State v. Locklear

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Sandy Lee Locklear, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001354

Appeal From Horry County
Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-313
Heard May 3, 2016 – Filed June 22, 2016

AFFIRMED

Edwin Thompson Kinney, of Mullikin Law Firm, LLC,
of Camden, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert
Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, all of
Columbia; and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of
Conway, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellant, Sandy Lee Locklear, appeals her convictions for two
counts of murder, arguing the trial court erred in (1) finding the search warrant for
her home was supported by probable cause, (2) determining she was not in custody
prior to being read her Miranda1 rights and admitting her pre-Miranda statement,
and (3) ruling the State did not violate Missouri v. Seibert.2 We affirm.

First, we find the trial court did not err in determining the search warrant for
Appellant's North Carolina home was supported by probable cause. See State v.
Dupree, 354 S.C. 676, 683, 583 S.E.2d 437, 441 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An appellate
court reviewing the decision to issue a search warrant should decide whether the
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed."); id.
("This review, like the determination by the magistrate, is governed by the 'totality
of the circumstances' test."); State v. Dunbar, 361 S.C. 240, 246, 603 S.E.2d 615,
618-19 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A reviewing court should give substantial deference to a
magistrate's determination of probable cause."); State v. Sullivan, 267 S.C. 610,
617, 230 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1976) (explaining "magistrates are concerned with
probabilities and not certainties" when determining whether a search warrant
should issue); Dunbar, 361 S.C. at 249, 603 S.E.2d at 620 ("[M]agistrates can
issue search warrants based upon hearsay information that is not a result of direct
personal observations of the affiant."); State v. Driggers, 322 S.C. 506, 510, 473
S.E.2d 57, 59 (Ct. App. 1996) ("[E]vidence of past reliability is not usually
required when information is provided by an eyewitness because, unlike the paid
informer, the eyewitness does not ordinarily have the opportunity to establish a
record of previous reliability."); id. at 511, 473 S.E.2d at 60 ("[A] non-confidential
informant should be given a higher level of credibility because he exposes himself
to public view and to possible criminal and civil liability should the information he
supplied prove to be false."); State v. Rutledge, 373 S.C. 312, 318, 644 S.E.2d 789,
792 (Ct. App. 2007) ("There is a presumption of validity with respect to the
affidavit supporting the search warrant."); State v. Robinson, 415 S.C. 600, ___,
785 S.E.2d, 355, 358 (2016) ("[A] defendant has the right to challenge false
statements in a search-warrant affidavit. In order to obtain relief, the defendant
must prove the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for
the truth, included false statements in the search-warrant affidavit." (citation
omitted)); id. at ___, 785 S.E.2d at 359 (finding a search-warrant affidavit may still
be upheld when the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for

1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
the truth included false statements in the affidavit if the remaining content
establishes probable cause).

Next, we find the trial court did not err in finding Appellant was not in custody
prior to being read her Miranda rights. See State v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 583, 582
S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003) ("Appellate review of whether a person is in custody is
confined to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial [court] is supported
by the record."); id. ("The purpose of the Miranda warnings is to apprise the
defendant of her constitutional privilege to not incriminate herself while in the
custody of law enforcement."); State v. Navy, 386 S.C. 294, 301, 688 S.E.2d 838,
841 (2010) (finding the question of whether a person is in custody for the purposes
of Miranda is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, "such as
the location, purpose, and length of interrogation, and whether the suspect was free
to leave the place of questioning"); Evans, 354 S.C. at 583, 582 S.E.2d at 410
("The custodial determination is an objective analysis based on whether a
reasonable person would have concluded that he was in police custody."); State v.
Williams, 405 S.C. 263, 272, 747 S.E.2d 194, 199 (Ct. App. 2013) ("Custodial
interrogation entails questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way."). Further, we find the trial court did not err in admitting
Appellant's pre-Miranda statement. See State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 121, 551
S.E.2d 240, 244 (2001) ("The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the trial [court], whose decision will not be reversed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Howard, 384 S.C. 212, 220-21, 682
S.E.2d 42, 47 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the [trial
court's] ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without
evidentiary support."); State v. Byers, 392 S.C. 438, 444, 710 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2011)
("To warrant reversal based on the wrongful admission of evidence, the
complaining party must prove resulting prejudice.").

Finally, we find the trial court properly held the State did not violate Missouri v.
Seibert. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 616-17 (addressing the admissibility of a
statement obtained by questioning a suspect until incriminating information is
elicited, administering Miranda warnings, and then—following the warnings—
leading the suspect to cover the same incriminating information a second time); id.
at 617 (holding postwarning statements repeating incriminating information given
prior to warnings are inadmissible); Navy, 386 S.C. at 303, 688 S.E.2d at 842
(finding officers' actions violated Seibert when they questioned respondent with
the knowledge victim had been suffocated and with the intent of eliciting a
confession, "'sprang' the suffocation/healing-rib-fractures information on
respondent, began an unwarned custodial interrogation" designed to have
respondent admit to hitting and smothering the child, allowed respondent a quick
break, then gave respondent Miranda warnings and immediately resumed
interrogation by the same officer). Here, unlike Seibert and Navy, the purpose of
questioning Appellant was to obtain information about crimes Appellant allegedly
witnessed and of which she was a victim, not to elicit a confession or incriminating
information about Appellant's involvement in the crimes. Given the information
available to the detective at the time he began Appellant's interview, i.e.,
Appellant's 911 call reporting the rape and murders, her statements to the officers
who responded to the scene, and Appellant's statements to medical examiners and
the rape crisis center representative, he reasonably believed Appellant was a
victim-witness; therefore, the detective could not have known his questions would
elicit an incriminating response. See Kennedy, 325 S.C. at 303, 479 S.E.2d at 842
("Interrogation is either express questioning or its functional equivalent. It
includes words or actions on the part of police . . . that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." (emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.