State v. Armstrong

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Molina Armstrong, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2013-000932

Appeal From Laurens County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-008
Heard December 7, 2015 – Filed January 13, 2016

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Appellant Molina Armstrong appeals her conviction for
manufacturing methamphetamine. Counsel for Appellant filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there were no meritorious
grounds for appeal and requesting permission to withdraw from further
representation. The Court denied the request to withdraw and directed the parties
to file additional briefs.

In the additional brief, Appellant argues the trial court erred in: (1) concluding the
magistrate properly determined probable cause existed to issue a search warrant;
and (2) refusing to require the State to reveal the identity of a confidential
informant (CI). We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:

1. As to whether the trial court erred in concluding the magistrate properly
found probable cause to issue the search warrant: State v. Rutledge, 373 S.C. 312,
316, 644 S.E.2d 789, 791 (Ct. App. 2007) ("An appellate court reviewing the
decision to issue a search warrant should decide whether the magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed."); id. ("A reviewing
court should give great deference to a magistrate's determination of probable
cause."); State v. Keith, 356 S.C. 219, 223–24, 588 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Ct. App.
2003) (stating the determination of whether probable cause existed "requires the
magistrate to make a practical, common-sense decision of whether, given the
totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and
basis of knowledge of persons supplying information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place"); State v. 192
Coin-Operated Video Game Machines, 338 S.C. 176, 192, 525 S.E.2d 872, 881
(2000) ("[A] warrant based solely on information provided by a confidential
informant must contain information supporting the credibility of the informant and
the basis of his knowledge. However, independent verification by law
enforcement officers cures any defect.").

2. As to whether the trial court erred in refusing to require the State to reveal
the identity of the CI: State v. Humphries, 354 S.C. 87, 90, 579 S.E.2d 613, 614–
15 (2003) ("Although the State is generally privileged from revealing the name of a
confidential informant, disclosure may be required when the informant's identity is
relevant and helpful to the defense or is essential for a fair determination of the
State's case against the accused."); id. at 90, 579 S.E.2d at 615 ("For instance, if the
informant is an active participant in the criminal transaction and/or a material
witness on the issue of guilt or innocence, disclosure of his identity may be
required depending upon the facts and circumstances."); id. ("On the other hand, an
informant's identity need not be disclosed where he possesses only a peripheral
knowledge of the crime or is a mere 'tipster' who supplies a lead to law
enforcement.").

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.