State v. Wyatt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Shawn Lee Wyatt, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001556

Appeal From Lancaster County
DeAndrea G. Benjamin, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-162
Submitted December 1, 2015 – Filed April 6, 2016

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender John Harrison Strom, of Columbia,
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield, Jr., of
Kershaw, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Moore, 343 S.C. 282, 288, 540 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2000)
("Generally, the decision to admit an eyewitness identification is at the trial
[court]'s discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of such, or
the commission of prejudicial legal error."); id. ("However, an eyewitness
identification which is unreliable because of suggestive line-up procedures is
constitutionally inadmissible as a matter of law."); State v. Brown, 356 S.C. 496,
502-03, 589 S.E.2d 781, 784 (Ct. App. 2003) ("An in-court identification of an
accused is inadmissible if a suggestive out-of-court identification procedure
created a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."); Moore, 343
S.C. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at 447 ("The United States Supreme Court has developed a
two-prong inquiry to determine the admissibility of an out-of-court
identification."); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) ("[F]irst of all . . . the
primary evil to be avoided is 'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.'" (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)));
id. at 199 ("We turn, then, to the central question, whether under the 'totality of the
circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation
procedure was suggestive."); id. at 199-200 ("[T]he factors to be considered in
evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of
attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation"); Moore, 343 S.C. at 287, 540 S.E.2d at
447-48 ("Only if [the procedure] was suggestive need the court consider the second
question . . . . Although one-on-one show-ups have been sharply criticized, and are
inherently suggestive, the identification need not be excluded as long as under all
the circumstances the identification was reliable notwithstanding any suggestive
procedure. [The] inquiry, therefore, must focus upon whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification." (alterations in original) (quoting Jefferson v. State, 425 S.E.2d
915, 918 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992))).

AFFIRMED.1

HUFF, A.C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.