Gibbs v. Gibbs

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Gene Gibbs, Respondent,

v.

Jill Roberts Gibbs, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000885

Appeal From Greenville County
Gwendlyne Y. Jones, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-454
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed November 9, 2016

AFFIRMED

Marion W. Fore, Jr. and J. Falkner Wilkes, both of
Greenville, for Appellant.

Bobby H. Mann, Jr. and Philip James Temple, both of
Temple and Mann, Attorneys, of Greenville, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Jill Roberts Gibbs (Wife) appeals a final divorce order from the
family court, arguing the family court erred in (1) denying her an award of
alimony, (2) awarding Gene Gibbs (Husband) a portion of her retirement account,
and (3) denying her an award of attorney's fees and costs. We affirm.1

1. As to issue one, we find the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Wife an award of alimony. See Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 452, 759
S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014) ("An award of alimony rests within the sound discretion of
the family court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); Lewis v.
Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 391, 709 S.E.2d 650, 655 (2011) ("[T]he inartful use of an
abuse of discretion deferential standard of review merely represents the appellate
courts' effort to incorporate the two sound principles underlying the proper review
of an equity case. . . . [T]hose two principles are the superior position of the trial
[court] to determine credibility and the imposition of a burden on an appellant to
satisfy the appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
finding of the trial court."); Pirri v. Pirri, 369 S.C. 258, 267, 631 S.E.2d 279, 284
(Ct. App. 2006) (stating this court's "inquiry on appeal is not whether the family
court gave the same weight to particular factors as this court would have; rather,
our inquiry extends only to whether the family court abused its considerable
discretion in assigning weight to the applicable factors." (quoting Allen v. Allen,
347 S.C. 177, 186, 554 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ct. App. 2001))).

2. As to issue two, we find the family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
Husband a portion of Wife's retirement account. See Crossland, 408 S.C. at 455,
759 S.E.2d at 425 ("The division of marital property is within the discretion of the
family court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.");
Lewis, 392 S.C. at 391, 709 S.E.2d at 655 ("[T]he inartful use of an abuse of
discretion deferential standard of review merely represents the appellate courts'
effort to incorporate the two sound principles underlying the proper review of an
equity case. . . . [T]hose two principles are the superior position of the trial [court]
to determine credibility and the imposition of a burden on an appellant to satisfy
the appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of
the trial court.").

3. As to issue three, we find the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Wife an award of attorney's fees and costs. See Srivastava v. Srivastava, 411 S.C.
481, 489, 769 S.E.2d 442, 447 (Ct. App. 2015) ("An award of attorney's fees rests
within the sound discretion of the [family court] and should not be disturbed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion." (quoting Doe v. Doe, 319 S.C. 151, 157, 459
S.E.2d 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1995))); Lewis, 392 S.C. at 391, 709 S.E.2d at 655

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
("[T]he inartful use of an abuse of discretion deferential standard of review merely
represents the appellate courts' effort to incorporate the two sound principles
underlying the proper review of an equity case. . . . [T]hose two principles are the
superior position of the trial [court] to determine credibility and the imposition of a
burden on an appellant to satisfy the appellate court that the preponderance of the
evidence is against the finding of the trial court.").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.