State v. Stalk

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

David Stalk, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000166

Appeal From Lancaster County
R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-341
Submitted June 1, 2016 – Filed June 29, 2016

AFFIRMED

Raia Jane Hirsch and Chief Appellate Defender Robert
Michael Dudek, both of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Attorney
General Alphonso Simon, Jr., all of Columbia; and
Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of Lancaster, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: David Stalk appeals his murder, attempted armed robbery, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime convictions
asserting the trial court erred in failing to suppress his confession because (1) the
statement was made following a promise of leniency and (2) threats or promises
were made to his family. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his
inculpatory statement because it was elicited as a result of an implied promise to
reward him in the form of a granted bond and by threats from law enforcement in
the form of repeated recitations of the amount of time he faced on an unrelated
charge: State v. Simmons, 384 S.C. 145, 162, 682 S.E.2d 19, 28 (Ct. App. 2009)
(holding, in determining the voluntariness of a statement, the trial court must
examine the totality of circumstances surrounding the statement and decide
whether the State has carried its burden of proving the statement was given
voluntarily); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 387, 652 S.E.2d 444, 453 (Ct. App.
2007) (finding, in a hearing to determine the voluntariness of a statement, the trial
court has the opportunity to "listen to the testimony, assess the demeanor and
credibility of all witnesses, and weigh the evidence accordingly"); State v.
McClure, 312 S.C. 369, 371-72, 440 S.E.2d 404, 405-06 (Ct. App. 1994) (noting,
when considering the voluntariness of a confession, the question of credibility is to
be resolved by the trial court); State v. Saltz, 346 S.C. 114, 136, 551 S.E.2d 240,
252 (2001) ("The trial court's factual conclusions as to the voluntariness of a
statement will not be disturbed on appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to
show an abuse of discretion."); id. ("When reviewing a trial court's ruling
concerning voluntariness, [the appellate court] does not reevaluate the facts based
on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines
whether the trial court's ruling is supported by any evidence."); id. ("A statement
induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the
inducement as to be a consequence of the promise." (emphasis added)); State v.
Arrowood, 375 S.C. 359, 368-69, 652 S.E.2d 438, 443 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding an
officers' offer to attest to the defendant's cooperation did not constitute a promise
of leniency; the defendant made his statements in the mere hope of leniency based
upon his cooperation rather than as the consequence of promises made to him); 23
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1247 (2016) ("[A] confession is not involuntary just
because a promise may have been made to the defendant. . . . In order for the
confession to be held involuntary, a causal connection must be shown between the
alleged promise and the defendant's decision to confess."); State v. Dunbar, 356
S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue to be preserved
for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
[court].").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his
inculpatory statement because threats or promises were made to a family member:
Dunbar, 356 S.C. at 142, 587 S.E.2d at 693 ("In order for an issue to be preserved
for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
[court]."); McClure, 312 S.C. at 371, 440 S.E.2d at 405 (finding a police threat to
the defendant to arrest family members unless the defendant cooperated could
render a defendant's confession involuntary if it in fact occurred).

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.