State v. Brewton

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Lashad Demond Brewton, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000880

Appeal From Union County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-222
Submitted April 1, 2016 – Filed May 25, 2016

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Tiffany Lorraine Butler, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York,
for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lashad Demond Brewton appeals his conviction of possession
with intent to distribute (PWID) crack cocaine, arguing the trial court erred in (1)
refusing to suppress evidence seized during a search of a vehicle and subsequent
searches of Brewton and his co-defendants when law enforcement did not have
reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; (2) refusing to suppress evidence
seized during the search of the vehicle and subsequent searches of Brewton and his
co-defendants when law enforcement did not have probable cause to believe the
vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity and there were no exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless search; (3) finding a sufficient chain of
custody existed to admit evidence found in a law enforcement vehicle that
transported Brewton and one of his co-defendants to jail; and (4) denying
Brewton's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to issues 1 through 3: State v. Pope, 410 S.C. 214, 225-29, 763 S.E.2d 814,
820-22 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding in the appeal of Brewton's co-defendant, the trial
court did not err in: (1) denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during
the search of the vehicle because law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to
justify the traffic stop; (2) denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized
during the search of the vehicle because law enforcement had probable cause to
believe the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity; and (3) admitting the
drugs found in the police car into evidence because a complete chain of custody
was established), cert. denied (Feb. 20, 2015).

2. As to issue 4: We find the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying
Brewton's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in crack
cocaine is moot because Brewton was acquitted of that charge. See Bozeman v.
State, 307 S.C. 172, 174, 414 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1992) (stating that by convicting
the defendant of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the jury, in
essence, acquitted the defendant of the murder charge for which he was indicted);
State v. Green, 337 S.C. 67, 71, 522 S.E.2d 602, 604 (Ct. App. 1999) ("When
judgment on an issue can have no practical effect upon an existing case or
controversy, the issue is moot."). We find the trial court did not err in denying
Brewton's motion for a directed verdict on the lesser-included charge of PWID
crack cocaine. See State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 353, 701 S.E.2d 766, 769 (Ct.
App. 2010) ("When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is
concerned only with the existence of evidence, not the weight."); id. ("When
reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must
review the evidence, and all inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
State."); id. at 353-54, 701 S.E.2d at 769 ("The trial court's denial of a directed
verdict will not be reversed if supported by any direct evidence or substantial
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt."); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B)
(Supp. 2015) (providing it is a felony to possess cocaine base with intent to
distribute); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-110(9) (Supp. 2015) ("Cocaine base is
commonly referred to as . . . 'crack cocaine.'"); State v. Mollison, 319 S.C. 41, 45,
459 S.E.2d 88, 91 (Ct. App. 1995) (explaining possession may be actual or
constructive); id. ("Actual possession occurs when the drugs are found to be in the
actual physical custody of the person. Constructive possession occurs when the
person charged with possession has dominion and control over either the drugs or
the premises upon which the drugs were found."); State v. Jennings, 335 S.C. 82,
87, 515 S.E.2d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Constructive possession may be
established through either direct or circumstantial evidence, and possession may be
shared."); State v. Tuckness, 257 S.C. 295, 299, 185 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1971)
("Intent is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence and must ordinarily be
proven by circumstantial evidence, that is, by facts and circumstances from which
intent may be inferred."); State v. James, 362 S.C. 557, 561-62, 608 S.E.2d 455,
457 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Possession of any amount of controlled substance coupled
with sufficient indicia of intent to distribute will support a conviction for
possession with intent to distribute.").

AFFIRMED.1

SHORT and THOMAS, JJ., and CURETON, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.