Adams v. SCDMV

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Tracy Lynn Adams, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles and South
Carolina Department of Public Safety, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002225

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-503
Heard September 15, 2015 – Filed November 4, 2015

AFFIRMED

C. Rauch Wise, of C. Rauch Wise Attorney at Law, of
Greenwood, for Appellant.

Frank L. Valenta Jr., Linda Annette Grice, and Philip S.
Porter, all of South Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles, of Blythewood, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Tracy Adams appeals the suspension of her driver's license,
arguing the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicle Hearings hearing officer erred
in (1) finding the stop was lawful and based on probable cause and (2) failing to
declare the implied consent law unconstitutional. We affirm pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

As to Issue 1: State v. Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 240, 679 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ct. App.
2009) ("Generally, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable when the
police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred."), aff'd as
modified, 392 S.C. 125, 708 S.E.2d 217 (2011); Lapp v. S.C. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles, 387 S.C. 500, 506, 692 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct. App. 2010) ("A finding of
probable cause may be based upon less evidence than would be necessary to
support a conviction."); State v. Blassingame, 338 S.C. 240, 250, 525 S.E.2d 535,
540 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Probable cause may be found somewhere between suspicion
and sufficient evidence to convict."); State v. George, 323 S.C. 496, 509, 476
S.E.2d 903, 911 (1996) ("Whether probable cause exists depends upon the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the information at the officer[']s disposal."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 56-5-1900 (2006) ("Whenever any roadway has been divided into two
or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others
consistent herewith shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as
practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until
the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.");
State v. Vinson, 400 S.C. 347, 353, 734 S.E.2d 182, 185 (Ct. App. 2012) ("The
plain language of section 56-5-1900 requires a driver to maintain his vehicle
'entirely within a single lane' and excuses this mandate only when it is not
practicable or the driver can safely change lanes."); id. at 349, 353, 734 S.E.2d at
183, 185 (affirming "the circuit court's decision that [an officer] was justified in
stopping [a driver] for a perceived violation of section 56-5-1900" when the officer
testified the driver "drift[ed] 'back and forth' between the double yellow lines," and
he suspected the driver was under the influence of alcohol); id. at 353 n.3, 734
S.E.2d at 185 n.3 (finding persuasive "the line of cases [from other jurisdictions] in
which courts have found the purpose of the 'as nearly as practicable' language is to
keep both drivers and pedestrians safe, not to allow motorists the option of when
they will or will not abide by a lane requirement").

As to Issue 2: Video Gaming Consultants, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 342 S.C.
34, 38, 535 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2000) (holding the ALC should not rule on the
constitutionality of statutes); id. ("[The ALC is] an agency of the executive branch
of government and must follow the law as written until its constitutionally is
judicially determined; [the ALC] ha[s] no authority to pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute or regulation."); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v.
Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 526, 613 S.E.2d 544, 550 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Because [the
driver] did not consent to [a breathalyzer test], the scope of the hearing was limited
to whether [the driver] (1) was lawfully arrested, (2) was advised in writing of his
section 56-5-2950 [of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014)] rights, and (3)
refused to submit to a test.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and KONDUROS and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.