Jasper County Board of Education v. Jasper County Council

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jasper County Board of Education, Appellant,

v.

Jasper County Council and Jasper County Auditor,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2013-002266

Appeal From Jasper County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-430
Heard April 16, 2015 – Filed August 19, 2015

AFFIRMED

Kenneth L. Childs, William F. Halligan and Keith Robert
Powell, all of Childs & Halligan, PA, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

David L. Tedder, of David L. Tedder, PA, of Beaufort,
and Marvin C. Jones, of Ruffin, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: In this appeal from a declaratory judgment, the School Board of
Jasper County (the Board) argues the trial court erred in failing to find the Board
has the authority to determine the school operating tax levy and millage rate for the
School District of Jasper County.

We find the trial court did not err in holding the Jasper County Council, rather than
the Board, has the authority to determine and set the millage rate. See Adams v.
Burts, 245 S.C. 339, 345, 140 S.E.2d 586, 590 (1965) ("Generally speaking, the
usual rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of statutes relating
to taxation. A tax statute should be construed with a view to ascertaining and
giving effect to the intent of the legislature."); Perry v. Bullock, 409 S.C. 137, 140,
761 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2014) ("The plain language of a statute is considered the best
evidence of the legislature's intent."); Adams, 245 S.C. at 345, 140 S.E.2d at 590
("Tax statutes cannot be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the
language used."); S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-70 (1986) ("[E]xcept as otherwise
provided for in this section the county council shall determine by ordinance the
method of establishing the school tax millage except in those cases where boards
of trustees of the districts or the county board of education established such millage
at the time one of the alternate forms of government provided for in this chapter
becomes effective."); Stone v. Traynham, 278 S.C. 407, 410, 297 S.E.2d 420, 422
(1982) ("By enacting [section] 4-9-70, the General Assembly attempted to insure
that the taxing power for all school districts would be properly vested in some
authority. The clear intent is to vest the power to determine the school tax levy in
county council in all cases where it is not vested elsewhere."). In creating the
County Council in 1968, the General Assembly granted it the power "[t]o make
appropriations and to levy taxes therefore for corporate and for educational
purposes . . . ." Act No. 982, 1968 S.C. Acts 2370, 2372. The General Assembly
gave the Board authority over the educational program for the schools and
budgetary powers, but it did not grant the Board any taxing authority. Act No.
601, 1971 S.C. Acts 1114. The 1989 amendment did not alter the financial powers
of the Board. Act. No. 288, 1989 S.C. Acts 1685. The County Council, not the
Board, was setting the millage rate at the time the council-administrator
government was chosen in the mid-1970s. The Board presented no evidence it has
ever set the millage rate for the School District. Thus, pursuant to section 4-9-70,
the County Council has the authority to set the millage rate. Consideration of
Articles VIII, X, and XI of the South Carolina Constitution does not change our
interpretation of this clear and unambiguous statute and these legislative acts.
Furthermore, as the trial court noted, the Board abandoned any challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute and acts.

AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.