided on
the Form 30 requesting oral argument is not marked, oral argument is waived. The
[Appellate Panel] will review the Commissioner's decision on the record without
oral argument.").

Shiver's argument that the Commission erred in consolidating her seven claims is
not preserved for appellate review. See Smith v. NCCI, Inc., 369 S.C. 236, 247-48,
631 S.E.2d 268, 274 (Ct. App. 2006) ("When a trial court does not explicitly rule
on an argument raised, and the appellant makes no Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to
obtain a ruling, the appellate court may not address the issue.").

3. The circuit court did not err in affirming the Appellate Panel's conclusion that
Shiver was bound by the consent order. See State Acc. Fund v. S.C. Second Injury
Fund, 409 S.C. 240, 244, 762 S.E.2d 19, 21 (2014) ("The South Carolina
Administrative Procedures Act (the APA) sets forth the standard for judicial
review of decisions by the Commission." (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380
(Supp. 2016))); Hutson v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 399 S.C. 381, 387, 732 S.E.2d
500, 503 (2012) ("Under this standard, we can reverse or modify the decision only
if the claimant's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision is
affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record."); Shealy v. Aiken Cty., 341 S.C.
448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) ("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla
of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but such evidence, when the whole
record is considered, as would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the
[Appellate Panel] reached."); Hill v. Eagle Motor Lines, 373 S.C. 422, 436, 645
S.E.2d 424, 431 (2007) ("The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent the [Appellate Panel's] finding from being
supported by substantial evidence.").

Shiver's argument that the consent order was invalid because of coercion is without
merit. See Coercion, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining coercion as
"[c]ompulsion of a free agent by physical, moral, or economic force or threat of
physical force"). Shiver's argument that the consent order was invalid because of
undue influence is without merit. See Undue Influence, Black's Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014) (defining undue influence as "[t]he improper use of power or trust
in a way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective; the
exercise of enough control over another person that a questioned act by this person
would not have otherwise been performed, the person's free agency having been
overmastered"). Finally, Shiver's argument that the consent order was
unconscionable is also without merit. See Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc.,
373 S.C. 14, 24-25, 644 S.E.2d 663, 668 (2007) ("In South Carolina,
unconscionability is defined as the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
party due to one-sided contract provisions, together with terms that are so
oppressive that no reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest
person would accept them."); id. at 225, 644 S.E.2d at 668 ("If a court as a matter
of law finds any clause of a contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made, the court may refuse to enforce the unconscionable clause, or so limit its
application so as to avoid any unconscionable result.").3

4. The circuit court did not err in affirming the Appellate Panel's determination
that the denial of benefits in each of her seven individual workers' compensation
claims was supported by substantial evidence. See State Acc. Fund, 409 S.C. at
244, 762 S.E.2d at 21 ("The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (the
APA) sets forth the standard for judicial review of decisions by the Commission."
(citing § 1-23-380)); Hutson, 399 S.C. at 387, 732 S.E.2d at 503 ("Under this
standard, we can reverse or modify the decision only if the claimant's substantial
rights have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is
clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record."); Shealy, 341 S.C. at 455, 535 S.E.2d at 442 ("Substantial evidence
is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but such
evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable minds
to reach the conclusion the [Appellate Panel] reached."); Hill, 373 S.C. at 436, 645
S.E.2d at 431 ("The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the
evidence does not prevent the [Appellate Panel's] finding from being supported by
substantial evidence."); Kennedy v. Williamsburg Cty., 242 S.C. 477, 480, 131

3
We find Shiver's argument challenging the subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Commission to issue the
consent order to be abandoned. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348
S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("South Carolina law clearly
states that short, conclusory statements made without supporting authority are
deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented for review.").
Nevertheless, we find no merit in Shiver's challenge to the subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Commission.
S.E.2d 512, 513 (1963) ("[T]he burden [of proof] is upon the claimant to prove
such facts as will render his [or her] injury compensable within the provisions of
the [Workers'] Compensation Act, and such award must not be based on surmise,
conjecture or speculation.").

AFFIRMED.

HUFF and SHORT, JJ., and MOORE, A.J., concur.