Wildflower Nursery v. Beasley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Wildflower Nursery, Inc., d/b/a Pleasant Landscapes,
Appellant,

v.

Joseph W. Beasley, Jr., a/k/a Bill Beasley, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2014-001493

Appeal From Charleston County
Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-082
Submitted December 1, 2015 – Filed February 24, 2016

AFFIRMED

Dennis Gregory Placone, of Nexsen Pruet, LLC, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Steven L. Smith and Zachary James Closser, both of
Smith Closser, of Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Wildflower Nursery Inc. appeals the circuit court's dismissal of
its case and grant of judgment in favor of Beasley arguing (1) its due process rights
were violated because it did not receive adequate notice of the proceedings before
the circuit court and the proposed order was issued ex parte, (2) the circuit court
erred in granting Beasley's Motion to Strike Wildflower's complaint, and (3) two
orders issued by the circuit court should be vacated because they were entered
prior to the issuance of the final judgment order. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. Wildflower's due process rights were not violated because the record contains
evidence, including the records of the clerk's office, Wildflower received notice of
case roster publication on two occasions. See Em-Co Metal Prods., Inc. v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 280 S.C. 107, 110, 311 S.E.2d 83, 85 (Ct. App. 1984) ("In
reviewing the lower court's order to determine whether its factual conclusions have
evidentiary support, we need not look just at the facts set forth in the order. We
may also consider other facts presented below and reflected in the record."). As to
Wildflower's argument Beasley submitted his proposed order ex parte, we note
Wildflower was not represented by counsel when Beasley submitted the proposed
order. See Renaissance Enters. v. Summit Teleservices, Inc., 334 S.C. 649, 651,
515 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1999) ("[A] non-lawyer cannot represent a corporation in
circuit or appellate courts."); Rule 5(b)(3), SCRCP ("Any party providing a
proposed order, proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law, or proposed
judgment or other paper to the court for its consideration in any pending matter
shall serve the same on all counsel of record at the same time and by the same
means.").

2. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wildflower the
opportunity to retain counsel prior to striking its complaint. Renaissance, 334 S.C.
at 651, 515 S.E.2d at 258 ("[A] non-lawyer cannot represent a corporation in
circuit or appellate courts."); Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 353,
359, 166 S.E.2d 297, 299 (1969) ("A motion to strike is generally addressed to the
sound discretion of the [trial court]."); McComas v. Ross, 368 S.C. 59, 62, 626
S.E.2d 902, 904 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Whether an action should be dismissed
for failure to prosecute is left to the discretion of the trial court . . . , and [its]
decision will not be disturbed, except upon a clear showing of an abuse of
discretion."). We note Wildflower was notified of the motion to strike fifteen
months before the hearing on the motion; thus, Wildflower had ample opportunity
to obtain counsel.

3. Wildflower argues the circuit court's orders of November 26, 2013, and June 9,
2014, should be vacated because they were issued before the final judgment order.
We find the denial of Wildflower's pro se motion to vacate proper because a non-

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
lawyer cannot represent a corporation before the circuit court. See Renaissance,
334 S.C. at 651, 515 S.E.2d at 258 ("[A] non-lawyer cannot represent a corporation
in circuit or appellate courts."). As to the denial of Beasley's motion for the
appointment of a receiver, we find Wildflower was not aggrieved by the circuit
court's denial of that motion. See Rule 201(b), SCACR ("Only a party aggrieved
by an order, judgment, sentence or decision may appeal."). Because we affirm the
circuit court's final order issued on July 21, 2014, we find any question as to the
propriety of the circuit court's June 9, 2014 order moot. See Sloan v. Greenville
Cty., 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670 S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2008) ("An appellate court
will not pass judgment on moot and academic questions; it will not adjudicate a
matter when no actual controversy capable of specific relief exists."); McCall v.
Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 4, 362 S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1987) ("[W]hatever doesn't
make any difference, doesn't matter.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.