State v. Williams

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Michael Edward Williams, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-002241

Appeal From Greenville County
Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-026
Submitted November 1, 2016 – Filed January 11, 2017

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General John Benjamin Aplin,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins,
III, of Greenville, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Michael E. Williams appeals his conviction of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct with a minor, arguing the trial court erred by (1) ruling
that section 17-23-175 of the South Carolina Code (2014) does not violate the
confrontation clause and (2) admitting a video recording of a forensic interview of
the minor victim. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred by ruling section 17-23-175 was
constitutional: State v. Spears, 403 S.C. 247, 252, 742 S.E.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App.
2013) ("In criminal cases, an appellate court sits to review only errors of law, and it
is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless the findings are clearly
erroneous."); U.S. Const. amend VI (guaranteeing a criminal defendant the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him"); State v. Hill, 394 S.C. 280, 291,
715 S.E.2d 368, 374-75 (Ct. App. 2011) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of the declarant's prior testimonial statements when the
declarant appears for cross-examination at trial."); State v. Stokes, 381 S.C. 390,
401-02, 673 S.E.2d 434, 439 (2009) ("[A]s to cross-examination specifically, the
Confrontation Clause 'guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-
examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
whatever extent, the defense might wish.'" (quoting United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554, 559 (1988))); § 17-23-175(A) ("[A]n out-of-court statement of a child is
admissible if . . . (3) the child testifies at the proceeding and is subject to cross-
examination on the elements of the offense and the making of the out-of-court
statement . . . ."); State v. Anderson, 413 S.C. 212, 217-18, 776 S.E.2d 76, 78-79
(2015) (holding a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are not violated as long
as a minor victim testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination); id. at 218,
776 S.E.2d at 79 (finding the fact "[t]hat [the defendant] would have to recall the
child as an adverse witness in order to examine her about her videotaped statement
does not render the statute or the procedure followed here violative of a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination").

2. As to whether the trial court erred by admitting the forensic interview: State v.
Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) ("The admission of
evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent
an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions
of the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of
law."); § 17-23-175(A) ("[A]n out-of-court statement of a child is admissible if . . .
(4) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provides
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."); § 17-23-175(B) ("In determining
whether a statement possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, the

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
court may consider, but is not limited to, the following factors: (1) whether the
statement was elicited by leading questions; (2) whether the interviewer has been
trained in conducting investigative interviews of children; (3) whether the
statement represents a detailed account of the alleged offense; (4) whether the
statement has internal coherence; and (5) sworn testimony of any participant which
may be determined as necessary by the court."); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 653,
258 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1979) ("A leading question is one which suggests to the
witness the desired answer."); State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 360, 737 S.E.2d 490,
500 (2013) (holding a forensic interviewer may testify regarding (1) "the time,
date, and circumstances of the interview"; (2) "any personal observations regarding
the child's behavior or demeanor"; (3) "or a statement as to events that occurred
within the personal knowledge of the interviewer").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.